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ABSTRACT
Francis Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm 
critiques the post-Cold War era. His premise is that 
liberal democracy is emerging as a global phenomenon 
because of the collapse of communism as a viable 
ideology. As a result, the states of the international 
system are then able to concentrate their efforts in 
economic maximization and in the building of an 
international consumer environment.
Fukuyama's paradigm is compared to the integration 
scholarship of David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas. As 
Fukuyama perceives nationalism becoming a less relevant 
issue in Western Europe because of the progressive 
elements of economic and political integration, Mitrany 
was one of the earlier political theorists to 
articulate that the purpose of politics was about the 
solving of practical problems of states through the 
development of functional international agencies. Haas 
believed that not only was nationalism dormant in 
Western Europe, but that its states would slowly but 
surely relinquish their sovereignty because of pressure 
from economic and political groups interested in the 
development of a a supranational Europe. What Haas came 
to realize, however, was that the concepts of 
sovereignty and self-determination remain important 
variables in certain regions of Western Europe.
The purpose of this dissertation, then, is to 
examine the clash between economic maximization and the 
role of ideas in Western Europe focusing particularly 
on a state not known for its nationalistic fervor. This 
dissertation examines the British Conservative Party’s 
and the Scottish National Party's (SNP) position 
regarding devolution (the Union) and the future scope 
of the European Union. The SNP is important to analyze 
because it offers a radical alternative to the status 
quo and, moreover, this project examines the Party's 
internal divisions over the EU and its relevance to the 
devolution principle. There are certain factions within 
the Tory Party which perceive the establishment of a 
single currency as detrimental to parliamentary 
sovereignty and that there should be a repatriation of 
functions back to the member states. This empirical 
exercise adds credibility to the argument that despite 
the alleged and perceived benefits of further economic 
and political integration, there are political groups 
who perceive certain issues, like self-determination, 
worth defending. In a liberal democracy there can exist 
clashes over fundamental issues. This, thus, offers a 
sound contribution to the End of History debate.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the Summer of 1989, the journal National 
Interest published Francis Fukuyama’s widely-read 
article ’’The End of History?”1 At the time Owen 
Harries, who served (and continues to serve) as the 
journal’s editor, was searching for a philosophical 
piece that would serve as a reflection of the 
contemporary international scene of that year; he 
wanted, as Harries explained, a piece that would "link 
history with the great traditions of political 
thought,"2 Harries believed that Fukuyama’s article, 
which was originally a lecture he delivered before the 
Committee of Social Thought at the University of 
Chicago in February 1989, to be a "provocative, 
stimulating essay, just what the times needed,"3 *
Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm is an 
intriguing commentary on the contemporary political 
culture of the post-Cold War world. His basic premise 
is that liberal democracy has become a global 
phenomenon as a result of the collapse of communism as 
a viable and working ideology,1 Fukuyama’s End of
1 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," The 
National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18.
2 James Atlas, "What is Fukuyama Saying? And to 
Whom is He Saying it?" New York Times Magazine, 22 
October 1989, 40.
3 Ibid.
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the 
Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992).
2History paradigm suggests that economics, rather than 
the ideological rivalry that consumed the Cold War 
period, will now preoccupy the activity of states in 
the international community,5 National capitals, 
Fukuyama asserts, can concentrate their efforts on 
economic maximization and on the building of a global 
consumer culture,6
Fukuyama1s End of History paradigm produced a 
plethora of commentary from political pundits and 
scholars. Commentaries have criticized Fukuyama for 
misinterpreting the writings of Hegel and Kojeve and 
for overlooking the obvious empirical fact that 
conflict and political turmoil is still in progress in 
certain regions of the globe such as Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union,7 In Eastern Europe political 
uncertainty also includes the economic and political
5 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and 
the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 
Ltd., 1995), xiii.
6 Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 18.
7 Joseph McCamey, "The End of History?, "
Questions of Ideology, no. 1 (July 1993): 1-21; John 
J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in 
Europe after the Cold War," International Security,
Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990): 5-56; Margot Norman, "The 
End of History: Is it Really All Bunk?," The Sunday 
Telegraph, 8 March 1992, iii; Richard Peet, "The End of 
History ... Or its Beginnings?" Professional Geography, 
Vol. 43, No. 4 (November 1991): 512-519; Stephen 
Sestanovich, "Response to Fukuyama," National Interest, 
no. 16 (Summer 1989): 32-35; Norman Stone, "A New 
World Order," The Sunday Times, 1 March 1992, Sec. 7,
1; Judith Weinraub, "The End of History; Well, Not 
Quite," International Herald Tribune, 19 March 1992,
18; and George F. Will, "History Revs its Engine," 
Newsweek, 25 September 1995, 28.
3challenges of democratic transformation,8 Other 
commentaries have concentrated their critique of the 
End of History paradigm by taking a new look at the 
economic and social problems of the United States,9 
Moreover, there is the question of whether or not 
capitalism — as understood and perceived by Western 
states — is compatible with regions like Asia and the 
Middle East,10 Finally, Fukuyama further provoked 
political theorists to ponder the ethical difficulties 
of liberal democracy at the end of the historical 
process.11
There is a paucity of literature, however, 
commenting upon the impact of End of History paradigm 
on the contemporary political scene of Western Europe. 
Fukuyama asserts that his End of History hero,
8 Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution 
in Europe (New York: Time Books, 1990) and Vladimir 
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from 
Stalin to Havel (New York: The Free Press, 1992).
9 Francis Fukuyama, "Race and Culture," The 
National Interest, no. 38 (Winter 1994/95): 97-103; 
James Kurth, "The Real Clash," The National Interest, 
no. 37 (Fall 1994): 3-15; Claes G. Ryn, "Democracy 
Boosters," The National Review, 24 March 1989, 30-32 
and 52; and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting 
of America: Reflections on a Multicultural America (New 
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1992).
10 Benjamin Barber, "Jihad v. McWorld, " The 
Atlantic Monthly, March 1992, 56-63 and Samuel P. 
Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.
11 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global 
Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993); Samuel P. Huntington, 
"No Exit: The Errors of Endism," The National Interest, 
no. 17 (Fall 1989): 3-11; and Leszek Kolakowsky, 
"Uncertainties in a Democratic Age," Journal of 
Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990): 47-50.
4Alexandre Kojeve, believed the European Community to be 
an "appropriate institutional embodiment of the end of 
history."12 West Europeans came to an ideological 
consensus at the end of the Second World War because
they no longer faced "great political goals to struggle 
for and [that they] could [therefore] preoccupy 
themselves with economic activity alone."13 While the 
pace of the European integration process is dependent 
upon the political willingness of the EC’s member 
states/4 Fukuyama notes that the economic and political 
challenges that politicians like John Major and Helmut 
Kohl face in pursuing integration are simply 
"subsidiary" issues.15 As in any other liberal 
democracy, Fukuyama observes, interest groups and 
political parties articulate political differences over 
issues of economic maximization and social welfare;
12 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
67.
13 Ibid.
11 Read, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate 
or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case 
of Western Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed.,
International Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1968), 177-230; Alan S. Milward, The Frontier 
of National Sovereignty: History and Theory, 1945-1992, 
with F.M.B. Lynch, R. Ranteri, F. Romero, and V. 
Sorenson (London: Routledge, 1993); and Andrew 
Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act,” in 
Robert 0. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The New 
European Community: Decisionmaking and Intstitutional 
Change (Boulder" Westview Press, 1991), 41-85.
15 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, at the RAND 
Corporation, in Washington DC (USA), 16 December 1993. 
See Appendix A for a complete transcript of this 
interview.
5however, the "broad framework of the house" remains 
intact.16
In this study, the End of History paradigm is 
compared and contrasted to the integration scholarship 
of David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas. Like Fukuyama, both 
Mitrany and Haas conclude nationalism to be 
anachronistic to economic and social progress in 
international politics. In particular, Mitrany 
emphasized in his earliest work that practical politics 
should now work towards alleviating economic and social 
problems through the development of functional 
international agencies.17 The problems of environmental 
degradation and the depletion of national resources, 
the functionalists argue, demand a global response.18 
Building upon the work of Mitrany, Haas believed that 
the influence and overall merits of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) would "spillover" into other 
functions of the state at the regional, rather than the 
global, level.19 For the neo-functionalist, then, "the 
growth of central institutions and the shift in the 
locus of authority from the national and the 
supranational took on great importance..."20
16 Ibid.
lz David Mitrany, Progress of International 
Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933}.
18 Anne McLaren, "I-Iomo Sapiens: The Third 
Revolution," Science and Public Affairs, (Winter 1994) : 
8-12.
19 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe’ Political, 
Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1968) .
20 Emil J. Kirchner, "The European Community: A 
Transnational Democracy?" in Ian Budge and David McKay,
6This dissertation challenges the above 
assumptions. The difficulty with Fukuyama’s analysis in 
particular is that his paradigm underestimates the role 
of national identity and the power of ideas in certain 
regions of even Western Europe. The creation of the 
European Union pertains to the building of new economic 
and political institutions. This includes the 
completion of the European Monetary Union, the 
strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament, 
and, at the intergovernmental level, the establishment 
of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Home 
and Judicial Affairs.21 As will be shown in this study, 
these novel conditions of statecraft pose for some West 
Europeans a direct and fundamental challenge to their 
understanding of concepts such as political 
accountability and sovereignty.
While there are those who argue that the creation 
of the single market would foster job opportunities and 
influence free trade with other markets worldwide,22 the 
recasting the "European Bargain” cannot be attained, as 
Sandholtz and Zysman seem to suggest, by the sheer 
alleviation of technical questions and the creation of 
a wider consumer culture.23 The argument developed in
eds., Developing Democracy: Comparative Research in 
Honor of J.F.P. Blondel (London: Sage Publications,
Ltd., 1994), 253.
21 Werner Iloyer, "The Shape of the Union after 
1996," European Brief, Vol. 2, No. 7 (June 1995): 7.
22 Ibid.
23 Wayne Sandholtz and John Zysman, "1992:
Recasting the European Bargain," World Politics, Vol.
42, No. 1 (December 1989): 101.
7this study is that despite the perceived and purported 
benefits of economic and political integration, there 
are certain groups who perceive certain issues, like 
self-determination, worth defending and more important 
than these gains. After all, what prompted the Swiss 
electorate to reject membership into the European 
Economic Area in 1992 or, a year later, to adopt an 
initiative "designed to reduce road traffic in the 
Alps, thus complicating the bilateral negotiations 
between Switzerland and the EU over transportation 
policy [?]"24 Can the integration process be validated 
merely by the opening of Honda and Mazda plants across 
the western part of the European continent? Is what is 
good for Ford and Renault good for Europe?
Finally, this empirical exercise takes as its case 
study the clash between economic maximization and 
national identity within the United Kingdom, a state 
not known for its nationalistic fervor. This study 
concentrates on the continuing role of national 
identity and state sovereignty by examining the 
Scottish National Party’s (SNP) and the British 
Conservative and Unionist Party’s position regarding 
devolution (the Union) and the future scope of the 
European Union. For the SNP, Scotland is a nation (and 
was a state) in its own right because it possesses its 
own education and legal system and, moreover, its own
24 Thomas Bernauer, "The Swiss Switch to a World 
Role," European Brief, Vol. 2, No. 7 (June 1995): 21. 
For more on the Swiss Re^endum, see Keesing Ts Record 
of World Events, Vol. 38, No. 12 (1992): 39244-39245.
8unique sense of sovereignty,25 In understanding the 
devolution debate, the Liberal Democrat leader Paddy 
Ashdown eloquently summarizes the UK’s political 
predicament:
The ’’end of history" brigade should note the irony. At 
just the moment when Western liberal democracy in 
concert with liberal market capitalism became 
triumphant over authoritarian command societies, our 
present nineteenth century model of parliamentary 
democracy seems itself to be reaching the limits of its 
own utility and effectiveness. As democracy takes root 
in countries around the world previously dominated by 
one-party rule and dictatorship, parliamentary 
democracy seems more ineffective than at any time since 
the Second World War,26
While the Labor Party perceives the House of Commons as 
an overcentralized political entity,27 its solutions to 
overcentralization are essentially functional and, as 
this dissertation asserts, fails to address the 
influence and role of national identity in contemporary 
British politics.
The Tories, however, perceive the Union as 
sacrosanct because it is a political entity which has 
evolved piecemeal over the past three centuries. The 
Union for the Conservatives can be construed as how 
Danah Zohar defines her understanding of society as a
25 Paul H. Scott, Scotland in Europe: Dialogue with 
a Skeptical Friend (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1992), 
15-31.
26 Paddy Ashdown, "Democratic Renewal, " in Michael 
Foley, ed., Ideas that Shape Politics (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1994), 199. See also 
Lindsay Patterson, The Autonomy of Modern Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994).
27 John McAllion, "Westminsterized, ” Scottish Trade 
Union Review/ No. 63, March-April 1994, 18. For details 
on the proposed Scottish Assembly, see Scotland's 
Parliament. Scotland's Right (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Constitutional Convention, 1995).
9a free-dance company, each member a soloist in his or 
her own right but moving creatively in harmony with the 
others = 28
Moreover, the analysis below highlights the various 
strands of thought which emerge within both the Tory 
Party and the SNP over the constraints and future 
possibilities of the UK’s historic institutions and 
practices within Europe and Britain itself. Does the 
SNP’s "Independence in Europe" campaign, for example, 
replace one centralized political entity with that of 
another? Is the devolution process an impediment or 
means to Scottish independence? The different strands 
of thought within the SNP and the Tory Party challenge, 
then, the End. of History paradigm because they place 
cherished beliefs (like democracy, sovereignty, and the 
Union) under public scrutiny and assert them to be more 
important than "subsidiary" issues. This dissertation 
does not treat these ideas as abstract variables; 
rather, they are "ideas in motion," which reflect "the 
contemporary milieu of social drives, political 
movements and contemporary issues . ”29
This dissertation outlines its argument in the 
following manner. This study is divided into three 
parts, of which the first part is its theoretical 
dimension. Chapter II, for example, is essentially a 
critique of Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm. This
28 Danah Zohar and Ian Marshall, The Quantum 
Society: Mind, Physics, and a Hew Social Vision (New 
York: William Morow and Company, Inc., 1994), 21.
29 Michael Foley, "Introduction, " in Foley, Ideas 
that Shape Politics, 2.
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chapter analyzes what Fukuyama means by the concept of 
"history" and what he perceives as the driving forces 
behind the historical process leading society in 
establishing liberal democratic institutions. This 
chapter also scrutinizes the literature by highlighting 
the general pitfalls to the End of History paradigm. It 
looks, for example, at the writings of the scholar 
Samuel P. Huntington and his alternative theories to 
those of Fukuyama's work.
The following chapter, chapter III, continues the
dissertation's theoretical evaluation by comparing the
End of Hi story paradigm to the writings ?Mitrany and 
A-
Haas. In particular, this chapter outlines Mitrany's 
reasoning for the development of functional 
international agencies. Chapter III highlights 
Mitrany’s skeptical attitude to the system of states 
and how , functionalist approach might be suited to 
alleviating economic and social difficulties in the 
modern world. This chapter then outlines Haas’ 
objections to Mitrany's functionalist approach. The 
essential criticism for Haas revolves around Mitrany's 
use of the technician and, more importantly, for 
eschewing a clear and concise approach as to how such 
institutions might emerge. As well, this chapter looks 
at the criteria Haas defines in the neo-functionalist 
approach as a way of ascertaining Europe’s development 
of federal (or supranational) institutions.
Finally this chapter looks at some of the 
inadequacies of Haas' neo-functionalist approach. In
11
his later work, for example, Haas attempted to explain 
why the "spillover" effect fell short of neo­
functionalist expectations.30 Building upon the specific 
inadequacies of integration scholarship, this chapter 
looks at certain internal political and social 
difficulties ^nct attempts to analyze the challenges 
that economic maximization fail to give sufficient 
weight to. It concludes by examining why political 
ideas continue to matter in West European politics.
The next two parts constitute the empirical aspect 
of this study. Chapter IV applies a macrolevel analysis
to the tension of economic maximization and the role of
ideas by highlighting a variety of political themes 
that have emerged in the European integration process 
since 1945 to the present day. This part demonstrates 
that themes related to the End of History paradigm have 
manifested themselves in the writings of Jean Monnet 
and Alteiro Spinelli. Their writings highlight tensions 
between a "functional" approach and a "ideological" 
approach to European integration. The "functional" and 
"ideological" approach to European integration can also 
be found in the writings of Walter Hallstein which can 
then be compared to the intergovernmental approach of 
Charles de Gaulle and, later, Margaret Thatcher
Chapter IV also examines the 1991 
Intergovernmental Conference which led to the EC member
30 See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, The 
Obsolescence of Regional Integration (Berkeley: 
Institute of International Studies, University of 
California, 1975).
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states signing the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In 
particular, this chapter analyzes how the concept of 
subsidiarity can be perceived as a viable approach in 
alleviating the tension between the national interest 
of the member state and the development of EU’s 
supranational institutions. By looking at a variety of 
essays, speeches, and memoirs, this dissertation can, 
more importantly, clearly demonstrate what was (and is) 
the mood of the West European political scene by 
understanding how certain politicians and statesmen 
perceived what impact the principles of integration 
would have on the political ideas which have been 
clearly part of the European political tradition as far 
back as 1789.
Chapters V and VI take up the microscopic 
dimension of this study. These chapters rely on a 
diverse number of primary sources in analyzing the 
different strands of thought in the SNP and the Tory 
Party regarding the devolution process and the future 
of the European Union. For example, SNP press releases 
and manifestos provided a general perception of the 
Party's "Independence in Europe" campaign and of its 
leadership's pragmatic (yet hesitant) analysis of 
Labor’s devolution policy. The use of personal 
interviews and speeches of the SNP leadership provided 
specific information as to how they envisioned the 
growth of the EU and how Scotland would play a vital 
role in its development. Finally, the use of political 
polls from the Scotsman and Glasgow Herald provided a
13
sample of the electorate's aspirations as to how 
Scotland best be governed at the beginning of the next 
century.
In examining the diversity of opinion within the 
Tory Party, speeches presented provided a rich source 
of information in identifying the strain between the 
perceived "inevitability" of the European Union and the 
protection of parliamentary sovereignty by certain 
anti-European Tories, The use of personal interviews 
helped provide a clearer picture of the role of ideas 
in shaping the present institutions of British 
politics. Finally, political party manifestos, press 
releases, and policy papers were utilized in this study 
of the Conservative Party.
In conclusion, the goal of this dissertation is to
demonstrate that even in liberal democracies there can 
exist clashes over fundamental issues. Fukuyama writes 
that the End of History can be seen as the end of great 
struggles.31 The late Russell Kirk, being a skeptic of 
End of History-like arguments, wrote that
[t]he best way to fight clear of dullness is to revive 
the great questions which ritualistic liberalism has 
longed ignored.... Is there something more to reality 
than this workaday world?...Is there something more to 
society than economic efficiency, and something more to 
politics than boob-bumping? If the serious reviews can 
begin to consider such questions once more, ... the Age 
of Discussion may not be over for awhile yet.32
31 Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 18.
32 Russell Kirk, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice: 
Essays of a Social Critic (Peru, Illinois: Sherwood 
Sugden and Company, Publishers, 1991}, 50.
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CHAPTER II
A CRITIQUE OF THE END OF HISTORY
INTRODUCTION
The year of 1989 was an exciting one for political 
observers. While Western Europe celebrated the 
bicentennial of the French Revolution./- it witnessed the 
downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe.1 The collapse of 
the Berlin Wall rekindled hope in the possible (and 
eventual) unification of Germany.2 With the fall of 
authoritarian regimes at the end of the twentieth 
century, an important question for historians and 
political scientists was (and continues to be) this: 
Where does History go from here?
Francis Fukuyama addressed this question in an 
article entitled ’’The End of History?”3 The advent of 
liberal democracy as a global phenomenon, Fukuyama
1 For a western account of the fall of communism in 
eastern Europe read Timothy Garton Ash, IVe the People;
The Revolution of 1989 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, 
Berlin and Prague (London: Granata Books, 1990) and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and 
Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century (New York: 
Scribners, 1989).
2 In his memoirs, the former West German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt wrote, "I must admit that neither then or 
now have we abandoned the hope of living under one roof 
someday, even though we are aware that such a day lies in 
a far distant, unforeseeable future and that until then 
it is important to preserve the cohesiveness of the 
nation" (Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political 
Retrospective, Translated from the German by Ruth Hein 
[New York: Random House, 1987), 18-19.
3 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The
National Interest 16 (Summer 1989) : 3-18.
asserts, suggests that there exists no viable 
alternatives to democracy’s ’’foundational principles,"4 
For Fukuyama, the End of History represents the end of 
the development of ideas,5 The pursuit of economics, 
Fukuyama further observes, will now preoccupy state 
policy-making,6 The question addressed in this study, 
however, is whether or not this is valid. The purpose of 
this chapter is, therefore, twofold. First, it outlines 
Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm by highlighting its 
more important reasons for his assertion that politics 
can now be concerned with "subsidiary issues,”7 This 
chapter then explores the literature by analyzing some of 
the more general critiques to Fukuyama’s work and, thus, 
builds the argument that there is more to politics than 
the mere pursuit of economic activity.
ROLE OF HISTORY
A central theme to Fukuyama’s End of History 
paradigm is the role of History, Fukuyama, an apostle of 
the nineteenth century German philosopher GWF Hegel, 
concludes History has a specific destination, which 
Fukuyama defines to be as the "ultimate triumph of 
liberal democracy."8 Fukuyama perceives History to be
4 interview with Francis Fukuyama at the RAND 
Corporation in Washington DC (USA), 16 December 1993. For 
a transcript of this interview, see Appendix A of this 
dissertation.
5 Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 4.
6 Francis Fukuyama, Trust; The Social Virtues and the 
Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, Ltd., 
1995), xiii.
7 Interview with Fukuyama,
8 Fukuyama, "End of History?,”3, See also Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992), xii-xiii.
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progressive in which, as a dialectic process, it has "a 
beginning, a middle, and an end.”9 Mankind goes through 
stages of economic and social development.10 Mankind has 
progressed from developing tribal and slave-owning 
societies to establishing domestic-egalitarian entities?1 
Fukuyama writes Hegel ’’believed that history culminated
in an absolute moment---a moment in which a final,
rational form of society and state became victorious.”12
Fukuyama analyzes Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind in 
which Hegel traced the End of History's rational form of 
society back to the Battle of Jena in 1806. For Hegel, 
Napoleon's victory at Jena signified a victory for the 
principles of liberal democracy which can trace its roots 
back to the French Revolution.13 Fukuyama defines the 
concept of liberalism as "a rule of law that recognizes 
certain individual rights or freedoms from government 
control."14 The "open society" allows for the 
establishment of political parties, interest groups and, 
moreover, a system of government "constituted so that bad 
rulers can be got rid of without bloodshed, without
9 Fukuyama, "End of History?," 4. For a critique of 
Fukuyama's understanding of Hegel read, Victor 
Gourevitch, "The End of History?," in Timothy Burns, ed.. 
After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 1994), 111-131; 
Gertrude Himmelfarb, "Response to Fukuyama," The National 
Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 24-26; and Alan Ryan, 
"Introduction," in Alan Ryan, ed.. After the End of 
History (London: Collins and Brown, Ltd., 1992), 1-6.
10 Interview with Fukuyama,
11 Fukuyama, "End of History?," 4.
12 Ibid,
13 Ibid., 4-5;
14 Fukuyama, The End of History and. the Last Man, 42,
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violence, ”15 Leszek Kolakowsky writes that the judiciary 
branch should be independent of the executive branch; 
"the law acts as an autonomous mediating device between 
individual or corporate interests and the state, and is 
not an instrument of the ruling elites,"16 This is not to 
say that there were no problems to alleviate after 1806. 
In the United States, for example, abolishing slavery and 
extending franchise to African Americans and women were 
further challenges to the universalization of liberal 
democracy.17 What Fukuyama asserts, however, is that the 
principles themselves could not be improved upon,18 The 
victory of liberalism," Fukuyama writes, "has occurred 
primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is 
yet incomplete in the real or material world."19 The 
Battle of Jena could be construed as the beginning of the 
End of History.
Fukuyama adapts Alexandre Kojeve’s interpretation of 
Iiegel,20 As Fukuyama explains, Ko j eve was part of an 
intellectual movement which concluded Hegel’s writings 
were misinterpreted by Marxism,21 To begin with, Fukuyama
15 Karl Popper, "The Open Society and its Enemies 
Revisited," The Economist, 23 April 1988, 20.
16 Leszek Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic 
Age," Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1990): 47.
17 For an excellent critique on this point, read 
Judith N. Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for 
Inclusion (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
18 Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 5,
19 Ibid,, 4,
20 Ibid.., 4-5. See also Fukuyama, The End of History 
and the Last Man, 65-67.
21 Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 4. Kojeve taught 
political philosophy at L'Ecolc Pratiques des Hautes 
Etudes in Paris. His seminars attracted rising French 
intellectuals of the time like Raymond Aron and Jean-Paul
writes that Karl Marx ’’believed that the liberal state
failed to resolve one fundamental contradiction, that of 
class conflict, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat^’’22 Marx, in other words, perceived the 
liberal state as a victory for the bourgeoisie and that, 
the universalization of freedom was incomplete?3 "The 
Marxist end of history would come only with the victory 
of the true ’universal class,’ the proletariat, and the 
subsequent achievement of a global communist utopia that 
would end class struggle once and for all."24
With the apparent failure of Marxism in the 
twentieth century, Fukuyama explains, Kojeve wished to 
restore Hegel’s understanding of universal History,25 Like 
Hegel, Kojeve concluded the Battle of Jena to signify the 
beginning of the End of History, which would result in 
the formation of the "universal and homogeneous state,"26 
As Fukuyama understood Kojeve, all men are endowed with 
certain inalienable rights and the universalization of
18
Sartre. For more on the life and work of Kojeve read, 
Allan Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990 (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 268-275 and Michael S. 
Roth, "A Problem of Recognition: Alexandre Kojeve and the 
End of History," History and Theory, Vol. 24, No. 3 
(1985): 293-306.
22 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
65.
23 For more on this point read A.J.P. Taylor’s 
Introduction to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The 
Communist Manifesto (London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1985), 
7-48.
24 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 65,
25 Ibid,
26 Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 5, See also 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 66.
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the liberal democratic state would (or should) not
exclude a specific class or group.
Kojeve believed that Western Europe reached the End
of History at the end of the Second World War. "For these
were societies with no fundamental ’contradictions’
remaining: self-satisfied and self-sustaining, they had 
no further great political goals to struggle for and 
could preoccupy themselves with economic activity 
alone/'"7 For Ko j eve, the creation of the European 
Community was one of the End of History11 s great 
manifestations.27 8 Believing History had fulfilled its 
course, Fukuyama explains, Kojeve relegated "the study of 
philosophy to the weekends" and worked on the problems of 
economics as an EC bureaucrat, until his death in 1968.29
THE DRIVING FORCES OF HISTORY
27 Fukuyama, The End of History and the fast Man, 67.
28 Ibid. In his book, Fukuyama refers to Kojeve’s 
letters of correspondence with Leo Strauss of the 
University of Chicago in which they debated the question 
of the End of History. This interesting discussion can be 
found in Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, Revised and Expanded 
Edition, including the Strauss-Kojeve Correspondence, 
edited by Victor Gourevitch and Michael S. Roth (New 
York: The Free Press, 1991). For a discussion and 
critique of Fukuyama’s understanding of Kojeve, read 
Allan Bloom, "Response to Fukuyama," The National 
Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 19-21; Tom Darby, 
"Technology, Christianity, and the Universal and 
Homogeneous State," in Burns, After History?, 197-217; 
and Joseph McCamey, "The End of History?," Questions of 
Ideology, 1 (June 1993): 1-21
29 Fukuyama, Trust; The Social Virtues and the 
Creation of Prosperity, xiii. In following Kojeve’s 
example Fukuyama writes, "In the light of this 
progression, it seemed only natural that I also should 
follow my own The End of History and the Last Man with a 
book about economics" (ibid.).
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What directs History to the inevitable conclusion of 
liberal democracy? In Tho End of History and tho Last 
Man, Fukuyama defines the driving forces of History as 
technological development and the struggle for 
recognition.30 The first is based upon the work of Emile 
Durkheim and Max Weber.31 Modernization, Fukuyama asserts, 
"posited that industrial development followed a certain 
coherent pattern of growth, and would in time produce 
certain uniform social and political structures across 
different countries and cultures."32 In acquiring 
technology, Fukuyama argues, man is able to improve 
society’s economic base and, as a result, he is able to 
obtain employment so to satisfy his consumer needs.33
Fukuyama also asserts that technological progress 
leads to the modernization of the state.34 Technological 
progress breaks down traditional forms of social 
organization (for example, tribal and sect) with 
urbanization and centralization. The building of roads, 
the development of mass communication "make possible an 
expansion in the size of markets, which in turn 
facilitate the realization of economies of scale through 
rationalization of the organization of labor.’’35 It
30 Fukuyama, The End ot History and the Last Man,
xiii.
31 For example, read Emile Durkheim, The Division of 
Labor in Society (New York: The Free Press, 1964) and Max 
Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
edited by Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1947).
32 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 68.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., xiv-xv , 7 6-79.
35 Ibid., 77
requires, Fukuyama argues, workers to be ready to 
relocate and learn new skills in a competitive economic 
market. "Such societies become increasingly linked with 
one another through global markets and the spread of a 
universal consumer culture . "3(S
Fukuyama writes that technological development does 
not necessarily result in the creation of the liberal 
democratic state.36 7 Modern day Thailand and Singapore, 
while they are economically advanced, cannot be described 
says Fukuyama as paragons of the liberal democratic 
state.38 "[Economic interpretations of history are 
incomplete and unsatisfying," Fukuyama explains, "because 
man is not simply an economic animal."39
The second driving force of History is what Fukuyama 
refers to as the struggle for recognition. Man, as a 
rational being, has a conscious desire (or need) to be 
recognized as someone of value and worth and, thus, 
possesses certain inalienable rights which the state 
cannot suppress.40 Fukuyama relates the concept of 
recognition back to the ancient Greeks in which they 
defined it as thymes, translated by Fukuyama to mean 
"spiritedness."41 The concept of recognition can be seen
36 ibid., xv.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., xvi.
40 A powerful example of the concept of recognition 
can be found in Vaclav Havel's dramatic essay "Power of 
the Powerless," in Vaclav Havel, Living in Truth, Edited 
by Jan Vladislav (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1986), 
36-123.
41 Fred Halliday points out that Fukuyama's 
understanding of thymes comes from Allan Bloom’s 
translation of Plato's The Republic. See Fred Halliday,
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as a basis for nationalism/2 Paul IE Scott, for example, 
observes that the recognition of Scotland as a nation in 
its own right is a strong manifestation of the principle 
of self-determination endorsed by the Charter of the 
United. Nations/3 Jim Fairlie, who was a member of the 
National Executive Committee of the Scottish National 
Party,42 43 4 45eloquently writes about the cultural and social 
dilemmas of Scotland living under British rule:
Nationalists of long standing have always felt slightly 
ambivalent about the nature of their pride in Scotland. 
We tend to be proud of the contribution that Scots have 
made to humanity particularly in the fields of 
engineering and medicine, let at the same time ive feci 
angry and ashamed that so many of our people have failed 
to benefit from those contributions. There has always 
been a certain pride in the warm heartedness and 
generosity of Scots when it comes to raising money for 
charity — especially English charities — and anger at 
the way in which they have allowed themselves to be 
exploited f5
In his book, Fukuyama links the concept of thvmos to 
courage and self-esteem. As Fukuyama writes,
Conversely, when people fail to live up to their worth, 
they feel shame, and when they are evaluated correctly in 
proportion to their worth, they feel pride. The desire 
for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger.
"An Encounter with Fukuyama/’ New Left Review, no. 193 
(May/June 1992): 93.
42 The struggle of recognition, as related to the 
concept of nationalism, is discussed in the text below. A 
fuller discussion of nationalism in Western Europe is 
discussed in Chapter III of this study.
43 Paul IE Scott, Scotland in Europe: Dialogue with a
Skeptical Friend Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1992), 15.
This issue will be explored in Chapter V of this 
dissertation.
44 For a brief biographical sketch of Jim Fairlie, 
see Chapter V of this dissertation.
45 Jim Fairlie, "I Am Not a Nationalist, But...,’1 in 
David Rollo, ed., The Scotland We Seek (Oban: Scots 
Independent (Newspapers) Limited, 1987), 8-9. (Emphasis 
added.)
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shame, and pride, are parts of the human personality 
critical to political life/6
Thymes, Fukuyama concludes, constitutes "the desire for 
recognition around which the historical transition to 
modernity can be understood,"46 7
FUKUYAMA’S CRITIQUE OF REALISM
Fukuyama writes that Hegel’s End of History provided
some optimism in the nineteenth century, even though it 
was a period of war and revolution. Man’s general success 
in conquering the natural sciences reinforced that 
optimism. Mankind would be able to improve the quality 
of human life by obtaining a fuller control of poverty 
and disease through the progress of the natural 
sciences?8 "Nature, long man’s adversary, would be 
mastered by modern technology and made to serve the end 
of human happiness."49 The spread of the ideal of the 
universal and homogeneous state, Fukuyama argues, would 
allow man to live freely. "Blind obedience to authority 
would be replaced by rational self-government, in which 
all men, free and equal, would have to obey no masters 
but themselves."50 The nineteenth century, for Fukuyama, 
was seen as a time of man determining his own destiny. 
Rationalism would be the prevailing political and social 
thought.
46 Fukuyama, The End ot History and the Last Man,
xvii.
47 Ibid,, 182.
48 For a discussion on this point, read William II. 
McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (London: Penguin Books, 
Ltd., 1994), 217-269.
49 Fukuyama, The End. of History and the Last Man, 4,
50 Ibid,
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In the twentieth century, however, Fukuyama observes 
that optimism had turned to pessimism. Man's progress in 
technology did not coincide with man's progress in 
morality. "Without the latter," Fukuyama writes, "the 
power of technology will simply be turned for evil 
purposes, and mankind will be worse off than it was 
previously."51 The use of technology to build weapons of 
destruction resulted in the devastating magnitude of the 
First World War.52 This sense of pessimism continued with 
the rise of Fascism in Europe in which Hitler’s goal was 
to purify the Aryan race of human aberration.53 The advent 
of Communism after Second World War in Eastern Europe 
placed into question whether or not History was a 
progressive phenomenon.54
After the Second World War, the prevailing theory in 
international relations was (and continues to be) the 
Realist paradigm. Twentieth century Realists like Hans 
Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger, Fukuyama asserts, adhered 
to the view that directional history - that is history- 
resulting in the universal acknowledgment of man’s
51 Ibid., 6. (Emphasis in original.)
52 For an interesting assessment on this point, read 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on 
the Eve of the 21st Century (New York: A Robert Stewart 
Book, 1993), 1-45.
53 For example, read Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1973) and Carl J. Freidrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, 
Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965).
54 For more on the nature and rise of Communism, read 
Vladislav Krasnov, "The Resumption of History," Modern 
Age, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Fall 1991): 53-61 and Vladimir 
Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from 
Stalin to Havel (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 39-89.
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inalienable rights - is a myth/5 History is the story of 
struggle and conquest and insecurity is part of the 
global political framework,55 6 "In the absence of an 
international sovereign," as Fukuyama writes in 
describing the Realist paradigm, "each state will be 
potentially threatened by every other state, and will
have no other remedy for its security other than taking 
up arms in its own defence,"57
Realism, which can trace its origins back to the 
time of Machiavelli, explains the world as it actually 
is,58 Power, as part of the actual world, is a measure of 
a state’s influence in shaping international relations. 
"States seek to survive under anarchy," John J. 
Mearsheimer further writes, "by maximizing the power 
relative to other states,,,"59 "Other forms of power such 
as natural resources or industrial capacity are 
important," Fukuyama also observes, "but primarily as a
55 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
245. For example, read Henry Kissinger, A World Restored 
(London: Victor Goloncz, 1977) and Hans Morgenthau, 
Politics among Nations, edited by Kenneth Thompson, Sixth 
Edition (New York: Knoph, 1985).
56 For background to the Realist paradigm, read 
William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, International 
Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in 
Interpretation (London: Harper Collins, 1991), 42-45.
57 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,,
247 .
58 Ibid., 24 6. For background reading on 
Machiavelli’s work, read George Bull's Introduction to 
Machiavelli, The Prince, translated by George Bull
(Harmondsworth, Penguin Books., Ltd., 1981), 9-28 and 
Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and 
History in Sixteenth Century Florence (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1965).
59 John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability
in Europe after the Post Cold War World," International 
Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990): 12.
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means of creating the military capabilities for self­
defence o "60
The continued adherence to a pessimistic perspective 
of international relations,- for Fukuyama, is an 
unwillingness to concede to the possibility of the end of 
ideological competition. "To assert that things cannot 
get better,” Fukuyama writes, "is to undercut the hopes 
for better lives of the people who actually live in those 
countries [fighting against communism]."61 In particular, 
Fukuyama finds the Realist paradigm to be based upon two 
questionable foundations: "an impermissible reductionism 
concerning the motives and behavior of human societies, 
and failure to address the question of history."62
For Fukuyama, the concept of self-preservation alone 
does not explain why states in the international system 
are belligerent. States go to war because of the struggle 
for recognition.63 "Like giant thymotic individuals, 
[states] seek acknowledgment of their value or dignity on 
dynastic, religious, nationalist, or ideological grounds, 
and in the process force other states either to fight or 
submit."64 For Fukuyama the struggle of ideas, however, 
has moved on. This is because, unlike what the Realist 
paradigm asserts, History is a progressive phenomenon. 
The Realist paradigm, on the other hand, understands
60 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
249.
61 Francis Fukuyama, "A Reply to My Critics, " The 
National Interest, 18 (Winter 1989/1990): 24.
62 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
254.
63 Ibid., 255.
64 Ibid.
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History to be "immune from the evolutionary processes 
taking place around it.”65 For Fukuyama, History is not a 
static entity because Man’s behavior in, for example, 
international relations evolves. While a sceptic of the 
End of History paradigm66, even John Lewis Gaddis notes 
the concept of integration as a growing trend in the 
post-Cold War world.67
For Gaddis, the integration process manifests itself 
in many forms. Gaddis identifies three. The first form of 
integration is the communications revolution, "which has 
made it impossible for- any nation to deny its citizens 
knowledge of what is going on elsewhere."68 The 
communications revolution played a major role in bringing 
about the collapse of authoritarian regimes. It was 
impossible, for example, for the regimes of Eastern 
Europe not to be exposed to Western television or to 
evidence of a better way of life.69 Gaddis concludes that 
the communications revolution set into motion a
democratic domino effect, "in which the achievement of 
liberty in one country causes repressive regimes to 
topple, or at least to wobble, in others."70
65 ibid., 258.
66 John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory 
and the End of the Cold War," International Security,
Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/1993): 44-45.
67 John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War 
World," in Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkoph, eds., The 
Future of American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1992), 17.
68 Ibid.
69 Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution In 
Europe (New York: Times Book), 25.
70 Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 17.
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Gaddis also cites the integration of ideas.71 Through 
glasnost and perestroika, for example, Mikhail Gorbachev 
opened the door to the free exchange of ideas and to the 
opportunity of implementing .economic and market 
techniques from the West.72 Communism could no longer 
control public dialogue. "Gorbachev's restraint on the 
use of force,” Jeane Kirkpatrick also writes, 
"transformed the situation in Europe, opened the way for
a democratic revolution and altered relations with the 
United States and Western Europe.”73 Dahrendorf cites the 
integration of ideas as the unification of language.74 
Europeans no longer require "ideological translation." 
Terms like "human rights" and "democracy" became 
synonymous in the European context. There is no longer an 
Orwellian doublespeak. "Conversation, discussion can 
actually change views. We have entered an era of 
change. ”75
Finally, there is economic integration. In a global 
economy, it is difficult for a state (authoritarian or 
democratic) to isolate itself from the outside.76 "As 
modern technology unfolds," Fukuyama writes, "it shapes 
national economies in a coherent fashion, interlocking
71 Ibid., 18.
72 Jonathan Steele, "The End of History, " Marxism 
Today, November 1989, 27.
73 Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Beyond the Cold War, " Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 1 (1990): 3.
74 Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in 
Europe, 14.
75 Ibid., 15.
76 Ibid.
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them in a vast global economy,"77 What happens to one 
state’s economy can then have a profound effect world­
wide,78 The importance of economic integration is most 
vividly seen in the western part of the European 
continent,79 The Scottish National Party’s "Independence 
in Europe" campaign, for example, is based on the fact 
that economic and political influence is shifting away 
from Westminster in London to the European Union (EU) in 
Brussels.80 The government of Finland believes that EU 
membership will open to the Finnish people new markets in 
the western part of Europe. Lauri Korpinen, Finland’s 
Minister on European Community affairs, stated:
...Finland’s application was a logical continuation of 
our traditional policies of integration. For us, it has 
always been indispensable to maintain close economic 
relations with other Western countries. to have access to 
capital, technology, and. markets,81
Like Finland, the state of Austria perceives EU 
membership to be a "means to diversify its relations with 
the other nations of Western Europe." Furthermore,
Open and unrestricted market access will undoubtedly 
provide us with new and interesting business
77 Fukuyama, Trust: The Social virtues and the 
Creation of Prosperity, 3-4.
78 Francis Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism, " 
Commentary, (February 1994): 26.
79 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V 
of this dissertation.
80 For example, read Jim Sillars, No Turning Back:
The Case for Scottish Independence within the European 
Community and How We Face the Challenge of 1992. August 
1988. This issue will be covered in Chapter V of this 
dissertation.
81 Lauri Korpinen, "Finland and the northern 
Extension of the European Union, " Speech to the Scottish 
Branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
University of Aberdeen in Aberdeen Scotland (UK), 11 May 
1994. (Emphasis added.)
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opportunities, hopefully also in the field of agriculture
--  an area where bilateral trade suffered greatly when
Austria and Britain chose different European paths in 
1973.82 83
This sort of struggle for power, for Fukuyama, can be 
positive in the sense that "it is a sort of power 
struggle that can be pursued indefinitely by both 
countries to their mutual benefit, and to the benefit of 
the region as a whole which will have access to ever 
cheaper products. "S3
The End of History paradigm, Fukuyama asserts, 
allows for the states of the international community to 
preoccupy more of their time in alleviating economic and 
social problems within the domestic sphere.84 A liberal
82 Alois Mock, "Britain and Austria — Common 
European Interests," Closing Statements to the 
Participants of the First Anglo-Austrian Forum in London, 
15 April 1994.
83 Fukuyama, The End of History and. the Last Man,
257.
84 The problem here, however, is that not all states 
in the international community are democratic. This is 
because economic development, for Fukuyama, has 
limitations as to how homogenized societies can become 
(interview with Fukuyama), and, thus, lowers the 
expectations of whether or not all "countries are equally 
capable of sustaining stable democracies", in which a 
prime example is the Islamic world (Francis Fukuyama,
"The Beginning of Foreign Policy, The Mew Republic, 17 
August 1992, 30). Fukuyama notes that the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism was the result of regional discontent with 
Western values and ideals (Fukuyama, "The End of 
History?," 14-18). Ali Mazrui cites the controversy over 
the publication of the Satanic Verses as a "dialogue of 
the deaf between the West and the world of Islam" (Ali 
Mazrui, Cultural Forces in World Politics [London: James 
Curry, Ltd., 1990], 83). As Samuel P. Huntington notes, 
the next century will witness a "Clash of Civilizations," 
in which conflicts of global politics will occur between 
nations and groups of different civilizations" (Samuel P. 
Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 [Summer 1993]: 22). What must be 
asserted, Gertrude Himmelfarb argues, is that "not all 
countries are disposed or committed to free institutions"
31
democratic state’s duty, Fukuyama writes, is to eradicate 
the sort of social inequality which "is traceable to 
human convention, , »"85 These forms of social inequality, 
Fukuyama observes, include castes, class by race, and 
gender,86 "The dynamism of capitalist economics," Fukuyama 
observes, "tends to break down many conventional and 
cultural barriers to equality through its continuously 
changing demand for labor,"87 The variety of cultural and 
social attributes of a state, Fukuyama writes, will have 
to constantly adapt to the changing needs of a 
competitive international market which requires educated 
and skilled workers?8 "Without universal literacy and 
education, without a high degree of social mobility and 
occupations open to talent rather than privilege, 
capitalist societies would not work, or could not work as 
efficiently as they could."89
For Fukuyama, the End of History paradigm does not 
mean the end of politics,90 This means that issues of 
recognition and the "struggles over the economic and the 
share of the pie" will continue to take place within the
(Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The Dark and Bloody Crossroads: 
Where Nationalism and Religion Meet," The National 
Interest, 32 [Summer 1993]: 60).
85 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 
289-290.
86 Francis Fukuyama, "The Future of Equality, " The 
National Interest, 38 (Winter 1994/95): 98.
87 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
290.
88 Fukuyama, "The Future of Equality," 100.
89 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
90 Fukuyama, "The End of History?," 4.
290.
confines of the principles of liberal democracy/1 In 
regard to the role of politics, as Fukuyama observes, 
there continues to be many fights over recognition which 
includes gay rights and race relations/2 There is also 
the advent of the "genderquake" in which, for example, 
women are fighting for equal representation in Labour and 
Scottish National Party politics/3 The pursuit for gender 
equality, as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese notes, is based on 
"its convincing appeal to liberal values, notably 
equality (purported fairness) and individual rights."* 92 93 94 5
While modern democracies have taken the responsibility of 
regulating business and redistributing income from the 
rich to the poor, Fukuyama further observes, how these 
economic and social problems are alleviated will differ 
from one liberal democratic state to the next/5 The
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95 Interview with Fukuyama.
92 Ibid.
93 Naomi Wolf coined the term "genderquake” in fire 
with Fire: The New Female Power and How it Will Change 
the 21st Century (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 29-40. 
For gender politics in the UK read, Catriona Burness, 
"Drunk Women Don’t Look at Thistles: Women and the SNP, 
1934-94," Scotlands, 2 (1994): 131-155; Joanne Robertson, 
"Women in Labour," The Sunday Times — Scotland, 10 
September 1995, 5-8; and Robert Tait, "Women Ready to 
Share in Bright New Dawn," Evening Times (Glasgow), 28 
November 1995, 40. At a general level, read Betty 
Friedman, "Time to Transcend Sexual Politics," Newsweek,
4 September 1995, 16-17; A.A. Gill, "Sister Act," The 
Sunday Times, 23 January 1994, Sec. 3, 1-2; James 
Langton, "Nineties Feminists Do it by the Book," The 
Sunday Telegraph, 14 Novenber 1993, 9; and Kenneth L. 
Woodward, "The Pope's Voice in Beijing," Newsweek, 4 
September 1995, 56.
94 Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, "Letters: The Real Clash," 
The National Interest, 38 (Winter 1994/95): 103.
(Emphasis added.)
95 Interview with Fukuyama.
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responsibility for social welfare in the liberal 
democratic state "differs from Social Security and 
Medicaid in the United States to the more comprehensive 
welfare systems of Germany or Sweden."96
CRITIQUE OF THE END OF HISTORY
In his work, Fukuyama discusses the concept of
nationalism as a possible impediment to the End of 
History paradigm.97 In this section,- Fukuyama’s 
observations are compared to what his critics have 
written on this possible obstacle to the paradigm’s 
assertion that History has moved on to the economic 
realm. While there is evidence of integration, as Gaddis 
argues, there is also evidence of fragmentation in
international relations in which the latter "forces have 
begun to manifest themselves with unexpected strength, 
just when it looked as though integration was about to 
prevail.’’98 What is demonstrated here is that:
History has not ended but has become compressed. Whereas 
in the past, historical epochs stood out in relatively 
sharp relief, and could thus have a defined sense of 
historical progression, history today entails sharp 
discontinuities that collide with each other, condense 
our sense of perspective, and confuse our historical 
perceptions.99
This section also looks at Fukuyama's argument and 
understanding of the Last Man. Economic activity,
96 Fukuyama, The End ot History and the Last Man,
290.
97 Fukuyama, "End of History?," 14-18. It should be 
noted here that the concepts of nationalism and state 
sovereignty in respect to the policies of the Scottish 
National Party and the British Conservative and Unionist 
Party will dominate the latter part of this dissertation.
98 Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 18.
99 Brzezinski, Out of Control, ix-x.
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Fukuyama explains,- has turned man into "contemptible”100 
beings who are only interested in satisfying his consumer 
desires and needs. The battle of ideas, for the Last Man, 
has lost its significance. Again, is there more to 
politics than the sheer pursuit of economic and material 
gain? Or has the West, as John Galbraith laments, reached 
a "Culture of Contentment"?101
A. NATIONALISM
Nationalism may be seen as a recent political 
phenomenon tracing its roots back to the American and 
French Revolutions which brought forth the principles of 
liberal democracy.102 "Under the weight of nationalism," 
Fukuyama writes, "multinational empires of the Hapsburgs 
and Ottomans began to collapse."103 Alliances and 
boundaries "became much more rigid, because nations and 
peoples could no longer be traded like so many chess 
pieces."104 The industrial revolution, furthermore, 
required societies to become more egalitarian, 
homogeneous, and educated to compete. Fukuyama writes:
Rulers and ruled had to speak the same language because 
both were intertwined in a national economy; peasants 
moving from the countryside had to be made literate in 
that language and given sufficient education to enable 
them to work in modern factories and, eventually, 
offices. 105
100 Stephen Holmes, "The Scowl of Minerva, " The New 
Republic, 23 March 1992, 33.
101 John K. Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment 
(London: Sinclair-Steveson, 1992).
102 Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy, " Journal 
of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 4 (October 1992): 6-7.
103 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid., 269.
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Nationalism.,- as mentioned before, is a reflection of 
the struggle for recognition, However, there are forms of 
recognition which extend ’’only to members of a given 
national or ethnic group."106 107 108This type of illiberal 
nationalism has the potential, according to particular 
circumstances, to lead to conflict between groups seeking 
recognition?07 In the twentieth century, as Fukuyama 
laments, nationalism has manifested an extreme form of 
thymos known as magalothymia. ’’Nationalism is therefore 
fully capable of replacing dynastic and religious 
ambition as a general ground for imperialism, and did 
precisely that in the case of Germany ?’l0S
What are the contemporary reasons for the advent of 
this form of nationalism? The continent of Europe used 
to exist, Gaddis explains, in a bipolar environment,109 *
Such an environment allocated political strength between 
the two superpowers — the United States and the Soviet 
Union?10 Alliances were created to establish consensus and. 
solidarity in foreign policy decision-making. The 
presence of nuclear weapons on the European continent
106 ibid., 266.
107 John Palmenatz, ’’Two Types of Nationalism, ” in 
Marc Williams, ed., International Relations: A Reader
(London: MacMillan Education, Ltd., 1989), 48.
108 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
266.
109 Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 19. 
no For a more detailed discussion of these points,
read John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of 
Stability in Postwar International System," in Sean M. 
Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1991), 1-45.
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reinforced a credible balance of power.”1 Moreover, Gaddis 
argues, bipolarity suppressed long and tragic feuds in 
Europe. In Western Europe, the need to contain Soviet
adventurism "moderated old animosities between the French
and the Germans, or the Greeks and the Turks, or the 
British and everybody else."”2 The Warsaw Pact suppressed 
national rivalry between Hungarians and Romanians and 
between Czechs and Poles.111 112 13 Nationalism became a 
"historical curiosity" in Europe.114
With the end of the Cold War, Stephen Sestanovich 
argues, ethnic and national groups "whose animosities 
have festered in an illiberal setting, the freedom to 
speak up, organize, and assemble may present itself 
primarily as a long-sought opportunity to fight things 
out."115 Even Fukuyama notes that nationalism in Eastern 
Europe has become worse since 1989.116 Scholars debate 
whether this growing form of nationalism in Eastern 
Europe could bring back the type of conflict seen at the 
beginning of this century.117 Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic, 
for example, is fighting to maintain what is left of the
111 John J. Mearsheimer, "The Case for a Ukrainian 
Nuclear Deterrence," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No 3 
(Summer 1993): 57.
112 Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," 19.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Stephen Sestanovich, "Response to Fukuyama, " The 
National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989): 33.
116 Interview with Fukuyama.
117 For example, read Istvan Deak, "Uncovering Eastern 
Europe’s Dark History," Orhis, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 
1990): 51-65; Daniel P. Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity 
in World Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993); and Timothy L. Thomas, "Ethnic Conflict: Scourge 
of the 1990s," Military Review, December 1992, 15-27.
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Yugoslav Republic?13 Ilenry Kissinger writes that the 
conflict between Russia and its former republics:
is now compounded by the fact that all republics are 
undergoing major economic and political crises which 
accentuate the tensions between them. The economic crisis 
is the legacy of decades of stagnation caused by the 
Stalinist central command system. Yeltsin has 
courageously tried to spur reform by freeing prices, 
gambling that decontrol will bring out hoarded goods and 
stimulate production. Most of the other republics have 
followed suit. But the question is whether the process 
can work before the resulting austerity wrecks the 
political system?19
All of this, Fukuyama writes, "has undercut for many the 
credibility of this claim of all universalistic 
ideologies to have superseded nationalism?'118 119 20
While intense national conflict will occur in the 
less developed areas of Eastern Europe?21 Fukuyama does 
not believe that "the model [of Eastern Europe's] future 
[is that] of Serbia?'122 123Instead, he sees the future model 
of that part of the world to be along the lines of the 
EC.?23 Pierre Haasner believes, for example, that ethnic 
tension is the result of economic and social problems. To 
alleviate this tension of ethnicity, there must be an 
attempt to bring Eastern Europe into the fold of the new
118 For example, read Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of 
Slobodan Milosevic," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 
(Summer 1993): 81-97; Josef Joffe, "Bosnia: the Return of 
History," Commentary, October 1992, 24-29; and Sabrina P. 
Ramet, "Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic: A Profile," Orbis, 
Vol. 35, No. 1 (Winter 1991): 93-105.
119 Ilenry Kissinger, "The New Russian Question, " 
Newsweek, 10 February 1992, 12.
120 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
268.
121 Ibid-., 273.
122 Interview with Fukuyama.
123 Ibid.
European Union?24 For reasons described above, the 
peoples of Eastern Europe yearn for economic efficiency 
and the freedom to articulate individual opinion?25 
Nationalism in Eastern Europe "will mature and ultimately 
undergo the same process of 'Turkification’ as Western 
Europe?'124 125 26 "Nationalism," as Edward Mortimer analyzes 
Fukuyama’s paradigm, "is a kind of growing pain of 
liberal democracy, which in its mature form, viz. the 
European Community, it can overcome."127 Nevertheless, 
"Eastern Europe," Fukuyama observes, "will move towards 
Western Europe and not the reverse. The length of time 
that will take [, however, ] will be quite a long time?’128
Unlike Eastern Europe, the concept of nationalism in 
Western Europe has lost its political strength as a 
"source of thymotic identification..?’129 As Fukuyama 
notes. West Europeans no longer "struggle over whether or 
not [they] should be democratic, if they should be ruled 
by the throne or through popular election."130 Instead, the 
West Europeans have devoted their efforts in the building 
of a European Union in which, as David Held observes, its 
member states are relinquishing some of their autonomy
38
124 Pierre Haasner, "Beyond Nationalism and 
Internationalism: Ethnicity and World Order," Survival, 
Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 1993): 57-58.
125 Tismaneanu, Reinventing Politics, 279-288.
126 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Plan,
274.
127 Edward Mortimer, "End of History, " Marxism Today, 
November 1989, 29.
128 Interview with Fukuyama.
129 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Plan,
270.
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and the EU is establishing itself in the global market J31 
As Fukuyama notes in his European travels, "the gains of 
the EC are fundamentally irreversible.” * 132
However, Fukuyama does express reservations of 
"whether the more ambitious goals of European federalism 
[could] ever be realized..."133 In discussing and analyzing 
nationalism in Western Europe Fukuyama concentrates his 
efforts first of all in looking at the cultural and 
social differences between West Europeans.134 For example, 
Fukuyama discusses how West Europeans lament over how the 
EU means that the "way [they] label [their] local wines 
is going to change, and [how] some bureaucrat in Brussels 
is going to tell [them] how long of a sausage [they] can 
create, and do [they] really want this."135 The Germans are 
reluctant to relinquish the D-Mark for the ECU because, 
according to Fukuyama, the Germans are "fiscally tight 
fisted and they don't like inflation and they have the 
internal and social discipline to run a very tough anti­
inflationary policy, whereas the Italians were never able 
to balance a budget in their national existence."136
Fukuyama also examines how West Europeans perceive 
and understand the growing problems of nationalism in 
Eastern Europe. In his travels, Fukuyama found, for 
example, mistrust between French and Germans over the
135 David Held, "New Times: Farewell Nation State," 
Marxism Today, December 1988, 12-17.
132 Francis Fukuyama, "An American in Paris, " New 
Statesman and Society, 6 March 1992, 15.
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Interview with Fukuyama.
136 Ibid.
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EU’s handling of the Yugoslav crisis by its (primarily 
German) insistence in the recognition of Croatia?37 With 
the growing problems of the single currency and 
immigration, Fukuyama wonders "whether the more ambitious 
goals of European federalism would ever be realized, and 
whether Europeans themselves didn’t prefer remaining a 
’Europe of nations,’’’137 38 As mentioned above, however, 
Fukuyama notes that the End of History does not mean the 
end of politics for there will always be points of 
disagreement over questions of foreign policy to "fill 
the pages" of foreign Affairs.139 140 141As well, Fukuyama 
observes that these events described above simply point 
to what could be construed as a functional problem:
...[T]he whole world is in a broad transitional phase and 
it is very hard to understand what is going on. I am not 
sure that within the terms of the principles of foreign 
policy that there is a greater degree of disagreement 
than in earlier times. There has always been this tension 
between realpolitik and a more idealistic one.... I think 
that it is a permanent tension in foreign policy that 
won't go away.... It is just now finding what 
organizations are appropriate to deal with itb™
Fukuyama also notes that Europeans are reluctant to 
become involved in "foreign entanglements as they try to 
deal with pressing domestic economic problems,"111 For 
Fukuyama, despite Franco-German mistrust over issues like 
Bosnia and Croatia, nationalism in Western Europe has 
appeared "to have lost much of its ability to stimulate
137 Fukuyama, "An American in Paris," 15.
138 Ibid.
139 Fukuyama, "The End of History?" 4,
140 Interview with Fukuyama. (Emphasis added,)
141 Fukuyama, "Against the New Pessimism," 25-26,
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Europeans to risk their comfortable lives in great acts 
of imperialism.”142
Fukuyama does not perceive that what he has alluded
to above is a fundamental contradiction to the End of 
History because his paradigm rests on the premise that 
there exists no alternative principles to that of liberty 
and equality.143 This dissertation asserts, however, that 
the history of western political thought has argued over 
many other issues which include the concepts of national 
identity and state sovereignty. And, as this study will 
demonstrate, these principles are facing a fundamental 
challenge from the growing economic and political 
emergence of the EU. In the UK, for example, the British 
Conservative and Unionist Party are fundamentally divided 
over the ramifications of the EU’s federal agenda on the 
issue of parliamentary sovereignty.144 The question is 
whether or not these issues can be described as merely 
being "subsidiary" ones.
B. DEMOCRACY AND THE ISSUE OF THE LAST MAN.
It is this dissertation’s assertion that there is a 
critical need for the role of ideas because, as Samuel 
P. Huntington advocates, Fukuyama’s thesis can be 
construed as a form of endism in which its central
142 Fukuyama, The End ot History and the Last Man,
272.
143 Interview with Fukuyama.
141 For example, read David Baker, Andrew Gamble, and 
Steve Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 
1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification," 
Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1994): 38.
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premise is that "bad things are coming to an end."145 With 
the advent of liberal democracy as a global phenomenon, 
the Enel of History paradigm perceives a pacific world 
order because democratic states, by nature, do not fight 
with one another/46 Scholars point "to the historical 
absence of wars between democratic countries and
[conclude] the multiplication of democratic regimes since 
1974 as evidence that the probability of war [is] 
declining."147 While this might very well be true, 
Huntington’s essential criticism is that Fukuyama’s End 
of History paradigm "provides not a warning of danger but 
an illusion of well-being. It invites not concrete action 
but relaxed complacency."148
Fukuyama summarizes the position of the end of the 
role of ideas in the following paragraph of his original 
essay which this dissertation wishes to challenge:
The end of history will be a very sad time. The 
struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s 
life for a purely abstract goal, the world-wide 
ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, 
imagination, and idealism, will be replaced by economic 
calculation, the endless solving of technical problems, 
environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of 
sophisticated consumer demands. In the post-historical 
period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the 
perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history.149
145 Samuel P. Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of 
Endism," The National Interest, 17 (Fall 1989): 3.
14b For example, read Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and 
World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 
80, No. 4 (December 1986): 1151-1169 and John Mueller, 
Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New 
York: Basic Books, 1989).
147 Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," 3.
148 Ibid., 4.
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This quotation describes the concept of the Last Manf 
which is the product of the Ko jeve-IIegel150 universal and 
homogeneous state. The concept of the Last Manf which 
Brzezinski defines as ’’permissive cornucopia, ” ’’involves 
essentially a society in which the progressive decline in 
the centrality of moral criteria is matched by heightened 
preoccupation with material and sensual gratification."151
John Kenneth Galbraith defines this sense of self­
gratification as the ’’culture of contentment." Making up 
the political mainstream, the content find themselves 
satisfied with the status quo. Because the content are 
not affected by democracy's side effects, there is little 
reason to promote remedies. In an age of contentment, 
society prefers short- rather than long-term solutions to 
economic, ecological, and social problems because the 
long-term never arrives.152 Long-term solutions require 
sacrifice such as higher taxes and the changing of life 
styles.153 While long-term solutions will benefit future 
generations, the content are hesitant to support policies 
they might not enjoy or benefit from. The content rely on 
the hope that everything works out for the best in the 
end..154 "The last man at the end of history, " Fukuyama 
writes, "knows better than to risk his life for a cause, 
because he recognizes that history was full of pointless
150 Fukuyama coined this phrase in The End of History 
and the Last Man, 144.
151 Brzezinski, Out of Controlf 65.
152 Galbraith, Culture of Contentment, 20.
153 Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age, "
151 Galbraith, Culture of Contentment,. 20.
50.
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battles in which men fought over whether they should be 
Christians or Muslims, Protestant or Catholic, German or 
French. ”155
Fukuyama describes the End of History as the age of 
consumerism in which art, literature, and philosophy are 
set aside. Instead, the Last Man is ’’mesmerized” by a 
world of ’’fast music, fast computers, and fast food — 
with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations 
into one commercially homogeneous global network..."156 Man 
is "content with his happiness and is unable to feel any 
sense of shame in himself for being unable to rise above 
those wants. ”157 The Last Man is losing a sense of that 
which Fukuyama believes is the driving force behind a 
successful economy: a civil society. For Fukuyama, the 
civil society is
a complex welter of intermediate institutions, including 
businesses, voluntary associations, educational 
institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities, and 
churches — builds in turn, on the family, the primary 
instrument by which people are socialized into their 
culture and given the skills that allow them to live in 
broader society and through which the values and 
knowledge of that society are transmitted across 
generations.158
155 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 
307. (Emphasis in original.)
156 Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad v. McWorld," The 
Atlantic Monthly, March 1992, 53. As a note of 
comparison, read Claes G. Ryn, Democracy and the Ethical 
Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community, Second 
Edition, Exapanded (Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University Press, 1990), 232-239 and Peter J. Stanlis, 
"The Erosion of Political Principles," Modern Age, Vol. 
34, No. 1 (Fall 1991): 69-73.
157 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
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158 Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtue and the 
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The Last Man, on the other hand, is interested only in 
himself. He is not interested in improving himself 
intellectually or otherwise. The last man ’’has been jaded 
by the experience of history, and disabused of the 
possibility of direct experience of values.”159
The challenge of the Last Man on the role of ideas 
takes on a philosophical perspective. While this does not 
fall entirely within the scope of this dissertation, a 
few words should be noted. Leszek Kolakowsky notes that 
economic prosperity has produced "a mentality of endless 
expectations.”160 There exists a mentality among those who 
enjoy the culture of contentment "that each of us is 
going to have more and more of everything in the 
indefinite future and to the firm belief that this is 
what each of us deserves."161 In a speech to the Institute 
of Socio-Economic Studies Margaret Thatcher noted that 
"in some respect, the concepts of social responsibility 
have turned sour in practice."162 While liberal democracy 
provides the rule of law, the establishment of rights, 
Fukuyama argues, its fundamental flaw is that it has 
"arrived at an impasse unable, to come to a consensus on 
what constitutes man and his specific dignity, and 
consequently unable to define the rights of man."163
159 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
306.
160 Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age, "
49.
161 Ibid., 49-50.
162 Margaret Thatcher, The Revival of Britain:
Speeches on Home and Europeans Affairs, Compiled by 
Alistar B. Cooke (London: Aurum Press, Ltd, 1989), 3.
163 Fukuyama, the End of History and the Last Man,
337.
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Society, Gertrude Himmelfarb writes, must ’’develop a more 
effective system of incentives and disincentives, both 
economic and moral,”164 At Hillsdale College, Thatcher 
made the following point:
It is important to understand that the moral foundations 
of a society do not extend only to its political system; 
they must extend to its economic system as well... 
Capitalism is not, contrary to what those on the left 
have tried to argue, an amoral system based on 
selfishness, greed and exploitation.165
"Unless we restore and guard it," Thatcher notes, "the 
rule of law will generally fall into disrespect."166 167
The success of democracy, as this dissertation 
wishes to explore, does not "preclude conflicts within 
liberalism.1,167 For example, Anthony Hartley argues that 
the issue of the environment should not be treated as 
merely as a subsidiary issue because it is in flux with 
the idea of liberalism in which "green" values could 
"wreck" "the industrial base which supports consumerism 
itself."168 The states of the international community 
might have to take firmer measures in the allocation of 
resources to alleviate "damages already inflicted on our 
environment and to warding off further calamities."169
164 Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The Value of Victorian 
Virtues," The Sunday Times, 16 April 1995, 8.
165 Margaret Thatcher, "The Moral Foundations of 
Society," Imprimis, Vol. 24, No. 3 (March 1995): 4. For 
more on this point, read Joseph Baldacchino, Economics 
and the Moral Order, Introduction by Russell Kirk 
(Washington, DC: National Humanities Institute, 1989).
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These types of measures might require the polity to 
sacrifice its freedom of movement and rights to 
property/70 "The amount of frustration, irrational rage, 
and aggressiveness that these imperatives are going to 
cause," Kolakowsky argues, "will be enormous, and will 
affect the poor and rich alike/'170 71 The issue of 
multiculturalism tends, for example, "to elevate obscure 
leaders of minority groups to a level of importance equal 
to that of the founding fathers/'172 173At times, this 
American predicament has led to violence for "to a
believer the heretic is worse than the nonbeliever /,I73 
"New challenges to human well-being will emerge," 
Huntington concludes, "and people will develop now 
concepts, theories, and ideologies as to how those now
challenges should be met,"174
In particular, this dissertation's challenge of the
Last Man on the role of ideas takes on an institutional
perspective. This dissertation will examine how the 
British Conservative and Unionist Party perceive and
170 Ellen Wood, "A Tale of Two Democracies," History 
Today, May 1994, 54-55.
171 Kolakowsky, "Uncertainties of a Democratic Age, "
50.
172 Samuel P. Huntington, "If Not Civilizations, 
What?," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 
(November/Decmeber 1993): 190.
173 Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism," 9, 
For more on the debate of multiculturalism, read Reed 
Dasenbrock, "The Multicultural West," Dissent, Vol. 38 
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understand Britain’s relationship to the EU.175 176For certain 
segments of the Tory Party, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) 
is seen as detrimental to the sovereignty and historic 
institutions of the United Kingdom. As Bill Walker 
observes, the United Kingdom was not, unlike the European 
Union, imposed on the people of Britain; rather, it was 
(and is) a political Union that has evolved in the past 
three hundred years.170 For traditional conservatives, the 
development of political institutions is a piecemeal 
process based on pragmatism.177 As Edmund Burke once wrote:
[Society] is to be looked on with other reference; 
because it is not a partnership in all things subservient 
only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and 
perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a 
partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, 
and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership 
cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a 
partnership not only between those who are living, but 
between those who are living, those who are dead, and 
those who are to be born/8
"The permanence of a society, " the late Russell Kirk 
noted, "is formed by those enduring interests and 
convictions that give us stability and continuity; 
without that permanence, the foundations of the great 
deep are broken up, society slipping into anarchy."179
In Western Europe, the issue of nationalism is 
challenging the status quo of governing institutions in
17:1 See Chapter V of this dissertation.
176 Interview with Bill Walker at Constituency Office 
in Blairgowrie, Scotland (UK), 18 August 1995.
177 Ibid. See also Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism 
(London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), 13-14.
178 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, edited with an Introduction by Conor Cruise 
O’Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1969), 194­
195.
179 Russell Kirk, The Politics of Prudence (Bryn Mawr: 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1993), 25.
certain states of the EU. In some instances, it has taken 
on the extreme form of racism and xenophobia.180 While 
Fukuyama is correct in asserting that those upholding 
this type of nationalism are in the minority of public 
opinion/81 there are nationalist groups in Western Europe 
who are calling for a greater degree of self-rule. These 
type of nationalist groups include the Basques in Spain 
and the Flemings and the Walloons in Belgium.182
One of the issues that this dissertation will focus
is on the SNP's platform of democratic renewal by 
analyzing its radical alternative to statecraft in the 
UK.183 In analyzing the SNP, however, it becomes clear that 
there are factions fighting for the heart and soul of the 
Party. The question addressed in this study is whether or 
not the quest for Scottish statehood should be based upon 
the fact that Scotland has oil or that, for better or for 
worse, Scotland has a right like other states of the 
world community to exercise its own sovereignty over its 
own affairs? The SNPTs disagreements over these issues, 
as this study will show, demonstrate a clear example of 
the continuing clash between economic maximization and 
the role of ideas at the end of the twentieth century. 
CONCLUSION
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182 James G, Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and 
Ethnicity (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1991), 87-94.
183 See Chapter V of this dissertation,
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Francis Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm is an 
interesting perspective to the empirical examination of 
the study of international relations. As the analysis 
demonstrated,- Fukuyama’s general premise is that the 
principles of liberal democracy have prevailed as the 
dominant ideology around the world. Fukuyama also asserts 
that international politics is much more manageable at 
the End of History since historical evidence suggests 
that liberal democratic states are non-belligerent with 
one another.184 185"Britain and Germany,.’’ Keohane and Nye 
writes, "no longer feel threatened by each other. Intense 
relationships of mutual influence exist between these 
countries, but in most of them force is irrelevant or 
unimportant as an instrument of policy. "1S5
In his work, Fukuyama also concedes that the world 
is still a dangerous place and that nationalism in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is still a 
force to be reckoned with. In bringing Eastern Europe 
into the European Union, Haasner believes that such an 
approach would be appropriate because the European 
Union’s goal is to bring about a bureaucratic 
organization which attempts to bring about a modern 
social framework. The European Union, according to 
Hassner, is based upon building an economic and political 
framework, but not at the sacrifice of national and
184 For an interesting commentary on this point, read 
Fareed Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished?" The National 
Interest, No. 30 (Winter 1992/93): 21-33.
185 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and 
Interdependence, Second Edition (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1989), 27.
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cultural identityJS6 While nationalism has taken extreme 
forms (for example, fascism), the concept of nationalism 
"seems to be a necessary stage through which human 
societies have to pass,”186 87 188For Fukuyama, the concept of 
nationalism is a political process in which "communities
have liberated themselves from non-democratic forces of 
authority to take control of their destinies. "lss In 
Western Europe, however, Fukuyama believes that this 
process has come to an end and that, therefore, the 
concept of nationalism has lost its ability to inspire 
peoples to fight for the fatherland, instead, their 
interests are in creating a global consumer culture.
In the next chapter, this dissertation explores the 
writings of Ernst B. Haas and David Mitrany. The purpose 
here is to demonstrate that one can find precedents to 
Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm. Both Haas and Mitrany 
explore politics at the End of History and attempt to 
construct a new international environment which replaces 
the sovereignty of the state with that of international 
institutions. As the next chapter also demonstrates, 
however, there are other forces which impede , the 
assertion that economics should now preoccupy political 
behavior at the end of the twentieth century.
186 Hassner, "Beyond Nationalism and 
Internationalism," 59.
187 Ernst B. Haas, "Nationalism: An Instrumental 
Social Construction," Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1993): 545.
188 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History is Still
Nigh," The Independent, 3 March 1992, 21.
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CHAPTER III
FUNCTIONALISM AS A VARIATION TO THE END OF HISTORY AND 
THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN 
WESTERN EUROPE
INTRODUCTION
There is an interesting parallel between Francis 
Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm and David Mitrany’s 
functionalist approach which can trace its origins back 
to the 1930s. Like Fukuyama, Mitrany asserts that the 
democratic principles of liberty and equality cannot be 
improved upon. As well, the functionalist approach can 
•be seen as "a new ideology of international relations, 
deriving its inspiration partly from old ideals, but 
indicating a new approach to international and economic 
problems."1 Unlike Fukuyama, however, the functionalist 
approach does not place much faith in the international 
system of states because, as R.A.. Harrison writes, the 
international community is ’’broken up into self­
identifying, self-centered communities, whose jealous 
rivalry erupts, occasionally into violence."2 A change 
in structural transformation, is, for the 
functionalist, paramount in developing a more peaceful 
world order.3
1 Piotr S. Wandycz, "The Theory of International 
Relations," The Review of Politics, Vol. 17, No. 2 
(1955): 200.
2 R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question (London:
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1974), 27.
3 The World Order Models Project (WOMP), for 
example, has further explored alternative world order 
models. Originating in the 1960s, WOMP advocates four
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In advocating the change of structure in the 
international system of states,- Mitrany’s functionalist 
approach attempts to construct an international system 
of agencies which are designed to implement practical 
solutions to economic and social problems common 
between states. In exploring Mitrany’s analysis this 
chapter highlights two problems to his approach. First, 
functionalism eschews establishing a descriptive 
framework of agencies because, for Mitrany, it would 
limit the ability of the functionalist to amend the 
process. The greater difficulty to Mitrany's work is 
that he does not invest much thought as to how states 
change their Weltanschauung, particularly in regards to 
the transformation of the international system. The 
scholar Ernst B. Haas recognized, for example, the 
important role of interest groups and political parties 
in changing the thinking of the state in implementing
values: minimization of violence; maximization of 
social and economic well-being; maximization of social 
and political justice; and maximization of ecological 
quality. However, WOMP has never been able to arrive at 
a consensus regarding an optimum world order. WOMP 
books include Richard A. Falk, A Study of Future Worlds 
(New York: The Free Press, 1975) and Saul Mendlovitz, 
ed., On the Creation of a Just World Order (New York: 
The Free Press, 1975). For a critique of WOMP and the 
concept of world order in general read Richard A. Falk, 
Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for 
World Order (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1992); Stanley J. Michalak, "Richard Falk's Future 
World: A Critique of WOMP-USA," The Review of Politics, 
Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 1980): 3-18; Cornelius F. 
Murphy, The Search for World Order (Dordrecht, the 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 145­
184; and Nicholas G. Onuf, "International Legal Order 
as an Idea," American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 73, No. 2 (April 1979): 244-266.
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the solving of economic and social problems by building 
functional agencies at (at least) the regional level. 
As Harrison writes the integration process is
evidently a process of political but also farreaching, 
social transformation. The integration process which 
has interested modern theorists and the one to which 
the six are ostensibly committed by the Rome Treaty may 
be further, though still loosely, defined then, as the 
attainment within an area of the bonds of political 
community: of central institutions with binding 
decision making powers and methods of control 
determining the allocation of values at the regional 
level and also of adequate complementary consensus- 
formation mechanisms.... Within the terms of this 
stipulative definition, successful integration means a 
balanced development of all these elements/
In examining the European integration process, Haas 
assumed (as Fukuyama later did) that concepts like 
nationalism and sovereignty were becoming anachronistic 
among the states of Western Europe. At the end of the 
Second World War, the West Europeans no longer asked 
themselves if they wished to be democratic states; 
instead, Haas believed that they would preoccupy 
themselves in searching for the optimal way in 
integrating, for example, coal and steel. The 
integration of coal and steel, Haas later asserted, 
would then "spillover" into other economic (and, in 
particular, political) functions of the state.
In the economic realm, Haas’ "neo-functionalist" 
approach has been quite accurate,4 5 The states of 
Western Europe, for example, have been able to move
4 Harrison, Europe in Question, 14.
5 Jeppe Transholm-Mikelson, "Neo-functionalism: 
Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in Light of the 
New Dynamism of the EC," Millenium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Spring 1991): 1­
22.
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from the creation of a Common Market in the 1950s to
the creation of the single market in the 1990s, with 
the hopes of establishing a single currency at the end 
of the twentieth century/' Haas came to realize, 
however, that there were (and are) political forces 
which can obstruct the whole integration process. The 
advent of Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s (and, later 
with the British Conservative Party in the 1980s and
1990s) was a fundamental manifestation of such an 
impediment to the advent of a fully established 
supranational network/
While there is clear evidence of economic
integration in Western Europe, certain states in the 
European Union (EU) remain dubious of the present 
initiative for political unity. The argument developed 
here is that there is a fundamental clash between 
economic maximization and the role of ideas because, as 
Anthony D. Smith writes,
[states] grope in some confusion towards a new type of 
social order, yet are afraid to let go of the old. They 
wonder whether the new structures and identities that 
may be forged will answer to their needs and interests 
as well as the habitual and familiar ones/
The issue of state sovereignty makes, for example, the 
fifteen states of the European Union dubious about 
their role in foreign policy in the 1990s. While the * * *
6 For more on this point, read Chapter IV of this 
dissertation.
1 The advent of Charles de Gaulle and his views on 
the building of a united Europe are also discussed in 
Chapter IV of this dissertation.
s Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the 
Idea of European Unity," International Affairs, Vol.
68, No. 1 (1992): 56.
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Treaty on European Union of 1992 created, a common 
foreign and security policy, building upon twenty years 
of European political cooperation, there continues to 
be uncertainty and a lack of political consensus among 
the EU states,9 Moreover, the issues of national 
identity and self-determination are affecting the 
internal governing framework of certain members of the
EU,
This chapter is divided into three sections, The 
first section examines Mitrany’s functionalist 
approach. This study compares and contrasts Mitrany’s 
line of thinking to that of Fukuyama’s and how Mitrany 
wished to take an End of His tory- like environment a 
step further in the establishment of international 
functional agencies. The second section looks at how 
Haas amended Mitrany’s line of thinking and the 
assumptions he took for granted in assessing the 
creation of an integrated Western Europe. The last 
section seeks to understand why certain states (like 
the United Kingdom) in Western Europe are confronting a 
clash between economic maximization and the role of 
ideas in the EU. The ideas that are in flux (such as 
in the UK) include the challenges of nationalism and 
the preservation of state sovereignty.
FUNCTIONALISM
9 Trevor C. Salmon, "Testing Times for European 
Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990­
1992," International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 2 (1992): 
233.
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Mitrany’s most important works on functionalism 
include The Progress of International Government 
(1933), A Working Peace System (1943), and The 
Functional Theory of Politics (1975) .10 In The Progress 
of International Government, Mitrany discusses two 
branches of political thought. The first branch 
concerns itself with the progress of international 
relations and the second aspect concerns itself with 
the governing principles of the municipality. In 
relation to the first aspect of political theory, 
Mitrany observes that the state, which is the current 
manifestation of the political community, is a 
fundamental concept in international relations.11 Modern 
international law, articulated in the treaties of the 
League of Nations and United Nations, holds sacrosanct 
the legality of the state.12 At the end of the Second 
World War, for example, the European colonies of 
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East strived for 
statehood, and in the past fifty years there has been a
10 David Mitrany, The Progress of International 
Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933); 
David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for 
the Functional Development of International
Organization (London: The Royal Institute of
International Affairs, 1943); and David Mitrany, The 
Functional Theory of Politics (London: Martin Robertson 
and Company, Ltd., 1975).
11 David Mitrany summarizes the development of the 
state as a "fundamental concept" in The Progress of 
International Government, 15-57.
12 David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World 
Organization," International Affairs, (1948): 351. For 
more on the issue of international law in relation to 
the sovereignty of the state, read Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of World Order (London: 
MacMillan, 1977).
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remarkable increase in the number of newly independent 
states.13
Municipal political thought, Mitrany asserts,
raises another fundamental issue for the state: its
relationship to its citizenry. It is here where one can 
find remarkable similarities between the writings of 
Fukuyama and Mitrany. The relationship between 
citizenry and state pertains to the rights and duties 
of citizens living within the body politic. Like 
Fukuyama, for example, Mitrany traces the origins of 
this relationship from the times of the ancient Greeks 
to the era of the Enlightenment J4 Unlike the first 
branch of political thought, Mitrany explains, there
has been [much] progress [concerning] the idea of 
individual equality in the municipal branch of 
political theory. In this field it did not break 
through until much later, in the seventeenth century, 
and did not flow strongly until the eighteenth. But 
with the French Revolution and the subsequent rise of 
representative government it spread triumphantly over 
the whole of the civilized world.15
Political ideas such as common citizenship, 
constitutional law, and national independence 
"dominated the age" of the French Revolution,16 The 
revolutionaries of the period also believed that it was 
their responsibility to propagate their concept of
13 James G. Kellas, The Politics ot Nationalism and 
Ethnicity (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1989), 56.
14 Mitrany, The Progress of International 
Government, 16-18. See also Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man, 55-70.
15 Mitrany, The Progress of International 
Government, 19. (Emphasis added.)
16 Felix Gilbert, History: Politics or Culture? 
(Reflections on Ranke and Burkhardt) (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 5.
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statecraft around Europe and the world/7 While Edmund 
Burke warned his late eighteenth century readers of the 
many dangers the European continent would encounter as 
a consequence of the revolution in France/8 "the 
Revolution was also a turning point; it signified a 
development toward national states could no longer be 
halted,”17 18 9 "Their purpose," Mitrany concludes, "was to 
limit or to break down despotic rule; and they found 
philosophical justification for their stand point in 
the idea of a natural law, from which they derived the 
principle of the original equality of all men as of all 
political communities. "20
Like Fukuyama, Mitrany asserts that "the essential 
aspects and issues of government, in so far as they
17 Carlton J.H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution ot 
Modern Nationalism (New York: Russell and Rusell,
1968), 38-39. See also Walker Connor, "Ethnonationalism 
in the First World: The Present in Historical 
Perspective," in Milton J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict 
in the Western World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977), 20-21
18 For more on Edmund Burke’s writings and his 
times, read Fred Halliday, "International Society as 
Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama," Millennium:
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3 
(Winter 1992): 447-451; Hayes, The Historical Evolution 
of Modern Nationalism, 88-95 and 43-84; and Russell 
Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, 
Seventh Revised Edition (Washington, DC: Gateway 
Editions, 1986), 12-72.
19 Gilbert, History: Politics or Culture?, 5,
20 Mitrany, The Progress of International 
Government, 18. For more on the history and the 
principles of natural law, read Russell Kirk, "Burke 
and Natural Rights," The Review of Politics Vol. 13,
No. 4 (October 1951): 441-457; Claes G. Ryn, 
"Universality and Uniformity?," Modern Age, Vol. 32,
No. 1 (Winter 1988): 45-51; and Leo Strauss, Natural 
Rights and History (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1953).
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concern the relations of citizens to their State, have 
been worked out already by the Greek philosophers and 
their followers with a depth of intuition which has 
almost given them finality. 5,21 As John Eastby explains, 
Mitrany believes that the great questions of social and 
political equality have been fully dealt with and that 
’’the meaning of life and death as a question has been 
in part answered because a man's life is a part of a 
continuous community life and in the other part 
answered because personnel salvation... is an 
individual not a political affair.”21 2 In line with 
Fukuyama’s political thought, Eastby further observes 
that Mitrany asserts that the issues of international 
relations "are basically beyond the great philosophical 
questions, which have been answered, and have merely 
pragmatic life to get on with."23
Mitrany laments, however, that the ’’crisis through 
which our institutions of government are passing
21 Mitrany, The Progress of international 
Government, 16. (Emphasis added.) As a note of 
comparison, see Francis Fukuyama, "Reflections on The 
End of History, Five Years Later," in Timothy Burns, 
ed., After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics 
(London: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
1994), 239-259.
22 John Eastby, Functionalism and Interdependence, 
with a Preface by Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 1985), 11. Fukuyama also 
writes that "Religion has been relegated to the sphere 
of the private life — exiled, it would seem, more or 
less, permanently from European political life, except 
on certain narrow issues like abortion" (Fukuyama, End 
of History and the Last Man, 271 [emphasis added]).
23 Eastby, Functionalism and Interdependence, 11. 
(Emphasis added.) As a means of comparison, see Francis 
Fukuyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest, 
no. 16 (Summer 1989): 4.
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springs precisely from that divorce between the two 
fields of municipal and international political theory 
and practice."24 As Richard A. Falk comments, the
... failures of the modern world are here 
overwhelmingly associated with artificial and 
constraining boundaries on imagination and community, 
which then becomes the springboards for conflict, 
inducing violence and massive suffering. The most 
menacing of these artificial boundaries are undoubtedly 
the borders of the sovereign state and the refusal of 
larger, more ambitious states to respect the autonomy 
of smaller, more vulnerable states. But additional 
false boundaries interact and intensify the forms of 
conflict associated with the state itself: those of 
race, religion, ideology, gender, language, age, 
civi 1 i zat ion,25
Eastby comments that Mitrany’s functionalist approach 
asserts that "it is a mistake to equate the political 
community with the modern national state,"26 While the 
concepts equality and liberty should be upheld by
i
government, the "form of the community to which rights 
and duties are related neither need be, nor 
historically has been, eternal."27 It is here where 
Mitrany takes an End of History-like paradigm a step 
further. For Mitrany, the state is an inadequate 
structural form of political community to the solve the 
practical problems of international politics because 
since, at least, the aftermath of the Second World War 
there has been "a social surge and a scientific 
eruption that is moving beyond man's foresight and
24 Mitrany, Progress in International Government,
20.
25 Falk, Explorations at the Edge of Time, 6,
26 Eastby, Functionalism and. Interdependence, 3,
27 Ibid,
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control,”28 The development of economic, ecological and 
social problems "on a regional or global scale, ’’ 
Charles Pentland writes, "present irresistible 
pressures toward international cooperation and ultimate 
political unity,"29
Mitrany would agree with Fukuyama that the advent 
of technological development is a global phenomenon for 
"no country and no region can insulate itself against 
their effect,"30 Unlike Fukuyama, however, Mitrany notes 
that this
universal social revolution ... is hardening every 
state into something more truly 'organic' than anything 
known before,31
Mitrany would also agree with Fukuyama that the rise of 
technological development increases the demands and 
expectations of the body politic to solve various 
economic and ecological problems in the world today.32 
"We have reached a stage when the State," Mitrany 
warns, "is in danger of breaking down under the strain 
of the functions and in consequence of the powers
28 David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in 
Historical Perspective," International Affairs Vol. 47 
No. 3 (July 1971): 532.
29 Charles Pentland, Integration Theory and 
European Integration (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 
1973), 64.
30 Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical 
Perspective," 532. See also Fukuyama, The End of 
History and the Last Man, xiv-xv.
31 David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: 
Federal or Functional," Journal of Common Market 
Studies, Vol. IV, No. 2 (Decider 1965): 123. (Emphasis 
added.)
32 As a note of comparison, read Fukuyama, "The 
End of History?" 18.
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imposed upon it by the community which it serves/'33 
Given the extent of modern problems (for example, AIDS, 
environment, third world hunger, terrorism, etc.), the 
economic and social costs may prove to be too heavy a 
debt for the state to honor,34 Eastby writes
In short, whatever its value in meeting the needs of 
previous generations, the era when the nation state 
served as a useful agent to political community and to 
human happiness has passed,35
In putting aside the already "answered” questions of 
municipal political theory, Mitrany concludes, 
international relations must take pragmatic steps and 
concentrate in creating a new form of political 
institutions so to help commence the practical process 
of allieviating the world wide social and technical 
problems.
There are five stages to Mitrany’s functionalist 
approach to the development of international agencies,36 
In the first stage, the states of the international 
community come to "recognize" that certain functions 
are "more effectively performed through international 
cooperation,"37 State functions such as 
telecommunications or the monitoring of certain type of
33 Mitrany, The Progress ot International 
G over nine n tr 19.
34 For example, read Leszek Kolakowski, 
"Uncertainties of a Democratic Age," Journal of 
Democracy 1 No. 1 (1990): 47-50 and John Kenneth 
Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment (London: 
Sinclair-Stevenson, Ltd., 1992).
35 Eastby, Functionalism and Interdependencef 3.
36 See Mark F. Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A 
Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty," Review of 
International Studies Vol. 10, No. 2 (1984): 105-106.
37 Ibid., 105.
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diseases are good examples of "activities which by 
their intrinsic nature, technological or otherwise, are 
beyond the scope of national, territorial provision."38 
Mitrany emphasizes that the transfer of functions from 
the state to the international level is based upon
the common index of need. There are many such needs 
which cut across national boundaries, and an effective 
beginning could be made by providing joint government 
for them. On such lines, the emergence of so many new 
national states, which politically adds to our 
difficulties, might even be put into service of 
international unification. If they are to achieve a 
promising social foundation for their political 
independence, they need many things in the way of 
material and technical help and service which are 
beyond their means and experience... 39
An important characteristic of the functionalist 
approach is that it eschews prescription/0 For Mitrany 
the centralized planning of problem-solving can be 
"restrictive" for not "only do the number of functions 
which need to be carried out change; their character is 
apt to change even more rapidly."'11 41As Mitrany notes
Any scheme for a new international order must be able 
not only to contain and guide all present currents, 
under their given conditions, but must be capable of 
adapting its working to whatever fresh issues may come 
up as scientific ingenuity is pitted against old 
political ways and inhibitions.42
In an age of pragmatism, Mitrany notes, the 
functionalist approach can only develop on an ad hoc
38 Ibid., 107.
39 Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World 
Organization," 356.
10 Paul Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of 
David Mitrany," in A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., 
Framework of International Cooperation (London: Pinter 
Publications, Ltd., 1990), 126.
41 Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World 
Organization," 356.
42 Mitrany, "the Functional Approach in Historical 
Perspective," 533.
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basis for it ’’scorns rules and restrictions."43 44The 
functionalist approach,. Paul Taylor writes,
[emphasizes] the importance of allowing
interrelationships and interdependencies to£ according 
to the requirement of the function. Indeed, the theory 
was based upon the assumption that to isolate, as with 
nationalism and its various constitutional appendages, 
was to reduce, to trap or to limit; while to allow 
interdependence according to function was to add, to 
complete, to generatefA
As Mitrany summarizes:
Functionalism in essence means just that: a direct 
attack on problems, mutual problems, as such; in the 
process building up, sector by sector, effective 
positive rules of international government.. ,45
"In this community," Pentland writes, "there is the 
perfect elasticity of structures: they develop, as in 
Lamarck's Third Law, according to 'felt need' and die 
out with that need."46
The second stage of the functionalist approach 
pertains to the allocation of responsibilities among 
the variety of international agencies. In A Working 
Peace System, for example, Mitrany outlines a basic 
scheme of how to structure a functionalist system of 
agencies. A railway system, for example, would be 
organized at a continental level. This approach would 
alleviate the burdens of bureaucracy and "gives the 
logical administrative limit of co-ordination."47
43 Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World 
Organization," 356.
44 Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David 
Mitrany," 126. (Emphasis added.)
45 Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical 
Perspective," 543. (Emphasis added.)
46 Pentland, International Theory and European 
Integration, 70. (Emphasis added.)
17 Mitrany, A Working Peace System, 33,
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Shipping would best be served at an international 
level. "A European union could not solve the problem of 
co-ordination without the co-operation of America and 
of certain other overseas states.”48 Aviation, 
broadcasting, and postal service would best be 
implemented at a universal level because of world-wide
use.
The second stage of the functionalist approach 
also deals with the issue of representation in 
controls. In the allocation of functions, states join 
organizations which best serve their particular 
practical needs. After all, Mitrany acknowledges that
not all interests are common to all, and that the 
common interests do not concern all countries to the 
same degree.49
As Mitrany suggests, states would implement the 
organization's day to day activities. A state does 
not, however, have "the right" to lead in a functional 
agency; for "while it is understandable that all 
countries wish to have a voice in control, that would 
be really to hark back to the outlook of political 
sovereignty."50 The state's ability to administer the 
functional agency would be determined by
certain ... solid [and practical] merits: (i) Any claim 
to a share in control would have to be justified by a 
corresponding and evident capacity of performance; (ii) 
by that test smaller states could also qualify and the 
participants in control would vary, thus avoiding an 
exclusive accumulation of influence by a few countries;
48 Ibid., 33.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., 38-39.
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...[iii] and the performance would be practical and 
measurablef with a periodical balance-sheet.51 
In the "process" of solving economic and social 
problems, Taylor writes, individual and groups
experience the practical value of cooperation and are 
"increasingly involved in an international cooperative 
ethos, creating interdependencies, pushing for further 
integration, undermining the most important bases of 
the nation state.’’52 In such an environment, Mitrany 
asserts, the functional international agency develops a 
"detached" civil service which is not loyal to any 
particular state but is "largely technical and
permanent and Is likely to develop both a professional 
pride and a vested Interest In good performance.’’53 Such 
a scheme, Mitrany notes, would grant the functional 
international agency "all freedom for practical 
variation In the organization of the several functions, 
as well as in the working of a particular function as 
needs and conditions alter."54
The third stage of the functionalist approach 
pertains to how the various international agencies 
enhance or widen their scope of authority. The 
functionalist approach, as Imber notes, "suggests that 
through the progressive implementation of that 
organization’s original mandate, its powers will be 
enhanced vis-a-vis the residual rights of the member
51 Ibid., 39. (Emphasis added.)
52 Paul Taylor, "Introduction," in Mitrany, The 
Functional Theory of Politics, x.
53 Mitrany, A Working Peace System, 39. (Emphasis 
added.)
Ibid,, 33, (Emphasis added,)
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states."55 "This enhancement," Imber writes, is 
"measurable with respect to the creation of treaty law 
and agreements conferring upon the organization the 
right to undertake activities previously reserved to 
the state..."56 What is important to emphasize, 
however, is that with the development of a new 
cooperative and practical ethos (as Taylor described^ 
above) , the allocation of a particular task from the 
state to a specific functional agency would be 
implemented out of need for, as Mitrany asserts,
Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively 
through a formula, only through a function. By 
entrusting an authority through with a certain task, 
carrying with it command over the requisite powers and 
means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the 
old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such 
partial transfers in time brings about a translation of 
the true seat of authority.57
For Mitrany the transfer of "sovereignty through a 
function" has no time frame. Instead, as Mitrany 
writes, the functionalist alternative is a "gradual 
transfer of sovereignty for the ruler to the people, 
the people in their turn gradually entrusting its 
exercise to a central authority."58
Fourth, Mitrany asserts that a functional 
organization must have the legal right to impose 
sanctions on its member states. This is an important 
stage because Mitrany’s functionalist approach asserts,
55 Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic 
Assessment of Sovereignty," 105.
56 Tbid.
57 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 128. 
(Emphasis added.)
58 Ibid.
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as mentioned before, that if it is to bo lasting, the 
progress of international political thought must catch 
up with the progress of municipal political thought. 
"To try to set up an authority while refusing it to 
enforce the law," Mitrany reasons, "is to create a law 
without authority,"59 As Mitrany explains, an 
international organization’s primary duty, if it is to 
be effective at all, is to organize for the member 
state’s security,60 Without such an arrangement, Mitrany 
concludes, an international organization lacks the 
authority to impose sanctions and other measures.61 
Within the Grotian context of international law, 
security does not only pertain to the protection of a 
state’s territory but also to the protection of its 
interests,62 Domestic society, Stanley Hoffmann writes, 
"has laws that aim at deterring or punishing 
reprehensible behavior. International law tries to do 
the same insofar as national behavior is concerned."63
Mitrany’s task, therefore, is ambitious because he
59 Mitrany, The Progress of International 
Government, 143. See also Bertand Russell, Has Man a 
Future (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1961),
84.
60 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 128.
61 Mitrany, The Progress of International 
Government, 142-147.
62 For more on this point, read. Richard A. Falk, 
Normative Initiatives and Demilitarization: A Third 
Systems Approach, Working Paper No. 13 of the World 
Order Models Project (New York: Institute for World 
Order, Inc., 1982).
63 Stanley I-Ioffmann, Duties Beyond Borders: On the 
Limits and Possibilities of Ethical International 
Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 
17.
70
challenges the whole concept of security of the 
Westphalian system. Mitrany writes:
What we are trying to do now [therefore] is . . . 
revolutionary. Three centuries ago it was decided that 
only a sovereign ruler could use force. We are now 
trying to gain acceptance for the view that only 
sovereign society may do so.64
In creating a new sovereign society, Mitrany wished to 
set up agencies that not only provided services to its 
member states, but, more importantly, "to impose 
penalties upon states breaking their rules..."65 
Mitrany writes that economic technical agencies,
by their very nature, could be preventive in a way in 
which military agencies can never be. Just as it would 
be their function to give service wherever it was 
needed, so it would clearly be their duty to deny 
service where it was obviously not needed and might be 
abused; and they would have the means to do so without 
using force.’’66 67
A functionalist economic agency, for example, would 
have the ability to deny to a member state the 
building of a railway system "which would have a 
strategic rather than economic purpose, "6‘
At the fifth stage of the functionalist approach, 
Mitrany asserts that the creation of an international 
community makes the need and use for sanctions less 
relevant because of the gradual (but eventual) erosion 
of state sovereignty. International sanctions, thus, 
would "become as much as an anachronism as they would 
be in the United States, where the individual States no
M Mitrany, The Progress ot International 
Governmentr 149.
65 Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic 
Assessment of Sovereignty," 106.
66 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics/ 183.
67 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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longer think in terms of self-defence among 
themselves J’68 Functionalism weeds out social attributes 
which provoke human confrontation by changing the 
structure of the international system. Functionalism
would use, through a natural social selection, every 
prospect of linking together the life of peoples in 
particular serving unities, removing as many sections 
of international life as possible from the ambit of 
confrontation to the ambit of co-existence; whereas 
from long experience a general political appeal has 
tended to draw out competitive-aggressive traits — and 
from the same people, in the same time and from the 
same devotion to a common weal.69
The functionalist’s goal is not only to eradicate 
the causes of war, which include scarcity of resources 
and depriving the citizenry of basic human needs.70 "To 
think of international peace as only the prevention of 
violence is to ignore the factors of social unity and 
growth, of social life, and to concentrate on what is
an occasional disturbance of it."71 72Moreover, the 
importance of the functionalist alternative to the 
issue of world order is the ’’the process of dealing 
with such deficiencies within organizations which, it
is believed, produced the new dynamic of
was noted before, the functionalist
establishes gradually a new practical
peace.”72 As
alternative
”ethos” in
eg Mitrany, The Progress of International 
Governsien tr 171.
69 Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical 
Perspective,” 540.
70 Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David 
Mitrany,” 129.
71 Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics, 181.
72 Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David 
Mitrany," 129. (Emphasis added.)
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cooperation between states working in international 
agencies. In such a setting, Taylor writes
They become more involved in questions which relate to 
the broadest sense to welfare: the question of whether 
or not to hand over the responsibility for defence or 
foreign policy, for instance, to a common institution 
is bypassed because it has become irrelevant. The 
substantive issues of politics, even high politics, 
have changed,73
Mitrany’s application of functionalism could be seen as 
an attempt to separate the concept of the nation from 
the state. The "state," as mentioned above, is the 
legal manifestation of the political community; the 
"nation" represents the cultural and social 
characteristics of a group of people.74 75It is not the 
purpose of functionalism to disturb the cultural, 
national, or religious identity of the state. The 
functionalist approach does not seem to suggest that 
the cultural or religious identity of a nation need to 
clash with the solving of common economic and social 
problems of the modern age/5 What is important for the 
functionalist is that the various international 
agencies set up a pragmatic source of implementation in 
problem solving. But "[ujntil states are willing or 
coerced to surrender their sovereignty to international 
organizations," Michael Haas warns, the "effects of
73 Ibid., 132. (Emphasis added.)
74 The concept of the nation and its relevance to 
the issue of sovereignty will be dealt with later in 
this chapter.
75 For example, read David Mitrany, "Should 
Christianity Count in International Relations," The 
Hibbert Journal, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (1948): 160-163. For 
an interesting comparison, read Samuel P. Huntington, 
"Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 
3 (Summer 1993): 22-50.
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international institutions will not transform the world 
polity. ”76
NEO-FUNCTIONALISM; HAAS' RESPONSE TO THE FUNCTIONALIST
APPROACH
The functionalist "strategy” inspired Haas to look 
at the establishment of European unity at the end of 
the Second World War.77 In examining the course of 
European unity, Haas also shared Fukuyama's belief that 
post-War Europe existed in an "end of ideology."78 His
efforts resulted in the publication of his The Uniting 
of Europe (1958), which is essentially an extensive 
analysis of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) .79 After the Second World War the key goal for 
Europeans was to build a Europe which eschewed the 
political ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.80 The ECSC, established between 1951-1952,
76 Michael Haas, "A Functional Approach to 
International Organization," Journal of Politics, Vol 
27, No. 3 (August 1965); 500-501.
77 R.J. Harrison, "Neo-functionalism," in Groom and 
Taylor, Framework for International Cooperation, 139.
78 Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism, and the 
New Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., International 
Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1968), 
150. At the time Haas was writing The Uniting of 
Europe, Daniel Bell wrote The End of Ideology (Glencoe: 
The Free Press, 1960). It should be noted that most of 
the material in Bell's book pertained to the political 
culture in the United States.
79 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, 
Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1968). In this new edition's 
Preface, Haas explores some of the difficulties that 
neo-functionalism has encountered in the 1960s (ibid., 
xi-xxx). Some of these difficulties will be explored 
later in this chapter.
80 Volkmar Lauber, "From Growth Consensus to 
Fragmentation in Western Europe: Political Polarization 
over Redistribution and Ecology," Comparative Politics,
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was in part an attempt to neutralize the economic and 
political threat of West Germany?1 By uniting the 
European states of France, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy in this economic 
joint venture, the ECSC hoped to serve as an instrument 
in soothing ancient phobias and building a structure of 
trust and cooperation/2
The "neo-functionalist” approach strengthens (or 
elaborates upon) the basic tenets of Mitrany's work. 
While the functionalist approach does not, according to 
Lindberg and Scheingold, make a direct attack on the 
state,* 81 82 83 4the first major issue that the neo­
functionalist approach confronts is Mitrany's 
understanding of the concept of political community. In 
the spirit of perceiving economic and social issues in 
a "mechanical" fashion, Mitrany defines the concept of 
the political community as being "the sum of the 
functions carried out by its members. "S4 Ilaas finds this
Vol. 15 (1983): 332, See also Fukuyama, The End. of 
History and the Last Manf 270.
81 William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, 
Understanding the European Communities (New York: 
Philip Allan, 1990), 8.
82 The European statesmen Jean Monnet and Robert 
Schuman, were responsible for helping bring about the 
ECSC. Their line of reasoning will be looked at in 
Chapter IV of this dissertation.
83 Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, 
Europe’s Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the 
European Community (Englewoods Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1970), 7.
84 Quoted in Harrison, Europe in Question, 37, The 
actual quote can be found in Mitrany's International 
Congress on Mental Health, Proceedings on the 
International Conference on Mental Hygiene (London: 
Lewis and Co., 1948), IV, 84.
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definition nebulous because it "leaves in doubt whether
'members are individuals, voluntary groups, or 
functional agencies, and begs the question of the 
nature of the functions involved, for Mitrany surely 
cannot mean all functions, including waging war, that 
at present are within the scope of political 
communities. "S5
In his writings, Haas dissects the traditional 
understanding of the political community which, as 
earlier identified, is the state. For Haas, there are 
certain environmental conditions which foster (or 
encourage) the progress of integration between 
political communities. Haas seems to emphasize the need 
for the members of a political community to demonstrate 
loyalty "to a set of symbols and institutions when it 
habitually and predictably over long periods obeys the 
injunctions of their authority and turns to them for 
the satisfaction of important expectations.”85 6 Haas 
identifies the political community as a "process" in 
which its members (such as specific groups and 
individuals) demonstrate more allegiance
to their central political institutions than to any 
other political authority, in a specific period of time 
and in a definable geographic space.87
In the political community, Haas also identifies the 
need for pluralism. The political communities that make 
up Western Europe, for example, are pluralistic
85 Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), 22.
86 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, 5.
r Ibid.
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because ”[a]rticulate voluntary groups, led by 
bureaucratized but accessible elites, compete with each 
other more or less rationally for political power and 
social status."88 While these various groups compete for 
power/9 the political communities that make up Western 
Europe are described by Haas as enjoying an "index of 
ideological homogeneity” because
the parties are, very roughly, the same among all the 
countries in the cluster, [and] the principles 
professed and the concrete socio-economic interests 
represented by the parties are roughly analogous on 
both sides of a frontier.90
Finally, the political communities of Western Europe
are advanced economies which "correlated" with 
industrialization ^Haas finds ^a "usual high degree of 
urbanization and evergrowing demands for government 
services and durable consumer goods."91 * In this 
economic and political climate, the individual members 
of the West European political communities, through a 
democratic process, are "mobilized and participat[e] in 
this process through affiliation with mass 
organizations. ”93
For Haas, Mitrany’s functionalist approach 
emphasizes the technical side of international politics 
by "identifying those aspects of human needs and
88 Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The 
European and the Universal Process," International 
Organization XV (1961): 374.
89 Ernst B. Haas, "The United States of Europe," 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 63 (1948): 530-532.
90 Haas, "International Integration: The European 
and the Universal Process," 374.
91 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
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desires that exist and clamor for attention outside the 
realm of the political.”93 94In the functionalist 
approach, Mitrany believes that
[i]nternational conflict is best tamed by entrusting 
the work of increasing human welfare to experts, 
technical specialists, and their professional 
associations. Being interested in tasks rather than 
power, they can be expected to achieve agreement where 
statesmen will fail,.,™
"Step-by-step schemes of material cooperation, evolving 
in an unplanned fashion, " Haas also observes of the 
functionalist approach y'will eventually work themselves 
out in the direction of a world-wide system of 
cooperation."95 Haas, however, asks this fundamental 
question:
...Do people "learn" to think in non-national terms 
because of a pattern of technical cooperation? This is 
indeed the central issue in the functionalist theory of 
change. At first, it seems to be only the experts and 
managers who learn *They become habituated to consulting 
with their opposite numbers from other nations about 
technical problems, and eventually they come to see all 
problems from the perspective of mankind as a whole.96
The neo-functionalist takes the functionalist 
approach a step further. In ascertaining the process of 
integration, Haas asserts that in bringing about its 
imp1ement at i on,
... others beside experts, managers, and civil servants 
will participate and undergo the same process, 
particularly by way of greatly increased work and 
responsibility on the part of international voluntary 
groups. Learning becomes a species of group therapy.97
93 Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, 6.
94 Ibid., 11. (Emphasis added.)
95 Ibid., 20.
96 Ibid., 13.
™ Ibid, (Emphas1s added.)
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It is through the influence of interest groups and 
political parties that states "look at ways in 
encouraging the further progression of integration/8 
”[T]he successful realization of such a program/’ Haas 
reasons, "depends on continuing [support of] 
supranational activity; it cannot be terminated with 
the publication of a single decree or ruling/’98 9
For Haas, the "essence" of the integration 
process "lies in the tendency for economic and social 
decisions to ’spillover’ into the realm of the 
j’100 101The two important levels to the 
spillover process are functional spillover and
political spillover/01 Functional spillover refers to 
the idea "that some sectors within the industrial
economies are so interdependent that it is impossible 
to treat them in isolation/’102 Harrison also notes 
that "the sector [or function] chosen [to begin the 
integration process] must be important and 
controversial, but not so controversial that the vital 
interests of the states are immediately affected, nor 
so that their power and vested interests are seriously
98 Haas, The Uniting of Europe. 287.
99 Ibid.
100 Haas, Technocracy, Pluralism and the New 
Europe," 152.
101 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-Functionalism and the 
EC," 4-6. Tranholm-Mikkelsen’s typology of spillover is 
based upon Stephen George, Politico and Policy in the 
European Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), in 
note 7, 21-28. George categorizes cultivated spillover 
as "the role of the commission."
102 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism and the
EC, " 4.
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threatened,"103 For Harrison, political parties and 
interest groups perceive integration as a viable option 
because in Europe, for example, its governments face 
"problems which stem from increasing interdependence, 
and from the new burdens not fully matched by new 
capacity."10'4 In integrating the economic market, for 
example, Lindberg and Scheingold write that it "makes 
systematic coordination of economic policy for the 
entire area possible, thus enhancing stability and 
adding continuity of economic growth."105
Neo-functionalist scholars define political 
spillover as an education process in which interest 
groups and political parties develop "the perception 
that their interests are better served by seeking 
supranational rather than national solutions,"106 In 
other words, Haas perceives integration to be a process 
where states "shift their loyalties, expectations, and 
political activities toward a new and larger center, 
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over 
the pre-existing national states."107 108 "Such
reorientation will lead to calls for further 
integration, hence providing the process with political 
impetus, "l0S
103 Harrison, Europe in Question, 16.
104 Ibid., 12.
105 Lindberg and Scheingold, Europe's Would Be 
Polity, 9.
106 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionali,sm and the 
EC," 5. (Emphasis added.)
107 Haas, "International Integration: The European 
and the Universal Process," 366-367.
108 Ibid.
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In shifting economic and social issues to the 
political realm, integration "is taken to mean the 
deliberate creation of institutionalized cooperation 
among states."109 After all, Haas does not advocate the 
neo-functionalist approach to be a teleological one?10 
For Haas, neo-functionalism does not emerge because it 
is the next ’’scientific" step in the progress of 
international political theory. In his writings, Haas 
asserts that "the possible integrative consequences of 
interdependence are based on political acts that are 
not predicted by the theory."111 Neo-functionalism is a 
process insofar as interest groups and political 
parties of member states make a conscious effort in 
influencing the integration process. Haas writes:
In terms of a social process based on rational human 
perceptions and motives, no mere concept "calls for" or 
"needs" anything: a discrete set of group motives, 
converging with motives of cognate groups from across 
the border, results in a certain pattern of policy; the 
aims and the policy reflect demands born from the 
environment, and the later policies may well change the 
environment in a wholly unintended fashion. Only in 
this sense, then, does industrial urbanism favor 
integration. Because the modern "industrial-political" 
actor fears that his way of life cannot be safeguarded 
without structural adaptation, he turns to integration; 
but by the same token, political actors who are neither 
industrial, nor urban, nor modern in their outlook 
usually do not favor this kind of adaptation, for they 
seek refuge in national exclusiveness.112
109 Brigid haffan, "European integration, " in 
Michael Foley, ed., Ideas that Shape Politics
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 111. 
(Emphasis added.)
110 Haas, "International Integration: The European 
and the Universal Process," 375.
111 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism and the 
EC," 9.
112 Haas, "International Integration: The European 
and the Universal Process," 375.
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Neo-functionalism replaces ideological dogma with the 
organization of central institutions on a regional 
(rather than international} scale which would develop 
and implement social programs. Neo-functionalism is 
built upon particular circumstances and attempts to 
create, in the long run, a new structural framework in 
which citizen allegiance to a regional government would 
replace allegiance to state government. For Haas, the 
establishment of supranational institutions:
symbolizes the victory of economics over politicsz over 
that familiar ethnocentric nationalism which used to 
subordinate butter to guns, reason to passion, 
statistical bargaining to excited demands,113 *
The neo-functionalist is aware that a regional 
collection of states is a complex edifice of 
heterogeneous interests and values.111 Political 
spillover can only be achieved when the role of the 
regional government is preferred to the role of the 
national government in solving a particular problem. 
The case of "unanimous national opposition to 
supranational action could be considered incompatible 
with community sentiment."115 The important challenge to 
the neo-functionalist approach is to establish, in the 
short run, a procedure which reconciles a plethora of 
competing interests and values. Member states, through 
a supranational entity, "channel their objections
113 Haas, 
Europe," 159.
114 Haas,
115 Haas,
"Technocracy, Pluralism, and the New
(Emphasis added.)
’’The United States of Europe,’’ 230. 
The Uniting of Europe, 9,
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through the legal avenues provided instead of 
threatening or practising secession.’’116
THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONALISM AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN
WESTERN EUROPE
Haas and Mitrany explore in their writings the 
theme of the end of ideological conflict in 
international relations. At the time of their writings, 
Haas and Mitrany perceived that the international 
community was arriving at a consensus regarding the 
optimal relationship between state and citizen. Because 
of that ideological consensus, both Mitrany and Haas 
concluded that the international system could now 
preoccupy themselves with economic and social issues. 
For Haas and Mitrany, this preoccupation with economic 
activity would shift certain functions from the state 
to either the global or regional level. Reflecting the 
spirit of both schools of thought, Nicholas G. Onuf 
writes
Only if political theory reaches beyond, the casual 
sequence of authority, law, and order, which is at its 
heart and searches for the origins and limits of each 
do we have a chance of explaining international 
order.117
Both Haas and Mitrany also observe the need for 
international relations to evolve beyond the state as 
the principal foci of political power and the 
international political system.118 For example, John
116 Ibid., 10.
1,7 Onuf, "International legal Order as an Idea,"
245.
118 For example, read Edmund Fawcett, ’’Francis 
Fukuyama: The End of History and the Last Man,” 
Millenium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 21,
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Stoessinger argues that the advent of the global 
economic market is making the concept of sovereignty 
(the legal basis for the state) less salient in 
international politics.119 This is because the state 
itself is losing much of its autonomy over certain
functions which were considered before to be 
domestic.120 121In an interdependent environment, the state 
finds itself tangled in a ’’seamless web” of "diverse 
relationships.1(121
According to Fukuyama, the concept of national 
identity in Western Europe also appears to be losing 
its salience. For Fukuyama, the aspiration of an ever 
closer European Union would result in transforming 
national identity into a depoliticized entity, and 
simply become a parochial concern in West European 
political culture.122 Fukuyama writes that the empirical 
evidence suggests that national identity in Western 
Europe has been "Turkified;" that is, "no modern 
European nationalism any longer defines itself in terms 
of rule over other nations."123 As Fukuyama and Haas
No. 1 (1992) : 206 and Fred Halliday, "Tin Encounter with
Fukuyama," New Left Review, no. 193 (May/June 1992) : 
86-96.
119 John Stoessinger, "The Anatomy of the Nation­
state and the Nature of Power," in Richard Little and 
Michael Smith, eds., Perspectives on World Polities, 
Second Edition (London: Routledge, 1992), 25-26.
120 David Held, "New Times: Farewell Nation-State," 
Marxism Today, December 1988, 12-17.
121 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4.
122 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Plan,
271.
123 Francis Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy as a 
Global Phenomenon, ’’ PS: Political Science and Politics, 
Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1991): 663.
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seem to suggest the modernization of communication and 
technology is creating the world (and for Western 
Europe, in particular) into a more integrated 
environment to lived24
As described above, the political communities of 
Western Europe possess the essential prerequisites in 
implementing political integration. However, Haas, in 
his later writings, became dubious as to whether or not 
neo-functionalism was (and is) a viable explanation of 
West European politics. In the late 1960s, for example. 
Western Europe experienced difficulties in its 
establishing and implementing institutions to promote 
European unity at the political level.125 
"Disintegration and national immobilisme, " a frustrated 
Haas writes, "appear to dominate, rather than the 
advance of regional government.”126 Haas writes,
Converging economic goals embedded in the bureaucratic, 
pluralistic, and industrial life of modern Europe 
provided the crucial impetus. The economic technician, 
the innovating industrialist, and trade unionist 
advanced the movement — not the politician, the 
scholar, the poet, or the writer J27
124 For a review, 
Post-Cold War World," 
Eugene R. Wittkroph, eds., 
Foreign Policy (New York: 
17-18'.
125 Donald 
International 
Studies, Vol.
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Europe," 150.
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Moreover, integration, writes Haas, was a "conservative 
impulse."128 West Europeans, after the Second World War, 
had no desire to create a "new society"; rather, "each 
sought only to safeguard an existing way of life given 
a new birth through victory in World War II,”129
In this final section, this chapter takes a 
theoretical examination of the concepts of national 
identity and state sovereignty. Nationalism is 
discussed here because, as this dissertation will
examine later, it reflects one of the two fundamental 
ideas in contemporary British politics. This chapter 
sets the stage in its attempt to understand why a 
certain segment of the Scottish population hold 
aspirations for Scotland to assert its independence 
from the rest of the UK. The concept of state 
sovereignty represents the second fundamental idea in 
contemporary British politics because there are those, 
for example, in the British Conservative Party who 
perceive the European Union as a fundamental threat to 
the UK’s historic institutions and traditions. Before 
embarking in examining the British case-study of this 
dissertation, however, it is necessary to define how
128 Ibid., xviii
129 Ibid. See also James E. Cronin, "The End of an 
Era in British Politics," Current History, November 
1991, 363-367; John Fenske, "France’s Uncertain 
Progress Towards European Union," Current History, 
November 1991, 358-362; John Lukacs, "The Stirrings of 
Europe," Harper's, August 1990, 41-48; and Marlise 
Simons, "Hella Haasse; The Return of History," 
International Herald Tribune, 23 March 1993, 20.
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this study perceives and understands national identity 
and state sovereignty.
A. DEFINING ETHNICITY, NATION, AND STATE.
The concept of nationalism is a far more potent 
force in contemporary West European politics than the 
mere sense of patriotism. George Orwell defines the 
latter as ’’devotion to a particular place and a 
particular way of life, which one believes to be the 
best in the world but has no wish to force upon other 
people.”130 Patriotism, Orwell -writes, is not defensive 
(culturally or otherwise) in nature.131 132Nationalism 
articulates the norms of the nation or national
consciousness. The latter is a form of cultural and
political identity which, as will be demonstrated in 
the Scottish case, allows nationals "to compare their 
own achievements and capacities with those of 
others. 1,132
The concept of nationalism is the political 
expression of the nation.133 There is, however, much 
disagreement over what the latter means. Thorsten V. 
Kalijarvi, for example, understands the nation to be a
130 George Orwell, Collected Essays (London: Martin 
Seeker and Warburg, Ltd., 1961), 282.
131 Ibid.
132 John Plamenatz, ’’Two Types of Nationalism, ” in
Marc Williams, ed., International Relations in the 
Twentieth Century: A Reader (London: MacMillan 
Education, Ltd., 1989), 45. See also Chapter V of this
dissertation.
133 Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, "Nationalism, ’’ in Feliks 
Gross, ed., European Ideologies: A Survey of Twentieth 
Century Political Ideas, with an Introduction by Robert 
M. Maclver (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948),
542.
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specific group of people who live within defined 
territorial borders and believe their cultural society 
to be distinct/34 Anthony D. Smith writes that while 
ethnicity determines the origins of a nation,* 135 the 
nation, as he describes it, is a modern concept with
a named human population sharing an historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members J36
F. H. Kinsley refers to the nation as a "state of mind 
in which the supreme loyalty is felt to be owed to the 
nation or the nation-state."137
The nation, according to Connor, pertains to "a 
group of people who believe they are ancestrally 
related. It is the largest grouping that shares that 
belief."138 The nation, in other words, is a social 
concept which pertains to ethnic loyalty.139 Ethnies, 
or ethnicity, are
constituted , not by lines of physical descent [that 
is, race], but by the sense of continuity, shared 
memory and collective destiny, [that is] by lines of 
cultural affinity embodied in distinctive myths,
334 Ibid.
135 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1991), 41-42.
136 Ibid., 14. (Emphasis added.)
137 F. II. I-Iinsley, "The Impact of Nationalism, " in 
Brian Porter, ed., The Aberystwyth Papers:
International Politics (1919-1969) , with a Foreword by 
H.R.H. " ■" _ Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh
(London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 186.
138 Walker Connor, "From Tribe to Nation," History 
of European Ideas, Vol. 13, No.1/2 (1991): 6.
139 Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation­
Destroying, " World Politics, Vol. 24 (April 1972): 334. 
(Emphasis added.)
memories , symbols and values retained by a given 
cultural unit of the population
While the issue of language is important for those 
who advocate independence , for example,- in Quebec140 41 , 
Smith’s definition of ethnicity eschews this particular 
issue. At a general levels Smith does not perceive the 
subject of language as an important element in the 
formation of an ethnic group because what is important 
is that the ethnic group in question is able to trace a 
common history and culture. Ethnic historic.-m, as Smith 
defines it, is to establish a ’’particular ethnic 
atmosphere, unique to that community, and the provision 
of moral qualities (and heroic embodiments) particular 
to the group.”142 In Scotland, as mentioned before in 
the Introduction to this study, there is precisely this 
sense of common history and culture which includes 
their own sense of what it means to be sovereign 
(Declaration of Arbroath, 1320) and of their own
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140 Smith, National Identity, 29. (Emphasis added.)
141 This issue is discussed in Steven K. Holloway, 
"Canada without Quebec," Orbis, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Fall 
1992): 531-545 and David Milne, "Whither Canadian 
Federalism? Alternative Constitutional Futures," in 
Michael Burgess and Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., Comparative 
Federalism and Federation: Competing Traditions and 
Future Directions (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 
206-211.
142 Anthony D. Smith, "Introduction," in Anthony D. 
Smith, ed., Nationalist Movements (London: The 
MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1976), 17.
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education and legal system,'43 James Halliday,- of the 
Scottish National Party143 4  believes that without
...that history, and without that heritage it would be 
exceedingly difficult to make a case for Scottish 
identity and then for Scottish independence. If 
Scotland had never been, it would be almost impossible 
to create it, starting now, from scratch. The wrongs 
which we endure; the indignities and humiliations to 
which we are exposedr are wrongs and indignities 
precisely because they are inflicted upon a national 
community. Because we have a past our grievance has to 
it an extra dimension. We can look at our plight and 
ask, 'Need these things be?'... Our past gives us an 
extra political option and an alternative solution to 
our problems, which would not be available to us if 
Scotland had to be created by some act of will here and 
now. Our former existence gives to our present claims a 
special justice and an extra urgency. 145
For Smith, then, the decisive characteristic for an 
ethnic group is its ability to trace a distinct 
historical and cultural past. Such an awareness, as 
Smith writes, is the essence of ethnicity "for they can 
indicate much about the likelihood of ethnic
consciousness developing into ethnic nationalism and, 
hence, into a secessionist movement."146
A main concern with contemporary scholarship of 
the study of nationalism is that it defines nation as
143 Interview with Dr. Robert D. McIntyre at his 
residence in Stirling, Scotland, 24 March 1995. See 
also his maiden speech in Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), House of Commons, Vol. 5, Fifth Series, 
Session 1944-1945, 1 May 1945, cols. 1299-1303.
144 For a biographical sketch of Halliday, see 
Chapter V of this dissertation.
145 James Halliday, "Scotland the Separate, " 
Heritage of Scotland: The Historical Basis and 
Characteristics of Nationalist Aspirations in Scotland. 
1. (Emphasis added.) See also Alasdair Gray, Why Scots 
Should Rule Scotland (Edinburgh: Canongate press,
1992) .
146 Smith, "Introduction," 49. (Emphasis added,)
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loyalty to the state?47 The state, for Frankel, is a 
legal concept?48 While the state is made up of a group 
of people who may or may not be homo g erj>£bus,149 it is 
concerned with legal (and political) issues such as the 
formation of government and the protection of 
sovereignty?50 The state also has the specific duty to 
maintain domestic order?51 Joseph Frankel writes:
[States] have the monopoly of political organization at 
its highest level and the monopoly of territory/? .J 
States have also the near-monopoly of force — they 
determine the degree of freedom or constraint 
applicable to the inhabitants of their territories and 
they determine the ultimate issues of international 
peace and war?52
B. PROBLEM OF NATIONAL IDENTITY WITHIN THE NATION STATE
Another concern of contemporary scholarship is 
that scholars underestimate the impact of the concept 
of national identity in West European politics. This is 
because the occidental understanding of nationalism is 
based upon the principle of nation-building which is 
the political assimilation of ethnic (or national) 
groups into a single nation?53
The assimilation of ethnic groups into a single 
nation requires the latter acquiring a certain degree 147 148 149 150 * 152 153
147 Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying, "
335.
148 Joseph Frankel, International Politics;
Conflict and Harmony (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
Ltd., 1973 [1969]), 38.
149 Ibid., 37.
150 Ibid., 37-38. See also Hinsley, "The Impact of 
Nationalism," 188-189.
155 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1983), 4.
152 Frankel, International Politicsf 35.
153 Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World: 
The Present in Historical Perspective," 20.
91
of political participation. Such participation finds 
meaning in the rule of the state. Tracing this 
political concept back to the time of the French 
Revolution, the concept of state rule is not determined 
by divine authority; instead all citizens
were endowed with individual liberties and with 
national obligations. Government was by all and for 
all; it was to be democratic as well as national. For 
political democracy and humanitarian nationalism were 
born together in France; they were twins; they were 
different but simultaneous of the same humanitarian 
parentage.154
As will be shown in the analysis of the British 
Conservative Party's attitude to the Union of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland,155 156 157the assimilation of 
English ..Scots and Welsh under a single parliamentary 
framework has brought about "diversity within unity.1,156
Smith's definition of the modern nation
nation with the state/can be seen in Greatn
which it
blends the
Britain in
is depicted as one great family, the members as 
brothers and sisters of the motherland or fatherland, 
speaking their mother tongue. In this way the family 
but evokes similarly strong loyalties and vivid 
attachments. Even where local allegiances are tolerated 
and real families given their due the language and 
symbolism of the nation asserts its priority and, 
through the state and citizenship, exerts its legal and 
bureaucratic pressures on the family, using similar 
kinship to justify itself j51
154 Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern 
Nationalism, 35-36.
155 See Chapter VI of this dissertation.
156 Ian Lang, The Fulfilled Society (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 
1993), 14. (Emphasis added.)
157 Smith, National Identity, 79. (Emphasis added.)
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As mentioned before, Fukuyama writes that the 
Industrial Revolution also encouraged (but is not the 
sole criterion of) the process of nation-building?58 
The nation state "could not become really unified 
political entities until there was sufficient 
improvement of the mechanical arts to admit of swift 
intercommunication of persons and ideas within a wide 
area/'158 59 The increase in technology "establishes a 
uniform horizon of economic production
possibilities?’160 Groups of people are inevitably 
brought together to create a larger community of common 
interests and values. This process replaces 
"traditional" group formations (e.g. tribe, sect, etc.) 
"with economically rational ones based on function and 
efficiency, and provide[s] for the universal education 
of their citizens."161 As a result, the nation state 
becomes an "elaborate" system of division of labor.162
At the end of the twentieth century technology has
shifted from the era of the industrial to the era of 
the microchip. Zbigniew Brzezinski defines post 
industrial society as the "technetronic" era, in which 
the latter is "shaped culturally, psychologically, 
socially, and economically by the impact of technology 
and electronics — particularly in the area of
158 See Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last 
Man, 134 and Chapter II of this dissertation.
159 I-Iayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern 
Na tionalism, 233.
160 Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man,
xiv.
161 Ibid., xv.
162 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 4,
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computers and communications."163 Reflecting the 
attitude of Haas and Mitrany, Brezezinski asserts that 
the impact of the technetronic era on the nation state 
is that it is ’’altering the mores, the social 
structure, the values, and the global outlook of 
society. "l64
In the technetronic era the sovereignty of the 
nation state is, for Brzezinski, "no longer the vital 
subject, . . of dynamic processes J'165 lie observes that 
the technetronic age requires the nation state to be 
involved in regional and global cooperation in order to 
fulfill its interests J66 Moreover, as Arend Lijphart 
critiques, the technetronic age encourages the end of 
ideology which
implies not only the end of ideological politics but of 
all other types of politics, including ethnic politics , 
that are not purely pragmatic. In an age and in a world 
in which ideology is coming to an end, the resurgence 
of ethnic conflict seems unthinkable.167
West European bankers, industrial associations, trade 
unions, and other technocrats help shape the new Europe
163 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: 
America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: The 
Viking Press, Inc., 1970}, 9. Brzezinski also spells 
out his understanding of the technetronic era in 
’’America in the Technetronic Age: New Questions of Our 
Time,” Encounter, January 1968), 16-26.
164 Brzezinski, Between Two Ages, xiv-xv.
105 Ibid., 54.
166 Ibid.
167 Arend Lijphart, ’’Political Theories and the 
Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the Western World: 
Falsified Predictions and Plausible Postdictions," in 
Esman, Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, 51. 
(Emphasis added.) See also Bell, The End of Ideology, 
393-407.
94
by encouraging joint ventures in areas such as tele­
communications JGS Leonard R. Sussman writes:
Everyone will have immediate access, at home or at the 
workplace, or through a nearby communal telephone, to a 
vast volume of diverse information — a volume such as 
even the world’s finest libraries or news services 
cannot provide today. The cultures of even the 
smallest, least familiar peoples will be preserved, and 
made accessible to everyone, everywhere. New 
communications technologies will induce the human mind 
to think more clearly, to test new possibilities, to 
gain confidence and even exhilaration from the process 
of idea-discovery J69
Modernization, however, is not a universal panacea 
because it cannot by itself guarantee a more pacific 
political environment J70 According to Lijphart, 
modernization works well in the early stages of social 
development, but not in the later stages.* 169 170 171 In the 
early stages, groups of people are forced to redirect 
"loyalties from the traditional influences of the 
family and the immediate community to larger groups and 
more cosmopolitan symbols."172
Modernization can bring about within the ethnic 
groups what Milton Gordon refers to as "liberal
See, for example, Wayne Sandholtz, 
"Institutions and Collective Action: The New 
Telecommunications in Western Europe," World Politics 
Vol. 45 (January 1993): 242-270.
169 Leonard R. Sussman, "The Information 
Revolution: Human Ideas and Electronic Impulses," 
Encounter, November 1989, 60.
170 Ibid., 62.
171 Lijphart, "Political Theories and the 
Explanation of Ethnic Conflict in the Western World," 
48.
172 Cyril E. Black, "Challenges to an Evolving 
Legal Order,” in Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black, 
eds., The Future of the International Legal Order: 
Trends and Patterns, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1969), 5.
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expectancy;"173 that is, ethnic groups, unlike Smith’s 
definition of national identity asserting their 
historic and cultural identity, develop certain 
expectations from tho state. Ethnic groups’ main 
concern is not cultural identity, hut the attainment of 
economic, political, and social status in the state. 
This point reflects the attitude of economic 
nationalists in the Scottish National Party like Jim 
Sillars and Alan Macartney.174 175 176Their belief, as will be 
discussed later in this dissertation, is that 
Scotland’s membership of Great Britain is an 
anachronistic phenomenon because of the growing 
influence and economic power of the European Union?75 
For Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, then, ethnic 
groups become (as a result of liberal expectancy) 
cognizant of their (perhaps supposed) social 
inequalities?76 Modernization "intensifies the gulf in
173 Milton M. Gordon, "Toward a Theory of Racial 
and Ethnic Group Relations," in Nathan Glazer and 
Daniel P. Moynihan, eds., with the assistance of 
Corinne Saposs Schelling, Ethnicity: Theory and 
Experience (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 
34-111.
174 For a brief biographical sketch of Sillars and 
Macartney, see Chapter V of this dissertation.
175 For example, read Allan Macartney, The New 
Politics for Independence, SNP Conference Issue (1995): 
5-6 and Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of 
Commons, Vol. 836, Fifth Series, Session 1971-1972, 3 
May 1972, cols. 531-540.
176 Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, 
"Introduction," in Glazer and Moynihan, Ethnicity: 
Theory and Experience, 6-1. See also Smith, "The Ethnic 
Sources of Nationalism," 54.
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the material condition of mankind even as it contracts 
mankind’s subjective tolerance of that disparity."177
A central question addressed in this study is 
whether or not Britain (or the rest of Western Europe 
for that matter) has reached the end of ideology. This 
study agrees with Lijphart that the latter term implies 
"a misleading hyperbole and only means the decline of 
ideology."178 The term itself "does not mean the gradual 
disappearance of ideology, but the convergence of 
existing ideologies and to the growth of an ideological 
consensus — that is, the appearance of a new, 
generally accepted ideology."179 Moreover, Lijphart 
writes
. . . the ideologies that the theory, at least in its 
original and most authoritative formulations, was 
concerned with were the radical weltanschauungen of the 
left and the right — Marxism and doctrinaire laissez 
faire — instead of the whole range of value and belief 
systems that can be subsumed under the more or less 
loosely defined concept of ideology.180
The technetronic age has, for Connor, made groups of 
people all the more aware of their uniqueness.181 "As 
formal education and globe-girdling communications have 
spread,” Connor notes, "the likelihood of people 
becoming cognizant of historic and contemporary self­
determination movements has also spread. ”182
177 Brzezinski, Between Two Ages, 52.
178 Lijphart, "Political Theories and the 
Explanation of the Ethnic Conflict in the Western 
World," 51. (Emphasis in the original.)
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
181 Connor, "Ethnonationalism in the First World; 
The Present in Historical Experience," 29.
182 Ibid., 32.
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C. THE PROBLEM OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN WESTERN EUROPE
F.H. Hinsley discusses the concept of sovereignty 
in relation to the principle of power.183 As another 
fundamental idea in the history of political thought, 
Hinsley explains how sovereignty has evolved in the 
history of European politics. While at one time, for 
example, sovereignty in Britain rested in divine 
authority, it now rests in a parliamentary framework in 
which it ’’has the unlimited authority recognized by the 
courts, to make any law or amend any law already made. 
In consequence, no other body has the right to overrule 
or set aside its legislation.”184 185From a democratic 
perspective, sovereignty, Ghia Nodia argues, rests with 
those who make up the state ?S5 In this respect, the 
principle of sovereignty rests upon legitimacy from the 
state, in which "the government actually represents the 
political life of its people. ”186 187The state, as a 
political institution, is distinct in respect as to how 
one organizes power between government and the body 
politic J87
183 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, Second Edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 1.
184 From Vernon Bogdenor, The Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Political Institutions. Quoted in 
Geoffrey Howe, "Sovereignty and Interdependence: 
Britain’s Place in the World," International Affairs, 
Vol. 66, No. 4 (1990): 677
185 Ghia Nodia, "Nationalism and Democracy, " 
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Ocotber 1992): 8.
186 Michael Walzer, "The Moral Standing of States: 
A Response to Four Critics," Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1980): 214.
187 Hinsley, Sovereignty, 3.
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In respect to this dissertation's British case 
study, the concept of sovereignty is based upon what 
Alan James defines as its basic component; state 
practice dss In this respect, sovereignty, as James 
understands it, has the three following components: 
legal, absolute, and unitary,, Sovereignty is legal 
because the state’s constitution grants the latter’s 
central government predominant' law-making power,188 89 The 
state is absolute because no other component of the 
state can legislate or enact laws above the central 
government. As will be shown in the UK model, the state 
is the legal expression of the body politic; "it 
represents a certain territorial area of the globe and 
the people who live within it.”190 Moreover, sovereignty 
is, such as in the UK, unitary because the 
constitution grants the central government of the state 
the capacity to engage in international activity. James 
writes that sovereignty is unitary because:
The exercise of particular powers in the name of a 
sovereign state is not to be confused with the 
existence of the state as the kind of territorial 
entity which is called sovereign. In the one case there 
are many powers and many exercising them. In the other 
there is a single state in a condition which is unitary 
in the sense that it cannot be divided into entirely 
separate compartments. The state's sovereign powers are 
a reflection of its sovereignty or constitutional 
standing.191
188 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of 
International Society. Key Concepts in International 
Relations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 22-31.
189 Ibid., 49.
190 Ibid., 40-1.
191 Ibid., 51. (Emphasis added.)
99
Sovereignty, as J.D.B. Miller notes, grants the 
state a distinguished identity; that is, "this identity 
enables a state to play a role going well beyond that 
which might have appeared to play before it became 
sovereign,”192 Unlike James, Miller identifies the 
source of sovereignty in International law. 
International law, argues Miller, is a form of 
authority which acknowledges the state to be sovereign. 
Without the acknowledgment of international law the 
state's "opportunities for intercourse with other 
communities are restricted, and the likelihood that it 
will retain its positions is remote, unless influential 
states give its support."193 James, on the other hand, 
perceives sovereignty to come from the state's 
constitution. International law is simply, for James, a 
body of rules which gives the state certain duties and 
rights. Sovereignty, James, does not originate from 
international law.194
The state, Hedley Bull writes, is (or can be) an 
active partner in international society by upholding 
common interests, rules, and values through the working 
of common institutions.195 James concurs by noting that 
while the state is a sovereign entity, it does not have 
the autonomy to engage carte blanche in international
192 J.D.B. Miller, "Sovereignty as a Source of 
Vitality for the State," Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (April 1986): 84.
193 Ibid,, 80.
194 James, Sovereign Statehood, 40.
195 Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order 
In World Politics, 13.
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activity?96 David Held, for example distinguishes the 
difference between a state's autonomy and sovereignty. 
A state's sovereignty refers to its "legal and actual
control over the determination of the 
direction national policy.”196 97 *Autonomy, on the other 
hand, refers to a state’s ability to achieve goals 
independently from the outside world. States no longer 
possess that luxury "because in an interdependent world 
all instruments of national policy may be less 
effective. "l9S Its scope of political engagement, for 
Held, is limited through the growing influence of 
international organizations.199 For pro-Europe 
Austrians, for example, the issue of neutrality (which 
has been part of Austria’s national identity since the 
end of the Allied occupation in 1955) has become an 
anomaly in the post-Cold War world. Alois Mock, in his 
speech before the First Anglo-Austrian Forum in London, 
assert^ct that the Yugoslav crisis demonstrated the need 
of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and
it has also demonstrated the need that European and 
American security interests must remain firmly linked 
with the framework of a dynamic Atlantic Alliance.200 
The development of international institutions such as 
the European Union serve as a useful instrument to help
196 James, Sovereign Statehood, 165-195.
197 David Held, "New Times: Farewell Nation State," 
Marxism Today, December 1988, 12.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Alois Mock, "Britain and Austria — Common
European Interests," Closing Statement to the 
Participants of the First Anglo-Austrian Forum in 
London," 15 April 1994, 3-4.
199
200
encourage interstate co-operation.201 Geoffrey Howe, who 
served as Margaret Thatcher's Foreign Secretary, notes 
that sovereignty within the European Union context 
maximizes the state’s political ability to influence 
world events.202 For Howe, the concept of sovereignty 
implies an infinite number of "transactions” between 
states, which is based upon establishing consensus and 
accepting compromise.203
Nevertheless, there is the continuing role of the 
national (or state) interest in the politics of Western 
Europe. 204 The concept of national interest, according 
to James Rosenau, "serves as a means of justifying,
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denouncing, or proposing policies. ”205 The national
interest, continues Rosenau , reflects "what is based
for a nation in foreign affairs. ”206 The national
interest can be seen to be "value laden."207 According
to Joseph Frankel, there are three essential ways to 
categorize national interest: aspirational,
201 Paul Johnson, "Wanted: A New Imperialism, " 
National Review, 14 December 1992, 29. See also 
Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New 
World," Foreign Affaire Vol. 71, No. 1 (1992): 32-35.
202 Geoffrey Howe, "Sovereignty and 
Interdependence: Britain's Place in the World," 
International Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1990): 678.
203 Ibid., 679.
204 Henry Kissinger, "Foreign Policy is about the
National Interest," International Herald Tribune, 25
October 1993, 5.
205 James Rosenau, "National Interest," in David L. 
Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social 
Sciences, Vol. 11 (New York: The MacMillan Company and 
the Free Press, 1968), 34.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
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operational} and explanatory and polemical.208 The 
scholar (or policy maker) defines aspirational approach 
as outlining goals which the state would like to 
achieve. This can be defined as long-term goals. The 
operational approach refers to short-term goals, 
’’capable of achievement within the foreseeable 
future.’’209 The explanatory and polemical approach 
explains or criticizes foreign policy.
In examining the supranational framework, Haas 
seems to assume in his earlier work that the formation 
of aspirational and operational goals would shift from 
the state level to the regional level. As Fulvio Attina 
perceives the spillover process, there are two forms of 
supranationality: norms and decisions supranationality. 
Norms supranationality occurs when community values 
prevail over those of national institutions.210 "The 
latter exists when the decision pattern is different 
from traditional diplomacy."211 The integration process 
progresses on an even keel when these two forms of 
supranationality mature (or develop) at the same 
time.212 As will be demonstrated in the next chapter it 
was assumed by the integrationist scholars that 
integration was "motivated by pragmatic calculations of 
economic advantage on the part of politicians,
208 Joseph Frankel, National Interest (London: Pall 
Mall Press, 1970), 31-36.
209 Ibid., 32.
210 Fulvio Attina, "The European Community 
Political System: Paradigms and Democracy," Paradigms 
Vol. 5, Nol/2 (1991): 125.
211 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
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bureaucrats, and interest groups. ”213 Lauber writes that 
at the time of the end of the Second of World War, that 
in politics
this was the time of the ’end of ideology.’ Conflicting 
views about economics were settled in favor of a mixed 
economy relying not only on the market but also on 
macroeconomic management plus an extensive system of 
transfer of payments intended to make an efficient 
system responsive to social concerns. This consensus 
established the major structure. To be sure, it did not 
mean the end of all distributional conflicts; but 
because of the consensus on the fundamentals f the 
social partners "could safely afford to bicker. ”214 
The neo-functionalist approach, as Haas laments, 
’’neglected" to monitor the ongoing change of 
"conditions and expectations prevailing at the time a 
union is set up, as well as new aspirations and 
expectations that develop after the initial
experience.”215 The assertion of the next chapter is
that France (led by Charles de Gaulle) demonstrated
"the emergence of a new style of leadership at the
national level. . . ”216 De Gaulle, a nineteenth century
style nationalist, "thwarted the ambitions of the
Commission [norms supranationality], provided the
member states with a veto on 'vital’ issues and put a 
temporary brake to further extension of the scope of 
the Community.”217
213 Lijphart, "Ethnic Conflict in the Western 
World," 51. (Emphasis added.)
214 Lauber, "From Growth Consensus to Fragmentation 
in Western Europe,” 332. (Emphasis added.)
215 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, xiv.
216 Ibid.
217 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "Neo-functionalism and the
EC, " 7.
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The member states of the European Union are 
concerned with economic problems such as employment, 
management of inflation, and the improvement of the 
quality of life for their own citizenry.218 There are 
scholars who perceive this form of national interest 
to be a "benign” form of isolationism and not an 
aggressive form of conduct in international politics.219 
For Haas, however,
The fundamental logic that leads from national 
frustration to economic unity and eventually to 
political unification presupposes that national 
consciousness is weak and that the national situation 
is perceived as gloomy and the outside world 
unpromising. To be sure, the situation may improve. If 
integration has gone very far by then, no harm to the 
union; but in Europe it had not gone far enough before 
the national situation improved once more, before self­
confidence rose, thus making the political healing 
power of union once more questionable.220
Anthony Lewis writes that those who worked for European 
Union "hoped that [the EU] would arrive eventually at a 
stage where it commanded the allegiance of all 
Europeans."221 Instead, Lewis laments, "Britons and 
Frenchman and Germans look primarily to their own 
parliaments. "222
218 James Caporaso, "What is the New Nationalism?
Or is There a New Nationalism?" in Werner Link and 
Werner J. Feld, eds., The New Nationalism: Implications 
for Transatlantic Relations (New York: Pargamon Press, 
1979), 7.
219 Ibid.
220 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, xxvii. (Emphasis 
added.)
221 Anthony Lewis, "What is ’Europe’ Worth That 
Won't Help Bosnia," International Herald Tribune, 30 
March 1993, 10. See also F.S. Northedge, "The Nation 
State and the Coordination of Foreign Policies," in 
Link and Feld, The New Nationalism, 25-45.
222 Lewis, "What Is a 'Europe' Worth That Won’t 
Help Bosnia?," 10.
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The member states of the European Union combine
A
domestic politics with foreign policy goals tor the 
analysis of the national interest. 223 While Austria,
Finland and Sweden joined the Union, Norway, for 
example, did not. Much of the debate in Norwegian 
political circles revolves around fishing rights.224 
While Norway has retained exclusive fishing rights off
their shores there are trade unionists who believe that 
membership to the European Union will result in higher 
unemployment for Norway. 225 As well, there is a 
historical element (e,g , 400-year union with Denmark and 
hundred year political relationship with Sweden before 
independence in 1905) in Norwegian public opinion which 
eschews the idea of relinquishing sovereignty to any 
form of political unity.226
CONCLUSION
This chapter attempted to do the following. There 
are similarities between Fukuyama’s End of History 
paradigm and MitranyTs functionalist approach. As was 
demonstrated in this chapter, both thinkers perceive a
223 Frankel, National Interest, 39.
224 "Norway; Growing with Bruntland,’’ The 
Economist, 4 September 1993, 33.
225 John Burton, "New Nordic Euros, " in Dudley 
Fishburn, ed., The World in 1992 (London: The Economist 
Publications, 1991), 54.
226 "Norway Not Hooked, " The Economist, 22 May 
1993, 41. See also Frederick Studemann, "Austrians 
Split Down the Middle on the European Club," The 
European 3-9 June 1994, 5; Ilkka Suominen, "Finland, 
the European Union, and Russia," The World Today, Vol. 
50, No. 1 (January 1994): 12-14; and Robert Taylor, 
"Nordics Know What’s Best," in Dudley Fishburn, ed.,
The World in 1993 (London: The Economist Publication, 
1992), 55-58.
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world where there are no longer any viable alternatives 
to the principles of liberty and equality. In believing 
that municipal political thought has reached its final 
stages of development, both theorists envision a world 
where the international community becomes preoccupied 
in the solving of social and economic problems. Where 
Fukuyama and Mitrany differ, however, is over the 
progress of international political theory. Unlike 
Fukuyama, Mitrany believes that the concept of the 
state is an anomaly in the solving of social problems. 
Echoing Mitrany’s concerns, the political theorist John 
Dunn sadly notes;
The disruptions [between states] will often 
continue to accelerate, sometimes uncontrollably and 
devastatingly. In the tightly linked global economy and 
ecology within which we now live, no one can know even 
whether it is in principle possible for human beings to 
learn to understand the overall consequences of their 
actions fast enough to rein them in. . .22?
The establishment of international functional agencies, 
Mitrany reasons, would depoliticalize problem-solving. 
Problems, in the age of the end of ideology, would be 
looked at from a mechanical and practical viewpoint.
As demonstrated in this chapter, Haas also assumes 
an End of History environment. Looking at the 
integration process in Western Europe, Haas asserted in 
his early writings that West Europeans had moved on 
from ideological rivalry to the pursuit of establishing 
institutions which supersede state authority. Haas’
227 John Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face 
of the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), 134.
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Uniting of Europe demonstrated the West Europeans’ 
willingness to integrate their coal and steel 
production. Moreover, there is clear evidence, as the 
next chapter will show, of the general success of 
economic integration. Haas’ later writings, however,
lament over the failure of the neo-functionalist
approach not spilling over into political integration.
This then leads this dissertation to the next 
chapter. In this piece of work, this study takes an 
empirical examination to Haas’ work and its pitfalls. 
In looking at economic integration, the following 
chapter examines how the integration process moved
from the establishment of a common market to that of a
single market, with aspirations in setting up a common 
currency and a central bank at the end of the twentieth 
century. Haas’ essential pitfall is highlighted with 
the advent of Charles de Gaulle to power in France. The 
next chapter also serves as a strong reminder of Haas’ 
observation that the integration process can be held 
hostage by states (like France and the UK) who 
perceive the importance of politics as protecting their 
historic institutions and traditions from supranational
activity
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF
THE ROLE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN 
WESTERN EUROPE, 1945-1992
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is an empirical examination of a 
fundamental struggle between proponents of European 
integration and those who wish to preserve the 
concepts of national identity and state sovereignty in 
Western Europe since 1945/ The principle advocates for 
a supranational (or federal) Europe were the statesmen 
Jean Monnet and Alteiro Spinelli. Monnet and Spinelli
are important to analyze because they were two of the 
earlier advocates of European integration to assess 
political concepts such as nationalism and state 
sovereignty as archaic in the modern West European 
political world. Monnet, for example, wrote
The Europeans had to overcome the mistrust born of 
centuries of feuds and wars. The governments and the 
peoples of Europe still thought in the old terms of 
victors and vanquished. Yet, if a basis for peace in 
the world was to be established, these notions had to 
be eliminated. Here again, one had to go beyond the 
nation and the conception of national interest as an 
end in itself.1 2
Monnet and Spinelli understood that if the history of 
international relations in Western Europe was to be 
revolutionized, it was necessary to proceed with the
1 Chapter III of this dissertation explored the 
theoretical aspects of these ideas.
2 Jean Monnet, "A Ferment of Change,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962): 205. 
(Emphasis added.)
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development of a federal union? Such a framework, 
Spinelli argued, would
create institutions which [would.] frame and enforce an 
international law against the pursuit of aims that 
profit one nation at the expense of others/
While the collapse of authoritarianism was a 
reason for celebration, Monnet believed that a more 
peaceful Europe lay in confronting the "practical" 
problems of the "morning after" the War.3 4 5 This included 
restoring economic stability, alleviating mistrust 
between France and Germany, and overcoming political 
national self-assertiveness.6 Like Mitrany’s approach 
to the building of functional agencies, Monnet believed 
that the goal of European federalism had to be based 
upon "patience and direction [rather than on] speed and 
[on] the construction of false timetables."7 Mitrany 
referred to Monnet’s approach to European unity as 
"federal functionalism;"8 that is, a federation built 
upon the successes of small functional initiatives.
3 Altiero Spinelli, "The United States of Europe 
and the Various Political Trends, 1941-2," in Walter 
Lipgens, ed., Documents on the History of European 
Integration, 1939-1945 Vol. 1 (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter and Co., 1985), 485.
4 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
5 Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," 205.
6 Jean Monnet, Memoirs, Translated by Richard 
Mayne (London: William Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 
1978), 288-318.
7 Roy Jenkins, "Foreword," in Monnet, Memoirs, 12. 
See also Brent Nelson’s and Alexander C-G Stubb’s 
introduction to Monnet, "A Ferment of Change," Brent F. 
Nelsen and Alexander C-G Stubb, ed., The European 
Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European 
Integration, 17.
8 David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics 
(London: Martin Robertson and Company, Ltd., 1975),
76.
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The development of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in 1951-1952 is an example of
functional federalism because the ECSC started off 
integrating a small segment of Europe’s industrial base 
and attempted at motivating its member states9 to work 
in building a deeper European union. Spinelli, on the 
other hand, believed that there was something more 
profound at issue. For Spinelli, European integration 
was not simply about reconciling Franco-German rivalry 
through the integration of their coal and steel 
industries. Rather, the advocation of European 
integration, for Spinelli, symbolizes a critical 
rethinking of how to govern the different peoples of 
Western Europejfor such a process aspires that
the political institutions of a democratic Europe be 
constructed first, taking certain powers of initiative, 
deliberation, decision and execution from the national 
executives, parliaments, and judiciary and confiding 
them to a European executive, parliament, and 
judiciary. The institutions would derive their 
legitimacy from the consent directly expressed by 
European citizens without interference from the member 
states in matters of federal competence. Their models 
are little Switzerland and the great United States.10 
For Spinelli, Monnet "made the first steps easier to 
obtain but he made the later steps much more 
difficult."11 This is because the functionalist
9 The founding member states of the ECSC were 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Federal 
Republic of Germany, and Italy.
10 Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats; Conflict and 
Crisis in the European Community, translated by C.
Grove Haines (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1966), 11.
11 Interview with Spinelli, 14 February 1985, cited 
in Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union; 
Political Ideas, Influences and Strategies in the
Ill
federalists were caught up in solving "practical" 
problems. The solving of practical problems is not 
enough in advancing the need for a federation because 
it also requires, Spinelli argued, the creation of a 
"new political society.1,12
Other West Europeans, such as Charles de Gaulle 
and, later, Margaret Thatcher, asserted that the 
federalist dimension of European integration was a 
fundamental danger to the traditional understanding of 
statecraft in Western Europe. Unlike Monnet and 
Spinelli, de Gaulle and Thatcher advocated that 
European unity should be intergovernmental. Juliet 
Lodge writes that the advantage to the 
intergovernmental approach (for politicians like de 
Gaulle and Thatcher) assumes the state to be a major 
actor In the integration process.12 3 "At any point in the 
process of either launching integration or in pursuing 
it," Lodge further writes, "they can brake it or 
accelerate it.”14 Stanley Hoffmann refers to the state 
as the "gatekeepers" of the integration process.15 On a
European Community, 1972-1987 (London: Routledge,
1989), 60.
12 Spinelli, The Eurocrats, 12. (Emphasis added.) 
See also Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 43-64.
13 Juliet Lodge, "Preface: The Challenge of the 
future," in Juliet Lodge, ed., The European Community 
and the Challenge of the Future (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1993), xxi. (Emphasis added.)
14 Ibid.
15 Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete? The 
Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western 
Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed., International 
Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, Ltd., 
1968), 177-230. See also Chapter III of this 
dissertation.
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more positive note, however, Margaret Thatcher believed 
the intergovernmental approach involve r.he "willing and 
active cooperation between independent sovereign 
states" and saw it as "the best way to build a 
successful European Community."16
While the intergovernmental approach to European 
unity was construed by Thatcher as viable in advancing 
free competition and trade17, there continues to be 
something more profound at issue. The 
intergovernmentalists, such as those found in the 
British Conservative Party,18 believe that the 
federalists’ understanding of European unity was (and 
continues to be) a revolutionary concept to the 
governing of Western Europe. This type of process, 
argue Euro-skeptic Tories like Sir Teddy Taylor,19 both 
cannot be allowed to occur. and most particularly 
allowed to be implemented behind closed doors of 
Brussels. Politicians like Thatcher and Taylor would 
argue that the supranational agenda requires political
ib Margaret Thatcher, "Britain’s Policies Towards 
Europe, Trade, and Defence," Speech to the College of 
Europe in Bruges, Belgium, 20 September 1988, British 
Information Services, No. 50/88. (Emphasis added.) See 
also Trevor C. Salmon and William Nicoll, Building the 
European Union (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, forthcoming)
17 Margaret Thatcher, The Path to Power (New York: 
Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1995), 622. See also 
Richard P. Ashlstorm, "The European Community Faces 
1992," Current History, November 1991, 374-378 and 
Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of
International Politics," International Security, Vol. 
18, No. 2 (Fall 1993): 44-79.
18 See Chapter VI of this dissertation.
19 Ibid.
113
scrutiny from the member states’ parliaments because of 
the EU’s unwelcomed direction. They also remind 
Westminster that the Maastricht Treaty is a fundamental 
rethink of governance because it calls for the issuing 
of a single currency and the establishment of an 
independent Central Bank.20 Thatcher believes that such 
a revolutionary departure from the issuing of the pound 
sterling is a fundamental breach of parliamentary 
sovereignty. In her memoirs, Thatcher reasons that if 
such a crucial break were to take place it would 
require the consent of the people of the UK through a 
ref erendum.21
Like Thatcherj, de Gaulle’s opposition to the 
European initiative of integrationists such as Monnet 
and Hallstein was based upon the fundamental view that 
such a system of international organization would 
impede (or obstruct) France’s national aspirations to 
be a major player in international affairs. De Gaulle’s 
opposition to the federalist understanding of European 
unity was highlighted in the debate over the Fouchet 
proposals and over the issue of majority voting which 
resulted in the Luxembourg Compromise in January 1966. 
This chapter examines de Gaulle’s beliefs because he 
was, as Thatcher reflects in her memoirs, one of the 
earlier statesmen in Europe to grasp the political
20 See Articles 105a and 106 of the TEU.
21 Thatcher, The Path to Power, 480. See also 
Chapter VI of this dissertation.
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ramifications of the federalists’ understanding of 
European unity."
This part of the study ends with ^analysis of the 
significance of the Single European Act of 1986 and the 
Treaty on European Union of 1992. In both cases, there 
was a compromise between the intergovernmentalists and 
the supranationalists over the scope of institutional 
reform. The compromise between the two groups can also
be seen in how the EU was to handle the issues of
subsidiarity and common citizenship. In looking at 
these issues, this chapter highlights how some states 
like Denmark and Great Britain perceive the continuing 
importance self-determination as a basic right in
the practice of state sovereignty. These differences of 
fundamental beliefs between both groups over the future 
of statecraft in Western Europe further encourages this 
dissertation to question the End of History paradigm. 
This is because the issues discussed in this chapter 
are not merely a dispute over the mechanics of 
government, but about the very nature of European unity 
and its overall direction.
EUROPEAN UNITY: HALLSTEIN, MONNET, SPINELLI AND THE
SUPRANATIONAL APPROACH
For proponents of the integration process, the 
goal of European unity can be construed as the 
conscious development of international institutions 
which supersede the authority of the traditional system
22 Ibid., 126-127.
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of states.23 Walter Hallstein, who served as the 
President of the European Commission, asserted the 
integration process is
... trying to replace one political prejudice that has 
for centuries past swayed human beings in Europe, that 
has made the political map of Europe — what it is 
today — the national prejudice — by a better 
attitude, a European attitude — provided you do not 
take it as a piece of cynicism, I would even say: by a 
better, a European prejudice,24
After two world wars
Monnet asserted, should 
in bringing about a 
Europe.25 26Without the 
political institutions, 
European chaos can be
an integration
be understood as the
more peaceful and
establishment of
"all efforts
structure, as 
first step
prosperous
permanent
to overcome the
nothing more than ephemeral
expeditions. "2S
Both Monnet and Spinelli shared similar views on 
the need for European unity. They agreed, for example, 
that European federation had to be built at a time of 
immediate crisis.27 The "immediate crisis" for both of
3 See Walter Hallstein, "The True Problems of 
European Integration," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 
XXXI, No. 15 (May 15, 1965): 459 and Brigid Laffan, 
"European Integration," in Michael Foley, ed., Ideas 
that Shape Politics (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1994), 111.
24 Hallstein, "The True Problems of European 
Integration," 459.
25 Jean Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to 
Control Themselves," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 
XXVII, No. 19 (July 15, 1961): 579.
26 Reginald Lang, "European Federalism, " in Feliks 
Gross, European Ideologies: A Survey of Twentieth 
Century Political Ideas, with an Introduction by Robert 
M. Maclver (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), 
965-966.
27 Burgess, Federalism and European Unionf 56. See 
also Jenkins, "Foreword," 12.
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them was finding the optimal approach in reconciling 
those old tensions between states and, moreover, 
achieving common solutions to common problems.28 Both 
Monnet and Spinelli also perceived the ending of the 
Second World War as an opportunity to build a federal 
union because the concept of nationalism had lost its 
political zeal.29 James B. Conant, who served as the US 
High Commissioner for Germany at the time, reported 
that the German people were no longer nostalgic for 
their past; instead, Conant writes:
. ..[T]he eyes of the Germans today are focused not on 
the past but on the future; and this future they 
envisage as something different from anything in their 
past. If one defines a progressive as a man who looks 
toward a new and better future and a reactionary as one 
who looks longingly to the past, then I think it would 
be fair to say that the prevailing attitude in the 
German Federal Republic today is a progressive 
attitude. Certainly there are few reactionaries who are 
longing to turn back the clock of history.30
Unlike Spinelli, however, Monnet’s approach to 
European integration fell along a practical approach. 
Monnet believed that the establishment of a European 
federal union "could not be built at a stroke."31 
Monnet's essential problem with previous federal
28 Burgess, federalism and European Union, 44. See 
also Chapter III of this dissertation.
29 Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 48. See 
also the new Preface to his 1968 edition of Ernst B. 
Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and 
Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1968), xi-xxx.
30 James B. Conant, "The Foundations of a 
Democratic Future for Germany, ’’ The Department of State 
Bulletin. Vol. 30, No. 777 (May 17, 1954): 752. 
(Emphasis added.)
31 Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 53.
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initiatives was that they were too drastic in scope.32 
In other words, Monnet believed that previous federal 
initiatives attempted to do too much too quickly.33 In 
comparison to Mitrany,- Monnet asserted that the 
integrationist’s immediate task is to get states to 
feel comfortable working with one another beyond (in 
Monnet’s case) the inter-governmental sphere.34 While 
the Organization of European Economic Cooperation 
(OEEC) helped facilitate "economic efficiency and 
growth"35 36it did not, for Monnet, move beyond "mere co­
operation between Governments.1,36 Monnet shares 
Mitrany’s skepticism of the intergovernmental approach
because
all our major problems go beyond national frontiers. 
The issues raised by nuclear weapons, the 
underdeveloped areas, the monetary stability of our 
countries and even their trade policies, all require 
joint action by the West. What is necessary is to move
32 Ibid., 52-53. For more on the history of other 
European federal projects, read Andrew and Frances 
Boyd, Western Europe: UNA's Guide to European Recovery 
(London: Hutchinson and Co., 1948) and R.N. Coudenhove- 
Kalgeri, Europe Must Unite, Translated by Andrew 
McFadyean (Glarus: Paneurop Editions, Ltd., 1939) and 
Ernst B. Haas, "The United States of Europe," Political 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 63 (1948): 530-532.
33 Monnet, Memoirs, 3 67.
34 Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 53. 
Compare to David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An 
Argument of the Functional Development of International 
Organization (London: The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1943), 33.
35 Brigid Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in 
Europe (New York: Routledge, 1992), 30. The OEEC served 
as an administrative body which acted as a distributor 
of Marshall Plan (or European Recovery Program) aid. 
Laffan also writes that a total of $12.5 thousand 
million "in grants flowed into Western Europe during 
the four years of the program" (ibfrd.).
36 Monnet, Memoirs, 271-272.
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towards a true Atlantic Community in which common 
institutions will be increasingly developed to meet 
common problems.37 38
Monnet appears to follow a mechanical approach at 
achieving European integration because Monnet, 
throughout his Memoirs, reminds the reader of his 
pragmatism. As a problem fixer, Monnet placed his trust 
in ’’practical men” such as bankers, industrialists, and 
lawyers. Through the help of the banker and the lawyer, 
Monnet asserted that such a practical approach would 
bring about "limited achievements establishing de facto 
solidarity, from which a federation would gradually 
emerge, "3S
Monnet’s line of practical reasoning regarding the 
creation of European unity had to be based upon the 
building of institutions.39 While working with lawyers 
and bankers is necessary, Monnet also believed that 
’’when people accept the same rules and the same 
institutions to make sure that they are applied, their 
behavior towards each other changes. This is the 
process of civilization itself."40 As Monnet eloquently 
wrote in his Memoirs:
37 Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control 
Themselves," 579. (Emphasis added.) This skepticism, 
however, did not lead Monnet and Mitrany to the same 
conclusion as to how to solve economic and social 
problems. See Chapter III of this dissertation and 
David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach in Historical 
Perspective," International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 
(July 1971): 543.
38 Monnet, Memoirs, 271-272. (Emphasis added.) See 
also Chapter III of this dissertation.
39 Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 48.
40 Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control 
Themselves," 579.
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The union of Europe cannot be based on goodwill alone. 
Rules are needed. The tragic events we have lived 
through and are still witnessing may have made us 
wiser. But men pass away; others will take their plane. 
We cannot bequeath them our personal experience. That 
will die with us. But we can leave them institutions. 
The life of institutions is longer than that of men: if 
they are well built, they can accumulate and hand on 
the wisdom of succeeding generations.41
Monnet’s first European institution was the ECSC,42 The 
ECSC, which was founded by the Treaty of Paris signed 
on 18 April 1951,43 "was the beginning of sectorial 
integration involving a restricted number of states,”44 45
The Schuman Declaration of 1950 appears to take on a 
practical element when Schuman noted Europe "will be 
built through concrete achievements which first create 
a de facto solidarity.1,45 The practical goal of the 
ECSC, Schuman further observed, was "to make war not
41 Monnet, Memoirs, 384. (Emphasis added.)
42 Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control 
Themselves," 579.
13 Chapter I of the Treaty provided for the 
establishment of a High Authority which would serve as 
the ECSC’s supranational organ. The High Authority 
would take decisions through weighted majority and "its 
resolutions would be binding on all member states" 
(Amitai Etizoni, "European Unification and Perspectives 
on Sovereignty,” Daedalus: Journal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 92, No. 3 [Summer 
1963]: 500). In administering Europe’s coal and steel 
industries, the ECSC set prices, production standards, 
and investment and social conditions (British Iron and 
Steel Federation, Treaty Establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community [London: British Iron and Steel 
Federation, 1954], 32-34). For a description of the 
ECSC negotiations see Monnet, Memoirs, 288-318.
44 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
32.
45 "The Schuman Declaration" (9 May 1950) in 
European Parliament, Selection of Texts Concerning 
Institutional Matters of the Community from 1950-1982 
(Luxembourg: Committee of Institutional Affairs, 
European Parliament, 1982), 47. (Emphasis added.)
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merely unthinkable but materially impossible,1'46 In a 
letter on the Schuman Plan, Monnet wrote:
The Schuman proposals provide a basis for the 
building of a new Europe through the concrete 
achievement of a supranational regime within a limited 
but controlling area of economic effort[..1 The 
indispensable first principle of these proposals is the 
abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive 
field and £ , in my view, any plan which does not 
involve this indispensable first principle can make no 
useful contribution to the solution of the grave 
problems that face us J7
Monnet concentrated on the practical problems of 
European integration because, as demonstrated earlier, 
the states of Western Europe (at the end of the Second 
World War) to&hf no longer involved in an ideological 
debate about whether or not to be democratic/8 As 
scholars 1 ike Francis Fukuyama and Ernst B. Haas 
asserted in their writings, the ideologies of
Fascism and authoritarianism were no longer relevant to 
the West European political thought of 1945.49 What was
therefore important for Monnet was to get the states of
Western Europe to feel comfortable working with one
another. Monnet’s ECSC served as a prototype of
European integration in which (in the short term)^
offered the optimal route (or important first step) to
46 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
47 Monnet, Memoirs, 316. (Emphasis added.)
48 See Chapters II and III of this dissertation.
19 See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the 
Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992), 270 and 
Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New 
Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, ed,, International
Regionalism (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 
150.
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Franco-German reconciliation by merging their coal and 
steel industries.50
As Laffan notes,- however, the ECSC ’’was more than 
simply a functionalist organization a la Mitrany."51 
For Hallstein, the Treaty of Paris also perceived the 
ECSC as a means to a greater European unity "for 
politics always means changef the conscious changing 
of what we already have, achieved by the use of 
collective power. ”52 The question here is whether or not 
a federalist structure can be built solely on economic 
problem solving. This is an important question for this
dissertation because the conflict between the
ideologies of fascism and communism and liberal 
democracy may have well passed, but the conflict over 
ideas remained. The crucial debate in Western Europe 
over the next forty years (and perhaps beyond) was 
between the ideas of integration and federalism on the 
one hand, and intergovernmentalism and the importance 
of sovereignty and self-determination on the other.
While Hallstein noted that the Preamble to the 
ECSC described a Europe with a "future common 
destiny,"53 54there were no guarantees for success?4 Like
50 George W. Ball, "Introduction," in Douglas 
Brinkley and Clifford Hackett, eds., Jean Monnet: The 
Path to European Unity (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 
1991), xii.
51 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
32.
52 Hallstein, "The True Problems of European 
Integration," 459. (Emphasis added.)
53 Walter Hallstein, United Europe: Challenge and 
Opportunity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1962), 13.
54 Ibid.
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Haas, Burgess notes that the key to successful
integration is that it is "conscious, energetic and
purposive/’55 Burgess also asserts:
It incorporates both normative and empirical
propositions about the nature of human beings and
society, and it is organized behavior which relies 
upon political movements, groups and parties for 
realizing its aims. Accordingly federalist activity is 
ideological activity.55 6 57 58
As Hallstein summarizes:
Such choice and such decisions were needed before the 
process of European integration could begin. In order 
that it may continue, they are needed at every step of 
the way. And in order that an integrated Europe may 
make its full contribution toward solving the crucial 
problems that face us all, further political choice and 
political decisions will have to be made, not only by 
the European Community, but also by its friends, 
allies, and partners in the free world as a whole/7 
As noted earlier, Haas believed that the establishment 
of European unity required the transfer of loyalties 
from the state level to the supranational level/8 The 
establishment of a federal Europe requires, as was 
suggested by Spinelli, the creation of a new 
political society which goes beyond the confines of 
state sovereignty. European integration, as will be 
demonstrated below, requires a wider sense of political
purpose.
55 Michael Burgess, "Federalism as Political 
Ideology: Interests, Benefits, and Beneficiaries in 
Federalism and Federation," in Michael Burgess and 
Alain-G. Gagnon, eds., Comparative Federalism and 
Federation (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 102.
56 Ibid., 102-103. (Emphasis added.)
57 Hallstein, United Europe; Challenge and 
Opportunity, 58-59. (Emphasis added.)
58 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political, 
Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1968), 287. For more on this 
discussion, read Chapter III of this dissertation.
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however, 
Spinelli’s
Spinelli, who was very much influenced by the 
federalist writings of Luigi Einaudi,59 60 61accepted the 
creation of the ECSC and the other European
institutions as living political entities/0 There are, 
three important differences between 
and Monnet's understanding of the
integration process. First of all, Spinelli finds 
Monnet’s approach falls essentially into the realm of
the functional in which its essential outlook is "to
confine the administration of certain concrete public 
activities to a suitable European administration f'CA For 
Spinelli, Monnet’s approach is like Mitrany’s approach 
in which European institutions would be involved merely 
in solving technical problems and in which
[t]he proper ordering of men's daily lives is what is 
fundamental; therefore, the role of European union, for 
a long time, will not be the ephemeral, superficial, 
and inconclusive political struggle but the slow, 
progressive coagulation of customs and interests around 
an integrated European bureaucracy which is more
59 Einaudi was a prominent figure in the anti­
Fascist Resistance. In addition to his own work,
Einaudi also provided the young Spinelli with British 
and American writings on federalist political thought 
in which, argues Burgess, "confirmed [Spinelli’s] view 
of the anachronistic nature of the modern state and of 
the dangers of aggressive nationalism, and it convinced 
him that federalism provided the solution to these 
causes of war" (Burgess, Federalism and European Union,
133). Spinelli worked with Einaudi to establish the 
Movimento Federalista Europeo in 1943. For a sample of 
his federalist writings, read Luigi Einaudi's La Geurra
e L'Unita Europea, Milan 1950. A portion of this work z 
can be found in Walter Lipgens and Wilfried Loth, eds., 
Documents on the History of European Integration, 1945­
1950, Vol.3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1988), 
167-171.
60 Spinelli, The Eurocrats, 29 and Burgess,
Federalism and European Union, 57.
61 Spinelli, The Eurocrats, 11. (Emphasis added.}
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farsighted and rational than the national 
hureaucracies.62
The problem with the ECSC and the EEC, for Spinelli, is 
that Monnet's institutions produced a new species the
Eurocrat who
put [his or her] administrative abilities at the 
disposition of the growing supranational community and 
could look at the European problem with technocratic 
indifference toward political institutions but with 
great faith in the power of administrative 
institutions ,63
According to Spinelli’s understanding of the 
European integration process, Monnet’s approach failed 
to organize power at a European level =6’1 In an article 
for West European Politics, for example, Spinelli 
compared Monnet’s approach to that of nation building 
in which functional federalism assumes, Spinelli 
argues, to be "a continuing process,”65 66Spinelli 
continues the argument by asserting that the functional 
federalist thought that at "a certain point quantity 
would become quality: the originally functional
institution would become a fully-fledged political 
power.”56 Spinelli further explained that Monnet ’ s 
approach (like Mitrany) assumed the following:
This vision of a Europe united by a bureaucracy was 
based on the hypothesis that there would exist between
62 Ibid., 13. (Emphasis added.) As a note of 
comparison, read Mitrany, A Working Peace System, 39.
53 Spinelli, The Eurocrats, 16.
61 Interview with Spinelli, September 1983 and 14 
February 1985, European Parliament Strasbourg in 
Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 58.
65 Ibid,
66 Altiero Spinelli, ’’Reflections on the 
Institutional Crisis in the European Community,” West 
European Politics. Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 1978): 79­
80.
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the Council and the Commission a convergence of views 
on European unity similar to that which had existed 
between Kings and their commis about suprafeudal 
uni ty/’1
As Burgess observes, Spinelli’s concern with Monnet’s 
approach to federal Europe is that Monnet’s scheme 
lacked a King; that is, Monnet’s approach to European 
unity lacked a European mindset/s This is because as 
Burgess writes:
The machinery of the nation states provide only a 
system of reciprocal brakes which paralyze the European 
Community and furnish no basis for fostering the common 
elaboration/9
Spinelli argued that for years the people of Western 
Europe "were exposed to a methodical and mounting 
nationalistic brainwashing through the schools, the 
military services, public life, the press, the radio, 
and in other ways/’67 68 69 70 71This form of "brainwashing,” 
Spinelli continues, was an impediment to progress 
towards European unification because "there were 
lacking the traditions, the institutions, and a common 
political language, that is to say, the very 
instruments which are necessary to transform sentiments 
into the substance of politics."'1 The ending of the 
Second World war, however, produced, for Spinelli, 
particular circumstances which "greatly reduced the 
habitual respect of citizens for their states and their
67 Ibid, (Emphasis added.)
68 Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 59.
69 Ibid.
70 Spinelli, The Eurocrats, 4,
71 Ibid, (Emphasis added.)
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myths and opened the way to the united European 
transformation.1,72
The third essential difference between Monnet and 
Spinelli was that for Spinelli the establishment of a 
supranational entity must deal with the issue of high 
polities as well. Spinelli asserted that a
supranational political institution must be capable of
of deciding and carrying out economic, military and 
foreign policy. By themselves, the Communities are 
simple treaties of very advanced economic 
liberalization; but the power to rule, to make laws and 
to enforce them still rests exclusively and absolutely 
in the hands of the several national governments d3 
For Spinelli, the success of full European unity 
depends on whether or not the member states "end up^. .. 
bending and subordinating themselves to the European 
community creation [. This is] still an open problem, 
one which will be decided not by discussion but by 
political struggled3
In that political struggle, European unity entails 
the creation of a common army, a common currency, and a 
common legislature.72 73 74 5 In establishing a European army, 
for example, the European Defence Community (EDC.)76
72 Ibid., 5. (Emphasis added.)
73 Alteiro Spinelli, "Atlantic Pact or European 
Unity," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 4 (July 1962): 
546.
74 Spinelli, the Eurocrats, 10. (Emphasis added.)
75 Spinelli, "The United States and the Various 
Political Trends," 485.
76 French Foreign Minister Renee Plevin introduced 
the EDC to the French National Assembly in 1950. Like 
the ECSC, the EDC would have an Assembly, a common 
budget, and, more importantly, the "final organization 
which will replace the present provisional organization 
should be so conceived as to be able to constitute one 
of the elements in a subsequent federal or confederal
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provided for a single executive authority and for a 
common system of military training.77 The EDC served as 
the best way forward in ’’the creation of integrated 
arms forces obeying no neo-nationalist command.”78 While 
the EDC Treaty provided a solution to the issue of 
German rearmament/9 the EDC moreover provided the idea 
of European unification with the potential of becoming 
"a very real and doctrinal fact, a blueprint of 
political action which can offer an interpretation of, 
and a solution to, the problems of a Europe in misery 
and. a Europe in affluence*,,”80 81
Unlike Spinelli, however, Monnet did not perceive 
that European unity could be created with states 
attempting to integrate issues of ’’high" politics (such 
as defence and foreign policy) first.31 As mentioned 
before, Monnet believed that it is important first for 
states to get used to the idea of working with one
structure, based on the principle of the separation of 
powers and, in particular, a two-chamber system of 
representation" ("The European Defence Community 
Treaty," in Selection of Texts, 53). The EDC’s 
functions would be to establish a European army drawn 
from national divisions and serve as an "acceptable 
formula" for West German rearmament (William C. 
Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar: 
The Strained Alliance [London: MacMillan, Ltd., 1992], 
7) .
77 George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.., 1982), 92.
78 William Nicoll and Trevor C. Salmon, 
Understanding the European Communities (New York: 
Philip Allan, 1990), 9.
79 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An 
Introduction to the European Community (London: The 
MacMillan Press, 1994), 26.
80 Spinelli, The Eurocrats, 7. (Emphasis added.)
81 Monnet, Memo!rs, 338.
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Ianother. This would be accomplished starting with 
states attempting to integrate issues of "low" politics 
such as coal and steel.82 As Monnet understood it, 
Europe was simply not prepared at this point to take 
such a huge step like the EDC.83 84As Burgess notes, the 
EDC did not reflect Monnet ’ s piecemeal approach.34 For 
Monnet, the EDC project was "forced upon him" and, 
therefore, was required to take "short cuts" which 
would interrupt the piecemeal momentum of his vision 
for European unity.85 Monnet makes, however, this point 
in his Memoirs:
I had never believed that we should tackle the problem 
of Europe via defence. Although this would no doubt be 
one task for the future federation, it seemed to me by 
no means the most powerful or compelling motive for 
unity. But if circumstances were to accelerate or 
reverse the course of events -- wellr thenr that would 
he another matterf6
in other words, Monnet accepted that the establishment 
of European institutions had to be built around 
particular circumstances.87 In this case, circumstances 
required Monnet to deal with the political predicament 
of German rearmament.88 In its historic context, 
proponents of European unity were under considerable 
pressure from the United States (because of the 
military demands from the Korean War) to bring West
82 Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control 
Themselves," 579.
83 Burgess, Federalism and European Union, 54.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Monnet, Memoirs, 338. (Emphasis added.)
87 Ibid.
88 Ball, "Introduction," xviii.
129
Germany under a common military structure/9 It was 
believed at the time that if the Germans could be
reindustrialized under the ECSC, then they could be 
remilitiarized under the EDC.89 90
In 1954, however, the French National Assembly 
failed to ratify the EDC Treaty. While the issue of 
German rearmament was eventually resolved by 
integrating the Federal Republic of Germany into the 
NATO Alliance in 1955,91 the EDC initiative was riddled 
with political difficulties. Ball, for example, cited 
the political uproar of the French Communist Party in 
opposition to the EDC.92 Those on the Left (as well as 
on the Right) of the National Assembly turned the vote 
on the EDC into a referendum on German rearmament,93 
causing "[the West German Chancellor Konrad] Andenauer
to doubt France’s commitment to Franco-German 
reconciliation and European integration.”94
More importantly, the failure of the EDC "had 
resulted From the ambitious nature of the proposals and 
from their overt call for substantial secessions of 
national sovereignty,"95 In an interview with C.L.
89 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 26-27.
90 Ibid.
91 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
27.
Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 92 
Ibid
94 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 27.
95 Martin E. Elling, The European Community; Its 
Structure and Development (Washington DC: The 
Congressional Research Office, Library of Congress, 
1988) CRS Report for Congress, August 31, 1988: 7. 
(Emphasis added.)
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Sulzberger of the New York Timos, for example, Charles 
de Gaulle asserted that the EDC project was an "error, 
a stupidity,"96 97While he advocated the need to 
incorporate West Germany into Europe, de Gaulle was 
concerned with the need to maintain French sovereignty
and self-determination. De Gaulle noted:
But we must incorporate Germany into the West. 1 have 
always said that. How? By a very wide European 
arrangement — Britain, France, Germany, Scandinavia, 
all of free Europe in an alliance, a confederation, in 
which each would safeguard its own individuality. You 
cannot suppress nationalities. Within such an 
organization you can have common arms.... But it is an 
absurdity, a dream, a fantasy to think that you can 
suppress France and French nationality
It is fair to note, then, that de Gaulle's objections 
to the EDC rested "on his hostility to sharing 
sovereignty over sacrosanct national defence 
policy,.."98 For de Gaulle, however, the EDC "was not 
only absurd from a national, an international and 
military point of view," but that those French 
politicians who "invented" this European military 
structure "weren’t [acting] French."99 De Gaulle did not 
want France to "suffer the fate of those nations that 
once made history and now only observe it."100 De 
Gaulle, as will be seen below, had a vision for France
9b C.L. Sulzberger, Seven Continents and Forty 
Years: A Concentration of Memoirs (New York:
Quandrangle/New York Times Book Company, Inc., 1977), 
169.
97 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
98 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 28.
99 Sulzberger, Seven Continents and Forty Years, 
169. (Emphasis added.)
100 Richard Nixon, Leaders (New York: Warner Books, 
Inc.., 1982), 64.
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"which he held cut to the nation to try to raise and 
exalt its spirit.”101
EUROPEAN UNITY; DE GAULLE AND THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
APPROACH
Charles de Gaulle’s battle over the ratification
of the EDC was simply a prelude for later fundamental 
objections to the creation of a supranational 
understanding of European unity. De Gaulle’s assertion 
of France’s role in West European politics, as Haas 
noted in his later writings102, established that doubts 
"on [European] union are recognizably political in 
nature and spring from the fear that nations will no 
longer be fully masters of their own destinies. ”103 No 
one like De Gaulle, the late Francois Mitterand once 
noted, ’’could speak the language of State as he 
could,"104 De Gaulle had political aspirations for 
France. In his eyes, France was a great nation with a 
great past. In his memoirs de Gaulle wrote that France
has taken on an enduring character which makes each 
generation of Frenchmen dependent on their forefathers 
and pledged to their descendents. Unless it falls 
apart, therefore, this human amalgam, on this 
territory, at the heart of this world, comprises a 
past, a present and a future that are indissoluble. 
Thus the State, which is answerable to France, is in
101 Ibid., 65. (Emphasis added.)
102 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, xi-xxx. For a 
fuller discussion, see Chapter III of this 
dissertation.
103 Walter Hallstein, "The European Economic 
Community; Some of Our 'Faux Problems,’” Vital Speeches 
of the Day, Vol. XXXI, No. 11 (March 15 1965): 332. 
(Emphasis added.)
104 Francois Mitterand, The Wheat and the Chaff, 
with an Introduction by William Styron (New York; Seave 
Books, 1982), 8.
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charge, at one and the same time of yesterday’s 
heritage, today’s interests, and tomorrow’s hoped05 
For de Gaulle, France’s national identity was healthy 
and vibrant. Despite the turmoil of the Second World 
War, France was ’’alive, sovereign and victorious. "l0G 
Unlike Monnet’s prognosis of the demise of national 
identity, de Gaulle wished to mould and influence 
France’s national aspirations. In his New Year Day 
Speech (1965), de Gaulle nostalgically asserted his 
hopes for France in the mid-twentieth century:
Now, life is life, in other words it is a struggle, for 
a nation as well as for man. There are, there will be, 
always and everywhere, difficulties to be surmounted, 
efforts to be made, trials to be withstood in order to 
move forward with dignity, justice and fraternity. But 
together, we are a nation wherein, through modern 
evolution, solidarity among its people is, for better 
or for worse, becoming stronger every day. What this 
nation accomplishes determines our individual fated07
De Gaulle believed that with her established traditions 
France had the mandate to lead Europe.105 106 107 08 ’’There was
105 Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and 
Endeavor, translated by Terrence Kilmartin (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1971), 3.
106 Ibid., 163.
107 Charles de Gaulle, "France 1965: Nationalism 
and Cooperation," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXXI, 
No. 7 (January 15, 1965): 213. (Emphasis added.)
108 For that matter, de Gaulle was also adamant 
over the future of France’s role as an international 
player because he perceived a Europe divided by the 
superpowers as a result of the Yalta Conference of 1945 
(Charles de Gaulle, "The Independence of France: The 
Third World Power,” Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. 
XXXI, No. 17 [June 15, 1965]: 515). William C. Cromwell 
dismisses, however, this point on the significance of 
the Yalta Conference over the division of Europe in 
post-war period in "Yalta at Forty," The Atlantic 
Community Quarterly (1985): 259-266. It is also 
interesting to note that Sir Winston Churchill shared 
the same sentiments regarding Great Britain because of 
its historic institutions and past. See, for example, 
Winston Churchill, "The United States of Europe," The
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nothing,- therefore, to prevent her now from doing what 
she intended to be and doing what she wished to do,"109
De Gaulle asserted his political (and historic) 
argument against MonnetTs vision of the European 
Community because the founder of the ECSC was 
attempting to develop centralized political 
institutions that would supersede the authority of the 
stated10 111De Gaulle, Desmond Dinan observes, "despised 
the Brussels bureaucracy, dismissing the Commission 
officials as stateless and denationalized d’lu In­
particular, de Gaulle described in his memoirs the EC
Commissioner Hallstein as
ardently wedded to the thesis of the super-State, and 
bent all of his skillful efforts towards giving the 
Community the character and appearance of one. He made 
Brussels, where he resided, into a sort of capital. 
There he sat, surrounded with all the trappings of 
sovereignty, directing his colleagues, allocating jobs 
among them, controlling several thousands officials who 
were appointed, promoted and remunerated at his 
discretion, receiving the credentials of foreign 
ambassadors, laying claim to high honors on the 
occasion of his official visits, concerned above all to 
further the amalgamation of the Six, believing the 
pressure of events would bring about what he 
envisaged.112
In maintaining the integrity of the state, de Gaulle 
advocated an intergovernmental approach to the 
political dimension of European unity.113 De Gaulle1 s
Saturday Evening Post Vol. 202, No. 13 (Feb. 1.5,
1930); 25-51 and Chapter VI of this dissertation.
109 De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 163.
110 Ibid., 184.
111 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 55.
112 De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 184. (Emphasis 
added.)
113 Charles de Gaulle, "The Future of France: Its 
Aims and Ideals," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXX, 
No. 6 (January 1, 1964)" 197 and Maurice Couve de 
Murville, "French Foreign Policy: The Common Market,
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vision of European unity was that of a loose economic 
and political association which ’’would he limited to 
the technical aspects of the Treaty of Rome/* 111 * * 114 By 
limiting cooperation between the member states on 
’’technical" questions like the Common Agricultural 
Policy/15 de Gaulle wished "to limit further the Treaty 
of Rome’s restricted supranational provisions/’116 117De 
Gaulle articulated his intergovernmental vision of 
Europe through the Fouchet Committee/17 The Fouchet 
Plan, wishing to create a European confederation which 
would cooperate on educational and scientific matters, 
would put together an institutional framework that
Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. xxxi, No. 4 (December 
1, 1964): 101-105.
111 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 49,
115 In January of 1962, the European Economic 
Community established the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). The main task of the CAP was (and continues to 
be) "to ensure uniform prices throughout the [Western 
Europe] on most agricultural products and to guarantee
farm workers a standard of living comparable to that 
enjoyed by workers in other sectors of the economy"
(Elling, The European Community: Its Structure and 
Development, 13). Laffan notes that the CAP was a 
compromise between France and Germany. "France," Laffan 
explains, "was willing to face German competition in 
the industrial arena provided there was a protected 
market for agricultural products" (Laffan, Integration 
and Cooperation in Europe, 34).
116 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 55.
117 Richard J, Barnet, The Alliance: America- 
Europe-Japan, Makers of the Post War World (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1982), 215. The Fouchet Committee 
was organized by the Six in July 1961. The Committee 
was named after the French ambassador to the 
Netherlands, Christian Fouchet, who chaired the 
negotiations.
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included/- among other things, ”a consultative assembly 
of delegated national parliamentarians ."ns
The first draft produced by the Fouchet Committee 
was very much an intergovernmental document J19 In 
Article I, for example, the draft called for the legal
establ is lament of a Union of States. Article I of the
draft also asserts that the Union is
based on respect for the individuality of the peoples 
and of the Member States and for equality of rights and 
obligations. It is indissoluble.118 119 20
The Council, the main political organ of the Union, 
would take decisions by unanimous vote and its 
decisions would be binding on its members.121 The 
decision, however, would not be binding on those states 
who were absent or abstained from voting. Article VI 
also stated the member states "may endorse it at any
118 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 49. (Emphasis 
added.)
119 It should be noted that Britain’s Prime 
Minister Harold MacMillan expressed his government's 
interest in the Fouchet Plan's intergovernmental 
outlook. De Gaulle recognized that states like Britain 
would want to join such a confederation because "these 
countries, like ourselves, do not wish to lose their 
sovereignty" ("De Gaulle Speaks," European Community 
[October 1965]: 3 [Emphasis added.]). The only crucial 
difference between France and Britain was over foreign 
and security policy. Britain emphasized Europe’s need 
to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. As MacMillan wrote 
in his memoirs: "Nevertheless, I was always conscious 
that the very feelings of tradition which led him to 
oppose the federalist dream were instinctive cause of 
his reluctance to accept British membership, which 
might even develop into British leadership" (Harold 
MacMillan, At the End of the Day; 1961-1963 [London: 
MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1973], 112 [Emphasis added.]).
120 "Negotiations on the Draft Treaty for the 
establishment of a Political Union," in, Selection of 
Texts, 112. (Emphasis added.)
121 Article VI in ibid., 113. (Emphasis added.)
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time. From the moment they endorse it, the decision 
will he binding on them.”122 Foreign policy, according 
to Article II of the Fouchet Report, would be 
cooperation between States on issues of common 
interest.123 124 125
In December of 1961, however, the European 
Parliament adopted the Plevin Report which commented 
and made recommendations regarding the first Fouchet 
draft. For the federal proponents of the EC the purpose 
of the Committee was that in
the name of the peoples of Europe whom it represents by 
virtue of the Treaties, [to express] the hope the 
Governments will move ahead as far as possible along 
the road of European political union d24
It was therefore not surprising when de Gaulle’s 
European partners (like Belgium and the Netherlands) 
explicitly disagreed with the Fouchet Committee’s first 
draft for it failed to make any progress to
Communities,
cooperation,
give shape to the will for political unity already 
implicit in the Treaties establishing the European 
and this purpose to organize their 
to provide for its development and to 
secure for it the regularity which will progressively 
create the conditions for a common policy and will 
ultimately make it possible to embody in institutions 
the work undertaken/25
123 Article II in ibid., 112. (Emphasis added.)
124 "Plevin Report," in Selection of Texts, 116. 
(Emphasis added.) See also Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: 
The Ruler, 1945-1970, Translated from the French by 
Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton and Company,
1991), 347.
125 "Final Communique of the Meeting of the Six 
Heads of State or Government of European Community held 
in Bonn, 18 July 1961," in Selection of Texts, 107. See 
also Barnet, The Alliance, 215.
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The Plevin Report, which criticized Fouchet’s first 
report for eschewing a supranational framework/26 
stressed that the draft should in no way be "a step 
back from the Treaties establishing the ECSC, EEC, and 
EURATOM, "126 27
The Plevin Report also expressed "concern about 
the excessive rigidity involved in the absolute rule by 
which every decision has to be taken unanimously,"128 
The Plevin Report suggested "that certain sectors, 
stages and conditions in which decisions should be 
taken by a qualified or simple majority should be 
defined,"129 Finally, the Plevin Report also disagreed 
with describing a prospective European union as that of 
an organization of States because that term merely 
suggested an association of governments rather than the 
further development of a supranational entity,130 
Despite these recommended changes the second Fouchet 
draft of the 18 of January 1962 failed to appease the 
political wrath of France’s European partners because 
the Plan was still very much intergovernmental in
126 Cromwell, The United States and the European 
Pillar, 31.
127 "Plevin Report," 116,
128 Ibid,, 117,
129 Ibid. The Report also recommended that the 
Council "be empowered to give a ruling on questions of 
procedure by an absolute majority of the Member States. 
Every decision as to whether a question is of a 
procedural nature or not would be taken under the same 
conditions" (ibid.).
130 Christopher Johnson, "De Gaulle’s Europe,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1962): 
160.
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nature J31 For example, the second draft still called 
for a Union of States rather than Peoples,131 32 Like the 
first report, the second draft articulated an 
independent European foreign policy in which decisions 
are taken unanimously J33
The battle over the Fouchet Plan documents gave 
further incentive to European federalists in working 
towards creating a supranational structure. In working 
towards that direction, the European federalists looked 
towards budgetary reform of the EEC as a necessary 
step. According to Article 200 of the Treaty of Rome, 
for example, the EEC ^and EURATOM^were ’’financed by 
national contributions which the member states vote in 
their own national budgets.’’134 In bringing about 
further harmonization between the member states over
the establishment of the Common Market, however, 
Article 201 of the Treaty of Rome asserted that the
Commission would
study the conditions under which the financial 
contributions of Member States provided for in Article 
200 may be replaced by other resources of the Community 
itself, in particular, by revenue accruing from the 
common customs tariff when the latter has been 
definitely introduced.135
131 Cromwell, The United States and the European 
Pillar, 31.
132 "Second Fouchet Report, " in Selection of Texts,
119
133 Ibid.
134 Nicoll and Salmon, Understanding the European 
Communities, 25.
135 Paul Minet, Full Text of the Rome Treaty and an 
ABC of the Common Market (London: Christopher Johnson, 
1961), 201-202.
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In other words, the Community perceived an independent 
source of funding of its own affairs and programs would 
be the next logical step (or in effect an example of 
spillover) in the development of a supranational 
Europe/36 The Commission would take over funds which 
were collected by the member states and treat the funds 
collected as "independent revenue,"* 137 The Commission 
would then have a budget, which according to Article 
199 of the Treaty of Rome, would have to be kept 
balanced. The Commission further proposed that the 
European Parliament have joint budgetary authority with 
the Council.138 The Commission would outline a budget 
and send a copy to the Council which "acting by 
qualified majority, shall establish the draft budget 
and shall then transmit it to the Assembly,"139 The 
Assembly will have the power to amend the budget by 
absolute majority; it is sent back to the Commission 
and the Council.140 The Council, by a majority of five 
of its members, can adopt provisions "differing both 
from the Assembly’s amendment and from the Commission’s
536 Nicoll and Salmon, Understanding the European 
Communities, 2 5-2 6.
137 "Proposal of the Commission of the Communities 
for the Introduction of Own Resources," in, Selection 
of Texts, 128.
138 Article 2 of ibid,, 130,
139 Ibid. (Emphasis added,) Article 2 also asserts 
that if the Council does not agree with the preliminary 
draft of the budget, it will "consult with the
Commission and, where appropriate, the other
institutions concerned" (ibid.).
140 Ibid,
140
proposal,”141 This fundamental proposal, which was 
articulated by Hallstein, was ’’ahead of its time,"142
In addition to his stern opposition to the 
European Parliament’s joint budgetary authority with 
the Council, de Gaulle voiced his reservations 
regarding the expansion of supranationalism in which, 
for example, ”a large number of Council decisions 
[effective 1 January 1966] were to come under the rule 
of majority voting,’’143 De Gaulle insisted on preserving 
unanimity in which "any nation could unilaterally veto 
Community legislation ”144 While the other member
states understood de Gaulle’s fears, they "argued that 
important national interests were unlikely ever to be 
ignored," and, moreover, explicitly "refused to 
renegotiate one of the treaty's few supranational 
provisions."145 The tension between de Gaulle and the 
rest of the Community over this fundamental issue 
forced the French government to boycott the meetings of 
the Council of Ministers,146
The deadlock was not reconciled until January of
1966. De Gaulle returned to/negotiating table after he
had "failed to obtain a sufficient majority in the 
first round of the presidential elections,"147 At
141 Ibid.
142 Nicoll and Salmon, Understanding the European 
Communities, 26.
143 Ibid,
144 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 57,
145 Ibid, (Emphasis added,)
146 Ibid,
147 Nicoll and Salmon, Understanding the European 
Communities, 26.
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Luxembourg, the French government wanted to review all 
outstanding problems such as agricultural reform and, 
in particular, majority voting in the Council.148 In 
Luxembourg, the Six agreed to disagree, a result known 
as the Luxembourg Compromise. In the Luxembourg 
Compromise, the Commission would retain the right of 
initiative. However, before showing the proposals to 
the European Parliament, the Commission had to present 
the legislation to the member states for consultation. 
Moreover, the Luxembourg Compromise put on hold the 
issue of majority voting in the Council of Ministers. 
The Six agreed that
Where in the case of decisions which may be taken by a 
majority vote on a proposal of the Commission very 
important interests of one or more partners are at 
stake, the Members of the Council will endeavor, within 
a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be 
adopted by all the Members of the Council, while 
respecting their mutual interests and those of the 
Communities, in accordance with Article 2 of the 
Treaty.149
The critical point at this historic juncture revolved 
around the question of how best to govern Europe. For 
the federalists, the quest for European unity needed 
constant nurturing and progress. Like the debate over 
the Fouchet reports, the federalists’ deliberation over 
the issue of majority voting was not about "politics 
as usual,” but about impeding a Gaullist vision of 
Europe which would setback European political 
unification.150
148 Kulski, De Gaulle and the world, 223.
149 "Extraordinary Meeting of the Council in 
Luxembourg," in, Selection of Texts. 132.
150 Barnet, The Alliance, 215.
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For de Gaulle, European unification, under an 
intergovernmental framework, could only work if France 
took the lead/51 By doing so, De Gaulle hoped France 
would recover its "sense of 'grandeur/"151 52 "Once having 
been the star," as Barnet further commented about de 
Gaulle's vision of Europe, "Frenchmen were uninterested 
in playing a ’walk-on' part/'153 De Gaulle's objection 
to majority voting, more importantly, manifested his 
continuing determination not to "support a system of 
voting that implied a diminution of national 
sovereignty, "154 The Luxembourg Compromise was a major 
landmark for the EC's member states because its
"practical effect" was to give the members of the 
Council of Ministers the right of veto on Community 
legislation/55 De Gaulle's insistence on a right of 
veto made the EC's member states more aware of their
national interests/56
EUROPEAN UNITY; CLASH BETWEEN SUPRANATIONALISTS AND
INTERGOVERNMENTALISTS, 1969-1979
While the Gaullist period of the 1960s 
demonstrated Haas' point that European integration 
"would be neither smooth nor automatic, "l57 the period 
between 1969 and 1979 clearly illustrated the resolve
151 Ibid., 122.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe, 
51. (Emphasis added.)
155 Ibid.
156 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 58,
157 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe, 
53. (Emphasis added.) See Chapter III of this 
dissertation.
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of federally-minded EC member states to make piecemeal 
progress towards the development of a supranational 
Europe,
At the Hague Summit of 1969, for example, the 
federalists attempted to complete, deepen, and enlarge 
the European Community.158 As the Hague Summit asserted, 
completion pertains to the issue of the single market 
in which the EC member states, for example, would lift 
remaining trade barriers. As well, the Hague Summit
asserted
Entry upon the final stage of the Common Market not 
only means confirming the irreversible nature of the 
work accomplished by the Communities, but also means 
paving the way for a United Europe capable of assuming 
its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of 
making a contribution commensurate with its traditions 
and its mission.159
The Werner Report, which came out in October 1970, 
elaborated on the practical details regarding the 
transition member states would have to undertake to 
establish economic and monetary union.160 Economic unity 
meant, however, not only dealing with the technical 
issues of such an endeavor, but also recognizing that 
the member states of the EC would "cease to follow 
independent economic policies, and at least would
158 Georges Pompidou, "The ’Summit Conference’ at 
the Hague,” Bulletin of the European Communities, Vol. 
3, No. 2 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities, 1970), 34.
159 "The Hague Summit, ” in, Selection of Texts, 
136. (Emphasis added.)
160 Christian Franck, "New Ambitions: From the 
Hague to Paris Summits,” in Roy Pryce, ed., The 
Dynamics of European Union (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 
139.
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follow coordinated policies,"161 The Werner Report 
asserted what effect monetary policy would have on the 
issue of sovereignty:
[Monetary policy] implies inside its boundaries the 
total and irreversible convertibility of currencies, 
the elimination of margins of fluctuations in exchange 
rates, the irrevocable fixing of parity rates and the 
complete liberation of movements of capital d62 163
"To ensure the cohesion of economic and monetary 
union," the Werner Report further noted, "transition of 
responsibility from the national to Community plane 
will be essential,11163
The supranational understanding of the European 
Community would also "deepen" or "extend" its 
"competence beyond existing policies and activities,"164 
This would include the development of a Social Fund 
and, as
regards the technological activity of the Community, 
they reaffirmed their readiness to continue more 
intensively the activities of the Community with a view 
to coordinating and promoting industrial research and 
development in the principal sectors concerned, in 
particular by means of common programs, and to supply 
the financial means for the purpose,165
The Davignon Report, which was submitted in May 1970, 
took a pragmatic assessment of this political endeavor. 
"Europe," the Davignon Report asserted, "must prepare
161 Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the 
European Community, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 167.
162 "The Werner Report, " in, Selection of Texts,
166. (Emphasis added.)
163 Ibid,, 166. (Emphasis added,)
164 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 74,
165 "Communique Issued by the EEC Heads of State, 2 
December 1969," in Richard Vaughan, ed., Post-War 
Integration Europe (London: Edward Arnold, Ltd., 1976), 
182.
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itself to discharge the imperative world duties 
entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing 
role."166 167 168The Davignon Report also called for the 
"harmonization of views. concentration of attitudes 
[bat] joint action when it appears feasible and 
desirable. 1,167 The supranationalists/ asserted that 
European unity would give Europe "the means to its 
development and of its influence which [would] enable
it to make its voice heard in all areas of world 
politics. "16S
Supranational developments were further made at 
the Paris Summit of 1974. For example, the member 
states of the EC agreed to direct elections to the 
European Parliament. While there were disagreements as 
to when the direct elections should take place there 
was a belief among the EC states that such an endeavor 
would be "associated with the achievement of European 
unity" and that the
competence of the European [Parliament] [would] be 
extended, in particular by granting it certain powers 
in the Communities r legislative process.169
In an interview with Hugo Young, the then British Prime 
Minister Edward Heath, who was (and continues to be) an 
ardent federalist in the British Conservative Party,170
166 "Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member 
States on the Problems of Political Unification," in, 
Selection of Texts, 147.
167 Ibid., 148, (Emphasis added.)
168 Pompidou, "The 1 Summit Conference1 at the 
Hague,” 34.
169 "Communique Issued after the Paris Meeting of 
the Heads of State, 10 December 1974," in Vaughan, 
Post-War Integration, 196. (Emphasis added.)
170 See Chapter VI of this dissertation,
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summarized what a "full" community would mean for the
states of Western Europe:
we would develop not only the open market and remove 
all obstacles to the market, but we would also develop 
the social and economic fund, we would have a common 
currency, and a common central bank. [Furthermore,] 
[w]e would develop a European parliament with the full 
powers of a parliament, and a political unity which 
would embrace foreign and defence policy, and that 
would all be done by 1980
At the Paris Summit of 1974, the EC states also called 
for the development of a common foreign policy which
reflected
a view to progress towards European unity, the Heads of 
Government reaffirm their determination gradually to 
adopt common positions and coordinate their diplomatic 
action in all areas of international affairs which 
affect the interests of the European Community J72 
The Tindemans Report, which came out in 1975, suggested 
that the member states of the EC clearly spell out a 
common foreign policy which should coordinate policies 
during a period of transition.171 172 73 174However, if European 
unification is to take on a federal structure, the 
practice of foreign policy must "make way for common 
policies, which means that within the framework of the 
European union, our States must be able together to 
draw up a policy and to enact it,X74
171 Hugo Young, "No, Prime Minister, " Marxism 
Todayf November 1988, 16. (Emphasis added.)
172 "Communique Issued after the Paris Meeting of 
the Heads of State, 10 December 1974," 194. (Emphasis 
added.)
173 Leo Tindemans, "European Union: Report to the 
European Council," Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement 1/76 (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities), 15.
174 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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Finally, the concept of enlargement was defined as 
opening the European Community to new members in 
Europe?75 In maintaining the progression of European 
unity, potential members had to accept the present 
accomplishments of the Community. Furthermore, 
potential member states can make transitional 
arrangements, "but their purpose was solely to allow 
for the adhering states to adjust to the conditions of 
membership.”* 176 177 178The Tindemans Report only accepted the 
use of national interest by member states as an 
impediment in complying Treaty provisions up to a
certain point. The Tindemans Report was pragmatically
aware that it is
impossible at the present time to submit a credible 
program of action if it is deemed absolutely necessary 
that in every case all stages should be reached by all 
the States at the same time?77
Those who were not ready to forge ahead towards the 
completion of the single market, then, would not do so. 
However, this was not to say that the Tindemans Report 
advocated a Europe a la carte;17S the Tindemans Report 
was not prepared to see progress on EC development 
rolled back because, according to the Report, "each 
country [is to be] bound by the agreement of all as to
17> In 1973, the European Community welcomed 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom as new 
members.
176 Nicoll and Salmon, Understanding the European 
Communities, 29.
177 Tindemans, "European Union: Report to the 
European Council," 20.
178 Jacqus Vandamme, "The Tindemans Report (1975­
1976)," in Pryce, The Dynamics of European Union, 161.
the final objective to be achieved in common; it is 
only the timescales for achievement which vary."179 180
The harmonization of foreign policy tasks among 
the EC member states, however, would not be an easy
endeavor. Despite the ’’adamant” claims for a common 
foreign policy, certain states of Western Europe were 
still working from the perspective of L'Europe des 
Patries dso For example, the Midd-le East crisis did very 
little in the EC to create a common foreign policy 
because each of the member states were scrambling for 
bilateral oil arrangements.181 The member states of the 
EC, which received about 80% of its oil supplies from 
the Middle East and North Africa,182 183"did little to help 
the Netherlands in 1973 with an Arab oil boycott. "lS3 
With the rise of oil prices, Laffan further argues, the 
member states faced a serious recession and higher 
unemployment?84 While the EC attempted to counter the 
crisis with a common energy policy, "differences 
between oil producers such as Britain and the oil­
consuming states limited effective unity?’185
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179 "European Union: Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, " 
19-20. (Emphasis added.)
180 John Palmer, Europe without America? The Crisis 
in Transatlantic Relations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), 132.
181 Cromwell, The United States and the European 
Pillar, 89.
182 ”... And Now, the Oil Crunch," Time, 22 October 
1973, 9.
183 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
53.
184 Ibid.
185 Palmer, Europe without America?, 143.
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The member states achieving economic unity also 
proved to be difficult. In 1971,- for example, the 
member states of the European Community witnessed the 
breakup of the dollar-dominated monetary system which
"marked the end of the earlier Atlantic consensus 
enshrined in the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944. "186 
For the EC member states, this economic and monetary 
crisis "had the unfortunate but predicable impact of 
fueling inflation."187 In addressing the theme of this 
dissertation,- however, there was something deeper at 
stake. In France, for example, Pompidiou came under 
political "pressure from his orthodox Gaullists, who 
were appalled at the conclusions of the Werner 
Report"188 for it would inevitably "involve fiscal and 
monetary management at the European level."189 There 
were those on the British Left in the 1970s who
objected to the supranational (and pro-capitalist) 
dimension of the Common Market.190 In a pamphlet issued
186 ibid., 11.
187 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 83. In April of 
1972, the optimal option for the member states of the 
EC at the time was to establishing the "snake in the 
tunnel," in which the latter was "an arrangement of for 
approximating the exchange rates [within a 2.5% 
fluctuation] of member currencies one to another while 
holding their value jointly in relation to the US 
dollar" (George, Politics and Policy in the European 
Community, 168) .
188 "That Elusive European Currency, " The 
Economist, 19 December 1970, 68. (Emphasis added.)
189 "Willy Pays His Price in the West for the Deal 
in the East," The Economist, 30 January 1971, 27.
190 Unattributable interview with a former Labour 
MP at his residence in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 25 
October 1994.
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by the British Trade Union Congress in May 1975, for
example, it (asserted that beingk
in the Common Market means that the British people no 
longer have the final say in the way their country is 
run. Democracy in Britain has been based for centuries 
on the supreme power of an elected Parliament to pass 
laws and levy taxes. But this has all been brought to 
question in the Common Market. Regulations made in 
Brussels are law in Britain, and have to be enforced by 
our courts and put into effect by our administration. 
But they are not made by the British people, and they 
are not made by the British Parliament J91
The establishment of political integration proved 
to be a difficult task because, according to Burgess, 
the states of Western Europe "rediscovered their 
identities, their interests and their aspirations. "191 92 193 194 
It seems that this point highlighted the 
intergovernmental character of the Paris Summit of 1974 
in which the EC member states created the European 
Council to convene up to three times a year. The Paris 
Summit asserted that with the various Heads of 
Government of the member states the European Council
would
... ensure consistency in Community activities and 
continuity of work [...] the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, meeting in the Council of the Community, will 
act as initiators and coordinators J93
The Tindemans Report, which offered an analysis "on the 
concept and on the shape of the European Union, 1,194
191 "Pamphlet Opposing Continued EEC Membership, 
Issued by the Trade Union Congress of the United 
Kingdom, May 1975," in Vaughan, Post-War Integration 
Europe, 203. (Emphasis added.)
192 "Press Conference by Mr, Georges Pompidou 
President of the French Republic (21 January 1971)," 
in, Selection of Texts, 202. (Emphasis added.)
193 Ibid., 275. (Emphasis added.)
194 Vandamme, "The Tindemans Report (1975-76),"
150.
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cited the need to maintain Community patrimony and the 
need to complete the economic and monetary union of the 
EC; however, the "main thrust" of the Tindemans Report 
emphasized this point:
Public opinion is extremely skeptical on the will to 
establish a genuine European union and solve the real 
problems of the day at European level. It wants results 
and questions the lack of political will on the part of 
its leaders. For me, the conclusion is obvious: if we 
wish to safeguard the achievements of the Treaties and 
conquer new ground the member states must agree on new 
aims. At this stage, the stakes are political, that is 
quite irrefutable.195
If anything, history is not, according to the late 
George W. Ball, "the constant replaying of old themes, 
but a flow of events that, if man is to survive, must 
be so channelled as to meet the needs of an evolving 
age,"196 Georges Pompidou, who succeeded de Gaulle as 
President of France, asserted that while one cannot 
deny the political identity of states like Germany or 
Britain, it is possible to build a Europe which not 
only deals with technical issues but a Europe in which 
its member states
are prepared to harmonize their policies and to 
integrate their economies. If one takes this view the 
dispute over supranationality becomes irrelevant.197 
While the first direct elections of the European 
Parliament in 1979 "altered the barren institutional 
landscape and gave the parliamentary institution ample
i9s -pext of Leo Tindemans' letter to the
European Council in Tindemans, "European Union: Report 
to the European Council," 5. (Emphasis added.)
196 Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 98.
197 "Pompidou Press Conference (21 January 1971),"
202.
grounds for demanding greater powers, ”198 the member 
states (through an intergovernmental framework} 
developed new initiatives like the Snake199 and the 
introduction of a European Council to help bring the 
Community closer to a common foreign policy. While 
there were economic and political constraints, then, 
the member states did what they could to forge Europe
ahead.
EUROPEAN UNION; SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
AND THE MAASTRICHT TREATY
The essential groundwork for the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) of 1991 lay in the founding of 
the European Monetary System (EMS) of 1978 and the 
Single European Act (SEA) of 1986.200 The importance of 
the SEA for the supranational development of the 
European Community was that it introduced qualified 
majority voting for the establishment of the single 
market and increased the powers of the European 
Parliament.201 The supranational developments of EMS and 
SEA were important because they set the EC member 
states on the course of establishing the single market 
and in planning the implementation of an independent
central bank and a single currency.202 he details
of Europe’s single currency and Central Bank and their 
dividing impact on the British Conservative Party’s
198 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
199 See fn. 187.
200 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?f 129.
201 Palmer, Europe without America?, 21.
202 Chapter 2, Title II of the TEU.
55.
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understanding of the TEU are discussed in Chapter VI of 
this dissertation,) Jacques Delors noted that the 
single market would open markets to trade, secure 
"control over capital flows" and "strengthen" 
international monetary stability,"203
asserted that
Delors also
[t]he essential parallelism between the economic, 
social and monetary sectors, the irrevocable link in 
the final phase between currencies, the common 
management of some policies and the resultant 
relinquishment of sovereignty all make economic and 
monetary union a most profoundly political economic 
goal andf at the same time, the first initial sign of a 
genuine shared destiny,204
Delors’ supranational vision of the SEA and the 
TEU, however, clashed with the intergovernmental 
approach of certain states like Denmark and the United 
Kingdom. The debate, as will also be shown in the next
two chapters, is fundamental because it is here in 
these two international treaties that, according to 
Thatcher, the quest towards supranational Europe began 
to take its definitive shape, 205 It is therefore not 
surprising to note that the Thatcher government 
"entered the negotiations determined to limit [the]
203 Jacques Delors, "The Commission’s Program for 
1991: President of the Commission, to the European 
Parliament and His Reply to the Debate, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, Supplement 1/91 (Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communi ties), 10.
204 Jacques Delors, Address by the President of the 
Commission of the European Communities, to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 26 
September 1989, Information Department of Council of 
Europe, 4. (Emphasis added.)
205 Thatcher, The Path to Power, 473.
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scope [of institutional reform] J1’06 In explaining the 
SEA agreement to the House of Commons Thatcher
asserted:
I do not believe in the concept of a united states of 
Europe, nor do I believe that it would ever be 
attainable [for] [t]he whole history is completely 
different. . . . I am constantly saying that I wish that 
they would talk less about European and political 
union. The terms are not understood in this country. In 
so far as they are understood over there, they mean a 
good deal less than some people here think they mean.* 207 
Britain's determination to limit institutional reform
was also seen in the negotiations of the TEU. In 
negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, Major protected 
Britain's national interest by placing CFSP and Home 
and Judicial Affairs at the intergovernmental level,208
The importance of the supranational debate concerned 
many in Denmark to vote "No" (50.7% No; 49.3% Yes) on 
the TEU in early 1992,209 "When [the Danes] voted 
against Maastricht in their referendum," as Scottish 
nationalist Jim Fairlie210 211comments, "it was precisely 
the loss of sovereingty to which their government had 
agreed that they objected,"2U The "threat to national
200 Laffan, integration and Cooperation in Europe,
57 .
207 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 88, Sixth Series, Session 1985-1986, col. 
432. (Emphasis added.)
208 Titles V and VI of the TEU respectively.
209 "Why the Danes Wouldn't," The Economist, 6 June 
1992, 42.
210 For more on Mr. Fairlie's contribution to the 
Scottish nationalist movement, see his biographical 
sketch in Chapter V of this dissertation.
211 Jim Fairlie, in correspondence with Tom Kerr, 
undated. (Emphasis added.) Letter was most likely 
written in late October 1992.
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independencef ”212 as will be explored later in this 
chapter, highlighted the crucial debate over the issue 
of common citizenship.213
A. EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
The EMS was established at the Brussels Summit of 
December 1978 .214 Like Monnet, the then President of the 
Commission Roy Jenkins asserted that integration had to 
come about on a piecemeal basis.215 "The lesson [Monnet] 
taught me," Jenkins writes in his memoirs, "was always 
to advance along the lines of least resistance provided 
that it led in approximately the right direction."216 
For Jenkins, the creation of the EMS was not a "an 
original step;"217 rather, it was seen as a logical step 
in relaunching the supranational goals of the Hague
Conference back in 1969.
Jenkins also attempted to sell the EMS from a 
"macroeconomic" perspective in which the EMS would 
lower inflation, increase investment, and reduce
212 "Why the Danes WouldnTt," 42.
213 Ibid.
214 To summarize, the EMS had four main components; 
a European Currency Unit (ECU), an exchange and 
intervention mechanism, credit facilities, and transfer 
arrangements (Palmer, Europe without America?, 148). 
Under the exchange and intervention mechanism, the EMS 
established a grid of bilateral exchange rates in which 
there was a fluctuation of +/- 2.25%. The ECU would 
serve as a denominator for the exchange rate mechanism 
and "as a means of settlement between monetary 
authorities of the EC" ("Resolution of the European 
Council of 5 December 1978," in, Selection of Texts, 
414) .
215 Roy Jenkins, European Diary: 1977-1981 (London; 
Collins, 1989), 22-23..
216 Ibid., 23,
217 Ibid,
156
unemployment,218 Moreover, Jenkins wanted Europe to have 
a certain amount of economic independence.219 Helmut 
Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany was for the
scheme because of the "adverse effects on the German 
economy of the decline of the US dollar,”220 This was a 
result of Germany's dependence on the US market for the 
sale of German capital goods. Jenkins writes in his
memoirs
But in the late seventies, when the era of dollar 
omnipotence was only a decade behind, it seemed like a 
collapse of the verities. It produced considerable 
inconveniences as well a competitive disadvantage of 
for Europe. It also confirmed Helmut Schmidt's view 
that President Carter was abdicating from the 
leadership of the West. And the German Chancellor was 
less inhibited about filling the monetary than the 
political gap, and even better qualified to do so.221
Economic independence, along the lines of 
developing a supranational framework, did not inspire 
Great Britain to join the EMS. The UK did not join the 
EC's new monetary arrangement because the James 
Callaghan government was afraid that EMS, "with the 
probability of a consequent devaluation of the pound, 
would make inflation worse."222 London feared losing 
control over credit and monetary policy to the West
German central bank because
2,8 Dinan, Ever Closer Union?, 105.
219 Ian Murray, "Jenkins Warning on EEC Future,"
The Times, 7 October 1978, 4.
220 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in 
the European Community (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 126.
221 Jenkins, European Diary, 197. (Emphasis added.)
222 "ProblEMS, ProblEMS, ProblEMS, " The Economist, 
28 October 1978, 23. See also, "One Cheer for Mr. 
Callaghan," New Statesman, 27 October 1978, 229.
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of the dominating role of the Deutschmark in the EMS, 
while the Labour leaders feared they would be forced by 
Bundesbank conservative orthodoxy to deflate rather 
than devalue sterling if the UK economy hit troubled23 
There were domestic considerations. Prime Minister
James Callaghan’s Labour Party "remained suspicious of 
what they thought was too close an entanglement with 
Europe..."223 24 At the Labour Party Conference (October 
1978)r "speaker after speaker [came] to the podium to 
condemn the idea [of EMS]."225 226While the Labour Party 
Conference of that year defeated a motion "calling on 
the Government to start negotiations for Britain’s 
withdrawal from the Community, 1,226 the Labour Party 
Manifesto of 1979 asserted that
We aim to develop a Europe which is democratic and 
socialist, and where the interests of the people are 
placed above the interests of national and 
multinational capitalist groups, but within each 
country must be able to realize its own economic and 
social objectives, under the sovereignty of its own 
Parliament and people.227 228
Moreover, it became clear to Callaghan that EMS "entry 
would provoke a grand bust-up in the Labor Party, with 
the possibility of cabinet resignations that the 
government could ill afford,"223 Considerations "of
223 Palmer, Europe without America?, 148. (Emphasis 
added.)
221 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: 
Williams Collins Sons and Co., Ltd., 1987), 493.
225 George, An Awkward Partner, 129.
226 "Move to Leave European Community Soundly 
Rejected," The Times, 5 October 1978, 4.
227 The Labour Party Manifestof 1979 (London: The 
Labour Party, 1979), 32. (Emphasis added.)
228 "ProblEMS, ProblEMS, ProblEMS, " 23. (Emphasis 
added.) Similar themes and issues facing the Labour 
Party in the 1970s over European monetary policy 
affected the British Conservative Party in the 1990s. 
See Chapter VI of this dissertation.
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party unity," Stephen George argues, "seem to have been 
instrumental in swaying a Labour Prime Minister in a 
direction that would put Britain out of step with the 
rest of the Community."229
B. SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT
In examining the SEA, however, Burgess notes that 
the Act was a compromise between the 
intergovernmentalists and the supranationalists.230 In 
respect to the SEA’s federalist dimension, Disnan notes 
that the SEA "sought to infuse" the Community "with a 
renewed sense of purpose"231 and, as Article 1 of the 
Commission Provisions of the SEA observes, make 
"concrete progress towards European unity."232 Under the 
SEA, the EC member states agreed to the establishment
of a single market in which all trade barriers would be
lifted and all internal frontiers abolished, so to
ensure the free movement of capital, goods, and
services .233
The SEA’s supranational agenda also expands 
Community competences into other areas of state 
activity which include research and technological 
development, the environment, and regional and social 
policy. 234 In establishing the single market the
229 George, An Awkward Partner, 130.
230 Burgess, Federalism and the European Union,
205.
231 Disnari, Ever Closer Union?, 129.
232 "The Single European Act, " Bulletin of the 
European Communitias, Supplement 2/86 (Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities), 7.
233 Ibid., 11.
234 Ibid... 13-16.
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Council of Ministers, as outlined in Article 100A of
. . . . . . the SEA, will use qualifi^' majority voting m laying 
down provisions for health, safety, and environmental 
and consumer protection. 235 Moreover, in pursuing 
improvements in the work place, Article 118 B asserts 
that the Commission ’’shall endeavor to develop the 
dialogue between management and labor at European level 
whic?Vcould, if the two sides consider it desirable, 
lead to relations based on agreement.”236
Brigid Laffan writes, however, that the political 
success behind the SEA also "lies in the capacity of 
the negotiators to strike a new intergovernmental 
bargain, especially among the larger member states."237 *
Thatcher’s support for the SEA’s single market program, 
"with the strong support of British industry and 
business, "23S was made possible because deregulation 
"and economic liberalism began to replace Keynesian 
demand management as the dominant mode of economic 
policy in the 1980s."239 There were other incentives for 
the intergovernmentalists to support the SEA. While 
Thatcher agreed to the use of majority voting on some 
treaty articles dealing with certain aspects of the
internal market, 240 other aspects such as the free
235 Ibid., 12.
236 Ibid., 13.
237 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in .Europe,
57.
23S Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col.
429.
239 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
57.
240 Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col.
429
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movement of peC'&C'^H and fiscal harmonization,- covered in 
Article 100A(2) of the SEA., are based on unanimity.241 
What makes this point interesting, however, is that 
Thatcher and her fellow Euro-skeptic colleagues (like 
Bill Cash and Michael Spicer) would come to regret the 
significance of the above provisions in their fight 
against ratification of the TEU in 1992-1993 .242
SEA’s Title III, which pertains to foreign policy 
of the EC, is purely intergovernmental in nature. Under 
Article 30.1, for example, the EC states ’’shall 
endeavor jointly to implement a European foreign 
policy.”243 Laffan asserts that word "endeavor" "conveys 
the limits of the process as it exists"244 for a 
European foreign policy would, as stated in Article 
302 (a) of the SEA, require "the convergence of [the 
member states’] positions and the implementation of 
joint action,"245 *Laffan also asserts that much of the 
language in Title III is "non-binding.,,24G In Article 
30.2(d), for example, the SEA asserts that
the [member states] shall endeavor to avoid any action 
or position which impairs their effectiveness as a 
cohesive force in international relations or within 
international organizations.247
241 "The Single European Act," 12.
242 See Chapter VI of this dissertation.
243 "Single European Act," 18.
244 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
152.
245 "Single European Act," 18. (Emphasis added.)
245 Ibid.
247 "Single European Act," 18.
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Laffan seems to identify the SEA’s Article 30. 2 as a 
’’key" factor to the SEA’s intergovernmental dimension248 
for as is asserted in Article 30.2(c) the member states 
"shall take full account of the positions of the other 
partners and shall give due consideration to the 
desirability of adopting and implementing common 
European positions.’’249 250
In her report to the House of Commons,- however,
Thatcher noted that SEA’s Title III "looks to a 
steadily closer relationship."™ in foreign policy 
among the EC's member states. In her Bruges speech, 
Thatcher asserted that she perceived it in Britain’s 
interest to work on problems of common interest.251 252
Having said that, Thatcher also asserted in her Bruges 
Speech that "working together" on common problems does 
not ’’require power to be centralized in Brussels or 
decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy."™ 
For Thatcher, the intergovernmental approach to 
European unity preserves
the different traditions, parliamentary powers and 
sense of national pride in one's own country; for these 
have been the source of Europe's vitality through the 
centuries.253
Like Thatcher, Major (through the TEU agreement) 
aspired for Britain to retain its ability to act
248 Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe,
152.
249 "Single European Act," 18.
250 Parliamentary Debates, 5 December 1985, col.
429. (Emphasis added.)
251 Thatcher, "Britain’s Policies Towards Europe, 
Trade, and Defence."
252 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
253 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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unilaterally on other issues. This includes the special 
relationship with the United States and the 
difficulties over the issue of Hong Kong.254
C. TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION
Like the outcome of the SEA, there emerged at the 
Intergovernmental Conference of 1991 a compromise 
between those who wanted to see integration move ahead 
along federal lines and those who were considered 
reticent. 255 256H.T Wilson observed that so long as there 
is an intergovernmental factor to be dealt with in 
European Community affairs
its viability [that is, European unity] will be heavily 
dependent on its ability to meet the minimal needs of 
each member — particularly the large members — in the 
context of what is perceived to be the joint surrender 
of their respective governmental and political 
powers a
There emerged, for example, an intergovernmental 
outcome regarding the CFSP of the TEU. As Trevor C. 
Salmon explains, there emerged out of the Maastricht 
process two school of thoughts. The first school was 
the "quantum leap forward, " which called for a more 
federalist approach to the making and implementation of 
foreign policy. 257 Federalists wanted to develop the
254 This point is raised in Chapter VI of this 
dissertation.
255 Richard Corbett, "The Intergovernmental 
Conference on Political Union," Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3 (September 1992): 272.
256 H. T. Wilson, "The European Mind on the Eve of 
Full Economic Integration," History of European Ideas, 
Vol. 17, No. 1 (1993): 3. (Emphasis in the original.)
257 Trevor C. Salmon, "The Growing Pains of 
European Adolescence: Groping for a European Pillar," 
Journal of European Integration, Vol. 16, No. 2-3 
(1993): 220.
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’’tree” approach in which EC, CFSP, and Home and 
judicial Affairs would be under a single treaty 
framework and, more or less, reflect the Community 
method and structured58 In the Belgian Memorandum of 19 
March 1990, for example, the Belgian delegation
asserted the need for the General Affairs Council to
"become once again the Community's political decision­
making center. ”258 59 The Belgian delegation called for a 
European union to cover all aspects (economic, 
political, bilateral and multilateral) of foreign 
policy.260
There was (and is) the more gradualist approach to 
CFSP.261 The EU member states which supported this 
school of thought were Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, 
and Portugal. In ascertaining their position, Delors 
recognizes that the political realm of integration is 
much more difficult "than economic integration, because 
the traditions, diplomatic practices and history of the 
Twelve are dif f erent. ”262 A_s Thatcher has noted in her
258 Sophie Vanhoonacker, "A Critical Issue: From 
European Political Cooperation to a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy," in Finn Laursen and Sophie
Vanhoonacker, eds., The Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies 
and International Identity of the European Community, 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1992), 32.
259 "Belgian Memorandum: 19 March 1990, " in Laursen 
and Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union, 273.
260 Ibid.
261 Salmon, "The Growing Pains of European 
Adolescence," 220.
262 Delors’ Address to the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, 26 September 1989, 4.
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Bruges speech, the EC's member states’ future does not 
simply lie with only Europe.263 "Spain cares about Latin 
America,” European Commissioner Leon Brittan writes, 
"in the way that France looks to North and West Africa 
and Indo-China, and Britain to the Commonwealth."264 
Ultimately, the member states agreed under Title V of
the TEU
Should there be any major difficulties in implementing 
a joint action, a Member State shall refer them to the 
Council which shall discuss them and seek appropriate 
solutions. Such solutions shall not run counter to the 
objectives of the joint action or impair its 
effect i vene s s .265
The intergovernmental position was (and is) that the 
European Union should be built as a "Temple" in which
CFSP and Home and Judicial Affairs would "have their 
own rules and procedures. ”266 For the 
intergovernmentalists like John Major, the CFSP should 
not only aim to maintain peace and international 
stability and adhere to the compliance of the rule of 
international law, but it "should also bear in mind the 
special relations of individual Member States."267
Title VI, which pertains to Home and Judicial 
Affairs, also reflects the member states’ belief in the 
need for cooperation at the European level. Title VI,
263 Thatcher, "Britain’s Policies Towards Europe, 
Trade and Defence."
2M Leon Brittan, Europe: The Europe We Need 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), 182.
265 Article J4(l), (4), and (7) of the TEU
266 Vanhoonacker, "A Critical Issue," 32.
267 "European Council: Presidency Conclusions: 
Rome, 14 and 15 December 1990, in Laursen and 
Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union, 319. (Emphasis added.)
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for example, established, a European Police Office 
(Europol) which would coordinate efforts between states 
in combatting drug trafficking and terrorism.268 Matters 
such as the latter are international in scope. This 
reflects in Title Vi’s Article K3 the need to adopt
. . .joint action in so far as the objectives of the 
Union can be attained better by joint action than by 
the Member States acting individually on account of the 
scale or effects of the action envisaged; it may decide 
that measures implementing joint action are to be 
adopted by a qualified majority,269
While Article K2 stipulates that member states will 
coordinate efforts (through a coordinating Committee) 
in implementing the provisions under Article K1 (eg 
asylum policy, combating drug addiction, judicial 
cooperation in civil matters, etc), Article K4 asserts 
that the Council "shall act unanimously, except on 
matters of procedure and in cases where Article K3 
expressly provides for other voting rules, "27° Moreover, 
Title VI does not affect the "exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with 
regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security,"271 272
Neither Home and Judicial Affairs nor CFSP are
part of the TEU legal framework per se nor, more 
importantly, subject to judicial review of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) r" ; (Home and Judicial
268 Article K1 (9) of the TEU
269 Article K3 (2) (b) of the TEU
270 Article K4(3) of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)
271 Article K2 (2) of the TEU
272 Trevor C. Salmon, "The Union, CFSP, and the 
European Security Debate," in Lodge, The European 
Community and the Challenge of the Future, 264.
Affairs, the Council shall act "unanimously, except for 
procedural questions and in the case referred to in 
Article J3(2) . ”273 While the CFSP, as the
intergovernmentalists define it, calls for the EU 
member states to honor common objectives in the realm 
of international organizations, 274 there is "no 
suggestion that the Union should take over from the
member states in the UN as that would entail a loss of 
voting power,"275 While the EU member states who are 
Permanent Members of the United Nations Security 
Council retain the right to act in their own national 
interest, the Maastricht Treaty obliges member states 
like France and the United Kingdom to "ensure the 
defence of the positions and the interests of the 
Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities 
under the provisions of the United Nations Charter,"276
An interesting clash between progress towards a 
federal Europe and the national identity of a EU member 
state revolved around the issue of common citizenship. 
For supranationalists, the concept of common 
citizenship was perceived as a way of advancing the 
argument that the project of European unity "referred 
not just to governments but also to peoples,"277 The
273 Article. J8(2) of the TEU. In Article J3 (2) 
asserts that the "Council shall, when adopting the 
joint action and at any stage during its development, 
define those matters which decisions decided are to be 
taken by a qualified majority."
274 Lodge, "The Transition to a CFSP," 244,
275 Ibid., 245,
276 Article J4 of the TEU,
277 Jacob Soderman, "Citizen/! Who Stand Up for Your 
Rights," The European, 7-13 December 1995, 8. (Emphasis
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supranationalists, thus, assert that the "Community 
constituted a new legal order, the subject rights of 
which were member states and their nationals, "27S * * 278Under 
common citizenship, for example, the peoples of the 
European Union are allowed to work and reside in any 
part of the Union,279 This right is construed as 
fundamental because according to Title I of the 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Right of 
Workers (1989)
[t]he right to freedom of movement shall enable any 
worker to engage in any occupation or profession in the 
Community in accordance with the principles of equal 
treatment as regards access to employment, working 
conditions and social protection in the host country,280
added.) For example, see "Preambles to the Treaties of 
Rome," in Nelsen and C-G Stubb, The European Union:
Readings on the Theory and Practice of European
fn t egra t.ion, 14.
278 Soderman, "Citizen Who Stand Up for Your 
Rights," 8. (Emphasis added.)
279 Article 8a of the TEU. See also "Resolution on 
the Intergovernmental Conference in the Context of the 
European Parliament’s Strategy for European Union," 
Official Report, C324, 24 December 1990.
280 "Community Charter of the Fundamental Social
Rights of Workers," in Bernard Rudden and Derrick 
Wyatt, eds., Basic Community Laws, new edition: 
includes the Maastrich Amendments (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993), 613. This Charter, cite: Rudden and 
Wyatt, was only adopted by 11 of the 12 Member States 
at the Strasbourg Summit 9 December 1989 (p. 611). An 
individual and his family have the right to live 
anywhere in the Union but as Article I (1) of an EEC 
Directive (28 June 1990) states .• _ the individual
must be able to prove to possess'' insurance and "have 
sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the 
social assistance system of the host Member State 
during their period of residence" ("Council Directive 
of 28 June 1990 on the Right of Residence 
[90/364/F.EC] , " in ibid., 411).
168
The question here, however, is whether or not Community 
citizenship can replace national citizenship.281 It is 
an interesting question because under common 
citizenship of the TEU a European citizen can vote in 
the local and European Parliament elections of the area 
he worj^ and res id</ in.282 Furthermore , a European 
citizen has the right to petition (through an
Qbudsman283) the European Parliament regarding 
"complaints against the Union."284
The issue of common citizenship was a concern for 
the Danish people in the first referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty. 285 This is because the Danes were 
concerned that rights and privileges enjoyed by Danes 
would be extended to other European citizens.286 It was 
made clear at the Birmingham Summit (October 1992) that 
European citizenship would offer "additional rights and 
protection without in any way taking tho place of their
281 Ernest Wistrieh, The United States of Europe 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 94.
282 Article 8b of the TEU. See also "Resolution on 
the Intergovernmental Conference," 24 December 1990.
283 Article 8d of the TEU.
284 David O’Keefe, "Union Citizenship," in David 
O’Keefe and Patrick M. Twomey, eds., Legal Issues of 
the Maastricht Treaty (London: Chancery Law Publishing, 
1994), 101. According to Article 138 e of the TEU, the 
Audsman can make inquiries "for which he finds 
grounds, either on his own initiative or on the basis 
of complaints submitted to him directly or through a 
member of European Parliament, except where the alleged 
facts are or have been the subject of legal
proceedings."
285 "The Danes Say No, " The Economist, 6 June 1992,
11.
286 Carlos Closa, "Citizenship of the Union and the 
Nationality of the Member States," in O'Keefe and 
Twomey, Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, 114.
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national citizenship. "2S7 Denmark’s Declaration at the 
Edinburgh Summit (December 1992} also attempted to 
resolve this conflict over the problem of national 
identity within the European Union context. 238 In that 
Declaration,- Denmark stated that it would establish 
legislation granting European citizens the right to 
vote or to stand for elections in the next European 
Parliament election of 1994. However,
Nothing in the Treaty on European Union implies or 
foresees an undertaking to create a citizenship of the 
Union in the sense of citizenship of a nation state. . . . 
Citizenship of the Union in no way in itself gives a 
national of another Member State the right to obtain 
Danish citizenship or any of the rights, duties, 
privileges or advantages that are inherent in Danish 
citizenship by virtue of Denmark's constitutional, 
legal and administrative rules,239
Were the Danes’ concerns justified? If anything, the 
Birmingham and the Danish Declarations reinforced
traditional international law which states that 
citizenship of the individual is determined by . 
member state- 287 * 289 90 As well, an individual can only attain 
European citizenship if he (or she) is a national of
287 "Birmingham Declaration -- A Community Close to 
its Citizens,” Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Vol. 25, No. 10 (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1992), 9. 
(Emphasis added.)
2ss "Maastricht Sails On." The Economist, 22 May 
1993, 15-16.
289 "Unilateral Declaration of Denmark, to be 
Associated to the Danish Act of Ratification of the 
Treaty on European Union of which the Eleven Other 
Member States will take Cognizance," in Rudden and 
Wyatt, Basic Community Laws, 233. (Emphasis added.)
290 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law, 
Second Edition, Revised and Edited by Robert W. Tucker 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1967} ,
372.
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one of the Member States of the Union.291 "An individual 
who cannot claim to be a national of a Member State, ” 
therefore, "cannot claim to be a citizen of the Union
either."292 European citizenship does not replace the
citizenship of the member state for, as was outlined
above, it is limited in scope.293
Finally, there was (and is) the issue of
subsidiarity. Like the issue of CFSP and Home and
Judicial Affairs, there existed an ideological rift
between the supranationalists and the
intergovernmentalists. There was (and is) a rift
because there continues to be no agreement as to how
subsidiarity should be defined. 294 Articles A and 3b
were placed in the TEU to alleviate the anxieties of
"ideological" factions within the European Union.295 For
the supranationalists, for example, the European 
■tz- u FdhUvk.
Community is there to manage /legislation which affects 
directly the national life of European citizens.296 
After all, Article A of the TEU asserts a
29! Article 8 of the TEU.
292 Closa, "Citizenship of the Union,” 109.
293 Dawn Oliver and Derek Heater, The Foundations 
of Citizenship (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), 
142-143.
294 n^rial by Subsidiarity, " The Economist, 4 July 
1992, 15.
295 John Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to 
Suit Any Vision," Parliamentary Affairs: A Journal of 
Comparative Politics. Vol. 47, No. 1 (Januarv 1994): 
118.
296 "Resolution on the European Parliament’s 
Guidelines for a Draft Constitution for the European 
Union," Official Report, C231, 17 September 1990.
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new stage in the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions 
are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.291 
For the supranationalist this definition of 
subsidiarity is designed "to recognize that legitimacy 
of Government grows from the individual citizen and not 
from institutions."297 98 It is a "commitment"
to have its proposals adopted by all democratic means, 
in particular by mobilizing European public opinion and 
its democratically elected representatives.299
The supranationalists assert that there are certain 
economic and political functions which do' not have to 
implemented at the general (or federal) level of 
government, 300 Article A hopes to lead
to a better relationship between the States and the 
European Union as well as between the part of the 
states and their own government centers,301
The supranationalist approach to subsidiarity seeks, 
therefore, "to constitutionalize a division of powers 
between different levels of government in a federal 
constitution for Europe. ”302
The intergovernmental understanding of
subsidiarity, however, is perceived as limiting the 
powers of the European Union. 303 The British 
Conservative Party of John Major, for example, adopts
297 Article A of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)
298 Dafydd Wigley, in correpondence with the 
author, 8 September 1994. Mr. Wigley of the Plaid Cymru 
is an MP for Caernafon.
299 "Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference 
in the Context of Parliament's Strategy for European 
Union," Official Journal, C96, 17 April 1990.
300 See Chapter V of this dissertation,
301 George Robertson, in correspondence with the 
author, 6 September 1994. (Emphasis added.)
302 Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit 
Any Vision," 119. (Emphasis added.)
303 "Trial by Subsidiarity," 15, (Emphasis added,)
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this line of reasoning because it is based on the 
Tory’s belief in parliamentary sovereignty.304 ”A 
parliament which cannot provide redress for the 
grievances of its electors/' Lord Tebbit observes, "is 
an impotent parliament."305 In other words, Petterson 
writes that Major’s Tory government believes in 
"territorial government" which "resists any constraints 
— internal or external— on the autonomy of central 
government. "306
Unlike the supranationalists, the inter­
governmentalists assert that the principle of 
subsidiarity can only affect the relationship between 
Brussels and the member states. A.G. Toth notes that
only member states can determine at what level (be it 
central, regional or local government) to implement 
Community legislation. For Toth, this question "is a 
matter for national law to regulate in which
Community law cannot interfere. Subsidiarity can only 
determine whether decisions should be taken at the 
Community or national level, no more."307
Article 3b of the TEU reflects the 
intergovernmental approach to subsidiarity because it
304 Wigley, in correspondence with the author, 8 
September 1994. For more on the British Conservative 
Party's understanding of the impact the TEU (in 
particular the EMU) would have on parliamentary 
sovereignty, see Chapter VI of this dissertation.
305 Norman Tebbit, "Concern for Identity, " The 
European Journalr Vol. 1, No. 4 (February 1994): 4.
306 Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit 
any Vision," 119.
307 A.G. Toth, "Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity," in 
O'Keeffe and Twomey, Legal Issues of the Maastricht 
Treaty, 38.
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can be used as a device "for dividing competences 
between the EC and its member states according to which 
can perform specific actions more effectively,"308 
Article 3b is written as such:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers 
conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives 
assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall 
within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of 
the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better- 
achieved by the Community.309
For subsidiarity to work, however, there must be a 
clear outline as to what are the exclusive, concurrent 
and potential powers of the Union,310 311Exclusive powers 
are responsibilities and powers enshrined in the 
Treaties; because these powers are enshrined in the 
Treaties, the member states of the Community "lose the 
right to act unilaterally, "3U and therefore, do not 
apply to the subsidiarity principle. Concurrent powers 
are responsibilities
308 Petterson, "Subsidiarity: A Definition to Suit 
Any Vision," 120.
309 Article 3b of the TEU.
310 Toth, "A. Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity," 39, 
The European Community also acknowledged that this is 
one of the problems with Article 3b of the TEU. See 
"Subsidiarity Principle," 119. The "functional" element 
in which there is "an obligation to act because it is 
regarded as having the sole responsibility for the 
performance of certain tasks" ("The Subsidiarity 
Principle," Bulletin of the European Communities, Vol. 
25, No. 10 [Luxembourg: Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 1992], 120).
311 "Subsidiarity Principle, " J: 19, The exclusive 
powers of the TEU include the freedom of movement of 
goods and services (Article 8a), common commercial 
policy (Article 113), and the conservation of fisheries 
resources (Article 102 of the 1972 Act of Accession).
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in which both the Union and the member states would 
have the power to act. In this area, the Union would 
assert its authority only when it felt the need — for 
example/ delaying only with certain aspects of a matter 
or by enacting outline legislation. The member states 
would remain free to act on all aspect^ on which the 
Union had not taken action.312
Potential powers include responsibilities "which might 
come within Union competence but which would initially 
be left with the member states."313
The subsidiarity principle does apply, however, to 
the EU’s concurrent powers in which, as mentioned 
above, they are responsibilities shared with its member
states. While the authors of the TEU
did enumerate and at times carefully circumscribe the 
Community’s powers, they also drew a distinction in 
Article 3b between exclusive Community competence and 
competence shared with the Member States without 
defining or specifying the content of each of these 
'blocks of competence.’’314
The essential problem for anti-European elements in the 
British Conservative Party, for example, is that the 
European Union has discussed bringing shared 
competences into the European framework.315 With the 
establishment of the single market, the European 
Community has warned that
312 A.G. Toth, "The Principle of Subsidiarity in 
the Maastricht Treaty," Common Market Law Review, Vol. 
29 (1992): 1088. As mentioned in "Subsidiarity 
Principle," (p. 118): "Subsidiarity is a dynamic 
concept in the Community system. Far from putting 
Community action in a straitjacket, it allows it to be 
expanded where circumstances so require and,
conversely, to be restricted or abandoned where it is 
no longer justified."
313 Toth, "The Principle of Subsidiarity in the 
Maastricht Treaty," 1088.
311 "Subsidiarity Principle," 119,
315 Michael Spicer, A Treaty Too Far; A New Policy 
for Europe (London: Fourth Estate, Ltd, 1992), 116.
175
[t]he dynamics of the four freedoms generate— and will 
continue to generate— an impetus towards flanking 
measures which in turn call for the introduction of 
genuine policies,^. . J albeit ones that do not at present 
involve exclusive Community competence-- that is, the 
possibility of depriving the Member States of the power 
to act, 316
There emerged out of this constitutional (or 
legal) debate an attempt to reach a compromise between
the
For
to
intergovernmentalists and the supranationalists.
Six
eschew
Article 3b
the belief that
(like Article
all functions
A) attempts
need to be
performed at the federal level,317 318This article implies 
that
we have to examine if there are other methods available 
for Member States, for example, legislation, 
administrative instructions or codes of conduct, in 
order to achieve the objectives in a sufficient
□ 1 omanner.
Article 3b, for example, links subsidiarity to the need 
for proportionality in which Community action is 
limited to what is "appropriate and necessary to 
achieve its desired goal,"319 The Birmingham Declaration 
of 1992 affirmed to set
guidelines for applying the principle in practice, for 
instance by using the lightest possible form of 
legislation, with maximum freedom for Member States on 
how best to achieve the objective in question,320 
At the Edinburgh Summit (December 1992), the European 
Council agreed to a set of guidelines . which would
316 "Subsidiarity Principle," 121. '
31/ Brittan, Europe, 23.
318 "Subsidiarity Principle," 116.
319 Jo Steiner, "Subsidiarity under the Maastricht 
Treaty," in O’Keefe and Twom^v, Legal Issues of the 
Ma astri oht Treaty, 5 9 .
320 "Birmingham Declaration— A Community Close to 
its Citizens," 9.
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add strength to the proportional aspect of 
subsidiarity.321 The following was adopted by the member 
states:
- the issue under consideration has transnational 
aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated by 
action by Member States; and/or;
- actions by Member States alone or lack of 
Community action would conflict with the requirements 
of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion 
of competition to avoid disguised restrictions on trade 
or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would 
otherwise significantly damage Member States’interests; 
and/or;
- the Council must be satisfied that action at 
Community level would produce clear benefits by reason 
of its scale or effects compared with action at the 
level of the member state,322
As Article 3b asserts, then, the TEU attempts "to make 
clear from the outset that the subsidiarity principle 
regulates the exercise of powers rather than the 
conferment of powers,"323 While European institutions 
will only implement duties and responsibilities 
articulated in the Treaty,324 the Community "should only 
intervene [in concurrent competences] if and in so far 
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
realized sufficiently by the Member States."325 If the 
Community must intervene, the Commission must attempt 
to set "the result to be achieved, but leave it to the
321 "European Union: Application of the Principle 
of Subsidiarity, Bulletin of the European Communities, 
Vol. 25, No. 10 (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 1992), 17.
322 European Council, "Conclusions of the 
Presidency," European Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 
December 1992, 7.
323 "Subidiarity Principle, 119,
324 Toth, "Legal Analysis of Subsidiarity," 38,
325 "Subsidiarity Principle," 116,
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member states to choose the most appropriate means of 
doing so.”326
CONCLUSION
This chapter tested Haas’ assertion that the 
member states of the European Communities do have the 
ability to impede or pro*. - the integration
process. 327 In examining the history of the European 
Community,- supranationalists were able to bring forth 
new elements (like the Treaty of Rome and the CAP) 
which would signify development towards the 
establishment of a supranational Europe. It was during 
the de Gaulle years,- however, that integration 
practitioners and scholars began to realize that 
concepts like national identity and state sovereignty 
continued to have political zeal in Western Europe. For 
de Gaulle, the EDC was simply an impediment to his 
vision of France taking a leading role in European 
affairs. De Gaulle also fought with the 
supranationalists over the issue of majority voting.
The Luxembourg Compromise, for de Gaulle, signified a
state' s fundamental right to protect its national
interest when dealing with issues of European
integration.
In the 1970s, the oil crisis made it difficult for 
the EC’s member states to arrive at a foreign policy 
consensus. While there was progress towards developing 
a single market through (for example) the Werner
326 Ibid., 123.
327 See Chapter III of this dissertation.
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Report, foreign policy has remained an 
intergovernmental matter. The intergovernmental 
dimension to foreign policy can also be seen in the SEA 
and the TEU. While this may be the case, it was with 
the SEA and (in particular with) the TEU, however, that 
a supranational Europe took more of a definitive shape. 
Denmark, for example, responded to the development of a 
supranational Europe by voting "No" to the ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty in its Referendum in 1992. The 
key element in voting "No" revolved around the issue of 
common citizenship.
The fundamental clash of ideas between 
supranationalists and intergovernmentalists can be seen 
within the British case study which make up the final 
two chapters of this study. The next two chapters will 
examine the various schools of thought of both the 
British Conservative Party and the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) over the issue /the supranational shape of
Athe European Union and of the devolution process. This 
work analyzes to what degree issues like sovereignty 
and economic maximization take precedence in dealing 
with European membership and, moreover, highlight 'the 
main participants’ (both in the Tory Party and the SNP) 
views of where to lead Britain (or an independent
Scotland) into the next century.
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CHAPTER V
DIFFERENT STRANDS OF THOUGHT WITHIN THE SNP REGARDING 
DEVOLUTION AND SCOTLAND’S ROLE IN EUROPE
INTRODUCTION / ,
The chapter comprise the British case
study of this dissertation and test the hypothesis of 
whether or not there is emerging within the United 
Kingdom a fundamental debate between economic 
maximization and the role of national identity and 
state sovereignty. In particular, Chapter V outlines a 
clear manifestation of this crucial debate by examining 
two major strands of thought within the Scottish 
National Party (SNP). This debate over the importance 
of the role of ideas in the contemporary politics of 
Western Europe has emerged within the SNP over the 
issues of devolution and Scotland's "independent” role 
in the European Union.
The internal SNP debate over the future of 
Scotland's role in the European Union can be seen as 
that of an ideological one between economic and 
traditional nationalists. The economic nationalists, 
which include Allan Macartney,1 Alex Salmond,2 and Jim 
Sillars,3 assert that the United Kingdom is an
1 Allan Macartney was elected Member of the 
European Parliament for North East Scotland in 1994. He 
is also the SNP’s foreign affairs spokesperson.
2 Alex Salmond, who has served as the SNP’s MP for 
Banff and Buchan since 1987, is the National Convener 
of the Party.
3 Jim Sillars is the chief architect of the SNP’s 
"Independence in Europe" campaign. Before joining the 
SNP he was a Labour MP for South Ayrshire, 1970-1979.
He helped create the Scottish Labour Party in 1976.
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anachronistic phenomenon because it no longer possesses 
any political utility in advancing the economic and 
social interests of Scotland. Jim Sillars advocates, 
for example, that the European Union can be construed 
as a practical replacement of Westminster for the 
betterment of Scotland’s needs because of Europe’s 
institutional progress towards the development of a 
federal entity.4 An important example of this 
supranational development was the coming into operation 
of the Single European Act (SEA) in July of 1987 and, 
more importantly, the signing of the Treaty on European 
Union in 1992.5 These two supranational developments, 
Sillars notes, demonstrate that decision making power 
over economic and social matters was moving awray from 
the seat of government in London to the ever developing 
institutions in Brussels.
The traditional nationalists of the SNP include 
Jim Fairlie,6 James Halliday,7 and Jim Lynch.8 They are
After the 1979 referendum, he left Labour and joined 
the SNP. He was an MP for Glasgow Govan, 1988-1992. He 
has now retired from politics and works in the private 
sector,
4 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of 
Commons, Vol. 836, Fifth Series, Session 1971-1972, 3 
May 1972 cols. 537-538.
5 See Chapters IV and VI of this dissertation,
6 Jim Fairlie, who served, as the Party’s Senior 
Vice Chairman (1981-1984) and on the National Executive 
Council, was a staunch critic of the Party’s
"Independence in Europe" campaign. An intense debate 
between Fairlie and the leadership took place during 
the Paisley by-election in 1990. Fairlie had written an 
article for the Scots Independent critiquing Sillars’s 
position "on the understanding that it would not be 
published until after polling day in Paisley" (Jim
Fairlie, in correspondence to the author, 2 December 
1994. [Emphasis in the orginial.]). The Glasgow Herald.
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dubious about the ’’Independence in Europe” campaign 
because they believe that those who adhere to Sillars' 
economic recipe of nationalism have betrayed the SNP’s 
traditional line of thought regarding Scotland's 
political future. The traditionalists claim that the 
"Independence in Europe" campaign is just an example of
Orwellian doublethink because Sillars and Salmond want
for Scotland to be "independent" and a member of a 
supranational institution all at the same time. 
"Independence in Europe" is, for Fairlie, simply 
another form of devolution. The more important 
disagreement for the traditional nationalists, however,
eenters around the economic nationalists' assertion
however, obtained a copy of the article and published 
excerpts on the eve of the by-election. Party activists 
were upset with the article "and it became clear to me 
that however valid my arguments were in opposition, to 
the line being promoted by Sillars et. al, the Party 
were unlikely to support me" (ibid.). Fairlie resigned 
on 2 December 1990. What makes these series of events 
even more interesting is that the "Independence in 
Europe" campaign was not at the time formal SNP 
policy. Fairlie prepared a discussion paper called 
"Independence in Europe" for the December meeting of 
the National Assembly in the same year, but because of 
his resignation, it was never circulated. (Fairlie’s 
paper is discussed in this chapter.) At the National 
Assembly meeting, the Sillars' position was endorsed by 
44 votes to two, with 2 absentations (ibid.). The 
National Executive Council supported Sillars position 
in March 1991.
7 Jim Halliday was Chairman of the SNP, 1956-1960. 
He was a parliamentary candidate for Stirling and 
Falkirk Burghs, 1955 and 1959 and West Fife, 1970.
s Like Jim Failrie, Jim Lynch is a Euroskeptic 
and, as will be discussed below, a critic of the SNP’s 
position on devolution in the 1990s. Lynch, who served 
as a member of the SNP’s National Executive Council 
(1978-1988), was a parliamentary candidate for 
Edinburgh North (1974), Central Fife (1979) and Dundee 
East (1983). Unlike Fairlie, Lynch maintains formal 
links with the SNP.
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that the SNP needs to base Scotland's claim to 
independence in economic terms. For the traditional 
nationalists, as this chapter outlines, Scotland 
should, for better or for worse, be free and 
independent because it is a nation in its own right and 
is, therefore, worthy of statehood.
The SNP leadership’s policy regarding the issue of 
devolution has also sparked another fundamental debate
between the economic and traditional nationalists of
the Party. Salmond and fellow Scottish MPs like 
Roseanna Cunningham9 and Margaret Ewing10 have taken 
what Neil MacCormick11 defines as a "gradualist” line 
of thinking towards Scottish independence.12 13 As
understood by the SNP leadership, the concept of 
gradualism perceives devolution as a means for 
attaining Scottish statehood. While the gradualists of 
the SNP leadership remain dubious about the Labour 
Party’s ability to even establish a Scottish
Assembly/3 they assert that a devolved Parliament in 
Edinburgh is (at this historic juncture) the only
9 Roseanna Cunningham was elected MP for Perth and 
Kinross in April 1995.
10 Margaret Ewing, who is MP for Morary since 1987, 
serves as the SNP’s Parliamentary Leader.
11 Neil MacCormick served on the National Executive 
Council and helped draft the SNP’s new constitution in 
the 1970s. He also identifies himself with the pro­
European wing of the Party.
12 Neil MacCormick, "Unrepentant Gradualism, ’’ in 
Owen Dudley Edwards, ed., A Claim of Right for 
Scotland, Includes the 1988 Document (Edinburgh: 
Polygon, 1989), 99-110.
13 Interview with Alex Salmond in Scots 
Independent, September 1995, 6-7.
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credible (or realistic) choice which can revolutionize 
the annals of Scottish politics?4
For the traditionalists of the SNP, however,- there 
is a distinct feeling of political frustration with the 
SNP leadership's position on the devolution question?5 
They find it very difficult, for example, to understand 
why the SNP gradualists have failed to learn from the 
Labour Party’s indecisive (and Unionist) behavior
towards the 1979 referendum on devolution. Labour’s
conduct in 1979 convinced the fundamentalist wing of 
the SNP like Christine Creech14 15 6 17and Jim Fairlie that 
politicians like Tony Blair and George Robertson only 
perceive devolution as an end. rather than a means as 
to how Scotland is to be governed. For traditionalists 
of the Party, as this chapter demonstrates, the 
devolution process fails to shape any revolutionary 
alteration as to how Scotland is to be governed because 
the Scottish Assembly is designed to work around and, 
more importantly, to preserve the Westminster 
Parliament?7 In other words, the SNP leadership's 
gradualist position towards independence draws the 
Party away from its fundamental aim of trying to 
separate Scotland altogether from a "’system' itself
14 Anthony Kerr, "Share a Platform, " Scots 
Independent, February 1978, 8.
15 Interview with Jim Fairlie in Perth, Scotland 
(UK), 22 September 1995.
16 Christine Creech is a member of the SNP’s 
National Executive Council.
17 Christine Creech, "Devolution — A Unionist 
Parliament," The New Politics for Independence, SNP 
Conference Issue (1995): 7.
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[which] is at the root of the economic and social woes 
[that] plague the country as a whole.”18
SCOTLAND'S ROLE IN EUROPE
A. ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS
The economic nationalists of the SNP assert a
practical line of argument to the revolutionary quest 
for a sovereign Scotland. Economic nationalists like 
Salmond and Sillars advocate that political 
independence coupled without economic independence 
would merely he a "vain achievement.”19 This is because 
they believef as Robert Crawford observes, that the 
Scottish electorate "wants to know where the Party 
stands" on economic, political, and social issues for
there is little point in our propagandizing on 
independence and hope to persuade the majority of Scots 
of the merits of that if we are failing to attract 
support on the substantive issues which confront all 
societies,20
In arguing their case, for example, the SNP’s 
leadership issues the complaint of the isolation of 
Scotland from the governmental bureaucracy in London.21 
"Government," as H. Drucker observes, "has moved to the 
center of the social and economic life of the
18 Robert Crawford, "Ideology and the SNP," Scots 
Independent, February 1979, 3.
19 Leopold Kohr, "The New Radicalism," David Rollo, 
ed.f The Scotland We Seek (Oban; Scots Independent 
(Newspapers) Limited, 1987), 25.
20 Crawford, "Ideology and the SNP," 3. (Emphasis 
added.)
21 Allan Macartney, "A Springboard, for 
Independence," The New Politics for Independence, SNP 
Conference Issue (1995): 6-7.
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country.”22 While this might be the case, Jim Sillars, 
the author of the ’’Independence in Europe" campaign, 
has a clear answer to the query as to "whether the 
political union with England still has sufficient merit 
to warrant its retention, or whether it has become a 
stranglehold on Scottish aspirations."23 The Party's 
economic nationalists often deliberate why Scotland 
should be obliged to return North Sea oil revenue 
which, according to SNP economic figures, Scotland 
makes a net contribution to the UK Treasury of about £ 
2 billion.24 The SNP also deliberates as to why Scotland 
should be allowed to become a nuclear waste dump25 by a 
Tory government which is "predominantly an English 
political party enjoying the support of fewer than 40
per cen Scottish electors."26
SNP’s economic nationalists concur with Labour MP 
John McAllion's assessment that Scottish politics has 
become "Westminsterized;" that is, political action
22 H. Drucker, The Politics ot Nationalism and 
Devolution (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1980), 15.
23 "Destruction of Scotland 'Too High a Price' for 
Union," SNP News Release, 8 December 1988, 1. (Emphasis 
added.)
21 "Nine Reasons to Choose Independence in Europe," 
Scottish National Party Position Paper, n.d., Sec. 1, 
13) .
25 The SNP leadership claims that Scotland is 
becoming a nuclear waste dump in which if the nuclear- 
industry gets ij^ way European states and England can 
send nuclear waste (about ten train loads and 100 lorry 
loads) to Dounreay every day for the next fifty years 
("Nine Reason to Choose Indepedence in Europe," Sec 1, 
13) .
26 Anthony King, "What is Scotland's Future?," in 
Dudley Fishburn, ed., The World in 1996 (London: The 
Economist Publications, 1995), 29.
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and the formation of policy are organized around 
arguing not for what is good for Northern Ireland,
Scotland or for Wales but as to what is in the best 
interest for the United Kingdom as a whole.27 Margaret 
Ewing laments that
Legislative Bills — often ill thought out — are 
presented to MPs by an all powerful, ideological 
executive.... The Committees are stacked with an in 
built majority of Government sycophants ■— look no 
further than the recent Committee on Scottish Local 
Government. Unitary authorities make sense against the 
background of an independent Scottish Parliament; but 
Tory backbenchers with neither interest in nor 
knowledge of Scottish public opinion have their faces 
sternly set against such ideas.28
Paul H, Scott29 notes that the Scottish people are 
governed by a Scottish Office in which its civil 
servants are "subject to ministers appointed by the 
government in London which makes the major decisions of 
policy. "30
Economic nationalism, Isobel Lindsay argues, is 
not simply a "campaign for economic betterment;" 
rather, it is "concerned with how modern society can 
fulfill the social, emotional, and material needs of 
its citizens."31 In bringing about a more democratic
27 John McAllion, "westminsterized, ’’ Scottish Trade 
Union Review, No. 63, March-April 1994, 18.
28 Margaret Ewing, "Scotland: Pacesetter or 
Follower?" Scottish Trade Union Review, No. 66 
September-October 1994, 16. (Emphasis added.)
29 Paul H. Scott, who was Rector of University of 
Dundee, has served as Vice President of the SNP since 
1992.
30 Paul H. Scott, Scotland in Europe: Dialogue with 
a Skeptical Friend (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 1992), 
16.
31 Isobel Lindsay, "Nationalism, Community, 
Democracy," in Gavin Kennedy, ed., The Radical
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government, Sillars asserts that an independent 
Scotland would give back to its citizens charge over 
their own economic and political destiny.32 Sillars 
laments that the main weakness with the
traditionalists’ line of argument, however, is that 
they "have done little work on more closely defining 
what independence means in practical terms.”33 The basic 
incentive for the Scottish electorate to vote for an 
independent Scotland lies in the economic realm34 
because, as Sillars noted as way back as 1972, the 
Scottish "are living in a time when there is an 
explosion of expectations among ordinary people, a 
desire for job opportunity, a better standard of 
life.”35 Sillars continues with his assessment of the
Scottish electorate:
The doubts held by our group of potential independence 
voters, who go along part of the way but hesitate about 
the final irrevocable steps, are not without validity. 
Their collective caution will not vanish by increasing 
the volume of exhortion. They will only become 
convinced when the SNP faces up to certain economic and
Approach: Papers on an independent Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Lindsay and Co., Ltd., 1976), 21.
32 Interview with Jim Sillars at the Sheraton Hotel 
in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK) on 10 February 1995.
33 Jim Sillars, Scotland; The Case for Optimism 
(Edinburgh: Polygon, 1986), 182.
34 Margaret Ewing, "Learn from History, ” The New 
Politics for Independence, SNP Conference Issue (1995): 
10.
35 Parliamentary Debates, col. 537. (Emphasis 
added.) For example, read David Mitrany, "The 
Functional Approach in Historical Perspective," 
International Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July 1971): 543 
and Jean Monnet, "Men and Nations Must Learn to Control 
Themselves," Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXVII, No. 
19 (July 15, 1961): 579.
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political imperatives which lie at the root of public 
doubt and anxiety.36 *
In facing up to these "economic and political 
imperatives,-" however, Sillars came to realize that the 
economic and institutional decision-making of 
Scotland’s political and economic interests were 
shifting from London to Brussels/1 This development 
made Sillars further question whether or not the United 
Kingdom is suited for "Scotland’s internationalized 
community emerging as [the Scottish people] approach 
the Europe of 1992 and the world of the 21st century.’’38
The SNP leadership,- which inaugurated its 
"Independence in Europe" campaign at the Inverness 
Party Conference back in September 1988,39 believed the 
European Union would be a pragmatic replacement for 
Scotland to join as an independent state.40 Unlike its 
surrogate relationship with the United Kingdom, 
Scottish membership with the European Union would be 
based upon an equal partnership with the other member 
states of the Union.41 This equal partnership obliges 
all member states in the European Union to follow the 
institution’s rules and procedures. The SEA not only
36 Sillars, The Case for Optimism, 182.
3/ Parliamentary Debates, 3 May 1972, cols. 537­
538.
38 "Destruction Scotland ’Too High a Price’ for 
Union," 1.
39 "European Strategy Triumphs, ’’ The Scotsman, 17 
September 1988, 4.
40 Andrew Marr, The Battle for Scotland (London: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1992), 192.
41 Interview with Kevin Pringle, at Scottish 
National Party Headquarters, in Edinburgh, Scotland 
(UK), 25 October 1994. Mr. Pringle serves as the SNP’s 
Research Officer.
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requires member states to take on more decisions on the 
single market through majority voting,42 but, as Sillars 
asserts, there is also the expansion of Europe into 
other areas of state competencies such as the Common 
Fisheries Policy and the European Social Fund.43 In 
examining the Treaty on European Union (TEU),44 Europe 
is developing a federal Europe in which there are 
aspirations, not only for the establishment of a single 
currency and the establishment of a Central Bank,45 but 
for the expansion into other state competencies such as 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.46
The economic nationalists of the SNP also assert
that Scotland should join the European Union as an 
independent state because of its strong economic ties 
to the European continent.47 As the home to a hundred 
European companies, Scotland "builds more computers per 
head of population than any other country in the 
world.’’48 Scotland not only produces 20 per cent of 
Europe’s oil supplies,49 but Scotland’s productivity in
42 See Chapter IV of this dissertation.
43 Sillars, The Case for Optimism, 185.
44 For details on the TEU, see Chapters IV and VI 
of this dissertation.
45 For more on this point, read Peter Gumbel and 
Thomas Kamn, "Decision Point: EU Nations Near Vote on 
Fate of Single Currency," The Well Street Journal, 13 
December 1995, A14.
46 See, for example, the Declaration on Practical 
Arrangements in the Field of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy in the Final Act of the TEU.
47 "Independence in Europe — ’Good for Business,’" 
SNP News Release, 11 May 1995, 1-2.
48 Magnus Linklater, "Scotland the Brave European, " 
in Dudley Fishburn, ed., The World of 1992 (London: The 
Economist Publication, 1991), 38.
49 Ibid.
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manufactured exports is (according to the SNP) 30 per 
cent higher than the rest of the UK.50 While the British
Conservative Party have perceived Scotland to be a
"subsidized nation,"51 Anthony King points out that
Scotland (as an independent state) can "go it alone
inside the EU.”52 According to the SNP Budget figures 
for 1995/1996. for example. Scotland’s revenues made 
up 9.8 per cent (about £27.2 bn) of the UK’s total 
revenue (about £278.9 bn) .53 The SNP figures suggest, 
as Alex Salmond argues, that Scotland contributes 9.8 
per cent of total UK revenue — ’’over £23 per week 
per taxpayer.”54
As an independent state in the European Union,
Scotland would have a seat at the Council of Ministers
and European Council. This is important because, as 
mentioned above, it is in the Council of Ministers 
where key decisions on European policy are made.55 In 
the Council of Ministers, on certain matters Scotland 
would have an equal voice with the other member states 
of the Union because of the unanimity requirement. 
Unanimity, for example, is required (under the legal 
obligations of the TEU) on issues such as asylum, 
immigration, and indirect tax harmonization as well as
50 "Independence in Europe — ’Good for Business,5"
1.
51 See Chapter VI of this dissertation.
52 King, "What is Scotland’s Future?,” 29.
53 "Scots Pay More Tax than Rest of UK — Tartan 
Jibe ’Returned with Interest,” SNP News Release, 8 
November 1995, 2.
54 Ibid., 1. (Emphasis in the original-.)
55 Interview with Pringle.
191
treaty changes/6 Through the Council of Ministers, 
Sillars also asserts that Scotland can ’’address policy 
issues totally free from the need to check with 
Whitehall to see if our views must be adjusted to 
conform with their majority outlook”56 7 and, when
necessary, enact the Luxembourg Compromise/8 The SNP’s 
leader Alex Salmond notes that through the concept of 
subsidiarity59 60 61Scotland can play its
part in the political reform of the Community, arguing 
for greater democracy and accountability within EC 
structures to close the "democratic deficit.’ Our 
objective is not a European superstate but a 
confederate Community of independent nations which 
chose to share their sovereignty and cooperate more 
closely for the benefit of all, while still retaining 
their rich diversity/0
Sillars also notes that "Independence in Europe" gives 
Scotland an opportunity to develop its international 
dimension. Sillars discuses, for example, Scotland 
developing its relationship with the Nordic Region/’ In 
this respect, Scotland potentially might form a 
coalition with its Nordic partners in the Council of 
Ministers to block legislation deemed outside the realm
56 "The Power of Small Nations in the New Europe, " 
Scottish Center for Economic and Sociai Research, Paper 
No. 5 (September 1994): 6.
57 Jim Sillars, No Turning Back: The Case for 
Scottish Independence within the European Community and 
Plow We Face the Challenge of 1992, 10.
58 "The Power of Small Nations in the New Europe, " 
6. For more on the Luxembourg Compromise, read Chapter 
IV of this dissertation.
59 This concept is discussed in Chapter IV of this 
dissertation.
60 Alex Salmond, "A Response from the Leader of the 
Scottish National Party Concerning Scottish 
Independence," 9 August 1994, 8.
61 Interview with Sillars,
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of the bloc’s national (or regional) interest/2 As an 
anti-isolationist/separatist party, 62 3 Allan Macartney 
would like to see the development of an Association of
States of the British Isles in which there would be
regular meetings over issues of common interest such as 
railways and communications/4 In this new relationship, 
Jim Mitchell notes, London would not be able to hinder 
Scotland’s economic and political well-being/5 As the 
status quo stands, however, Sillars observes that
We may have opinions on the need to reach UN targets 
for Third World aid, and our people individually give 
more per head to aid charities than others in the 
British isles, but collectively we can do nothing 
systematic on an institutional basis,66
"By pooling sovereignty in defined areas," then, "the 
European Union enables all Member States — both large 
and small— to exert influence at a European level,"67
In examining the implementation of the 
"Independence in Europe," program, the SNP asserts that 
an independent Europe would not only have to be based 
upon an "negotiated settlement between Scotland and 
Westminster",68 but through a referendum “allowing the
62 Ibid,
63 Sillars, No Turning Back, 9. This point is 
discussed in Chapter VI of this dissertation.
64 Allan Macartney, "Independence in Europe," 
Scottish Government Yearbookf 1990, 38.
65 Jim Mitchell, "Only Way is a Powerful Scottish 
Parliament with Equal Voice in EC," The Scotsman, 3 
February 1992, 8.
66 Sillars, No Turning Back, 4, (Emphasis added,)
67 "The Power of Small Nations in the New Europe, "
2 .
cs Interview with Pringle, See also Lister 
Gardiner, "Scotland in Europe: Some Legal 
Implications," Scottish Center for Economic and Social 
Research Paper No. 2 (September 1990): 6.
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people of Scotland to decide If It should be part of
the EU, ”69 In a January 1995 poll, for example , 53 per
cent of the Scottish electorate favored Scotland
remaining in the EU .70 Without such a formal
arrangement, however, it becomes unclear as to whether
or not the European Union can recognize Scotland as an 
independent entity because such a political act would 
be "considered unwarranted interference in the internal
affairs of a member state."71
Nevertheless, the SNP leadership finds it
difficult to cite any reasonable objection as to why
the European Union would deny Scotland membership for
such a move would run "completely counter to the
preferred view of an inexorably expanding Community."72 
The philosophy of Europe, furthermore, is to establish 
closer ties with its peoples "and to ensure development 
of its prosperity in accordance with the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, "73 which supports 
"the truly democratic will of a nation like Scotland to 
attain self -government. "74 As Lister Gardiner further
69 Ian A. Bromner, "Scotland and Europe, " The 
Scotsman, 3 March 1995, 12. (Emphasis added.)
70 Robbie Dinwoodie, "SNP At Odds with Poll for 
Europe," The Glasgow Herald, 19 January 1995, 1.
71 Christian von Arnim, "European Route to Home 
Rule 'Fatally Flawed,'" The Scotsman, 21 September 
1994, 4.
72 Macartney, "Independence in Europe," 40.
73 Gardiner, "Scotland in Europe," 13 =
74 Ibid. (Emphasis added. ) See also Elizabeth Buie, 
"UN Tackles Britain over Home Rule," The Glasgow 
Herald, 21 July 1995, 1 and 3 and Elizabeth Buie, "UN 
'Not Satisfied’ on Home Rule Issue," The Glasgow 
Herald, 22 July 1995, 4.
194
argues, the Treaty of Union of 1707 created "a unitary 
state out of two European states which at that time 
clearly possessed sovereign statehood within the 
meaning of international law."75 If the United Kingdom 
were to be dissolved, the constituent parts "would 
return to their sovereign statehoods which would mean 
so far a may be relevant that each state would take on 
independently the treaties, rights and obligations in 
existence prior to that revocation."76 What is clear, 
however, as analyzed in the text below, is that there 
is empirical evidence to demonstrate that the Scottish 
people want some form of political change. In a 
February 1995 Glasgow Herald poll, for example, 76 per 
cent of the Scottish people favored the development of 
a new political relationship with the London 
establishment.77
For the SNP, the "Independence in Europe" campaign 
is an attempt to free Scotland from an "increasingly 
intolerant state," which, according to Paul H. Scott, 
is
riddled with secrecy, patronage and pompous absurdity, 
with a parliamentary system that allows a Prime 
Minister, usually elected on a minority vote, to assume 
virtually absolute power.78
75 Gardiner, "Scotland in Europe," 7,
76 Ibid.
77 Robbie Dinwoodie, "Shifting Scenery as the Play 
Goes on," The Glasgow Herald, 9 February 1995, 6.
78 Paul H. Scott, Towards Independence; Essays on 
Scotland (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1991), 214.
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While the member states of the European Union contest 
the institution’s economic and political future,79 80 
however, Roseanna Cunningham asserts that the SNP must 
develop a "detailed and constructive response" to 
Europe’s post-Maastricht debate/0 By being a member 
state to the EU, nevertheless, Scotland could negotiate 
on its own behalf over fishing and not be excluded from 
the Social Chapter/1 Sillars observed that the
great sea of change in economic power distribution to 
which I refer cannot be reversed. Indeed, it should be 
welcomed by internationalists, because a world more 
evenly balanced in terms of economics is likely to be a 
more stable one politically. We should also be happy to 
see peoples who have been traditionally poor and 
exploited creating an indigenenous strength, reaching 
new levels of independence, and growing in prosperity/2 
Scotland under the UK, the SNP leadership argues, has 
"zero independence/’83 Under the "Independence in 
Europe" campaign, however, Scotland regains its ability 
to shape its own destiny in a supranational 
organization (be it confederal, federal, or, simply 
intergovernmental) where sovereignty is shared in 
certain economic and political sectors of the state/'1 
As Margaret Ewing asserts, the "Independence in Europe" 
campaign signifies that SNP cannot be looked upon as a
79 For example, read Leon Brittan, "Europe Must 
Grow to Change," and Norman Macrae, "The European 
Farce," in Fishburn, The World In 1996, 48 and 19 
respectively.
80 Roseanna Cunningham for Vice Convener Policy, 
Pamphlet distributed at the 1995 SNP Conference in 
Perth, Scotland (UK).
83 Paul H. Scott, "Europe Adds Urgency to the Case 
for Independence," The Scotsman, 15 February 1995, 14,
82 Sillars, No Turning Back, 8.
83 Interview with Pringle,
81 Interview with Sillars,
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mere protest party; "Scottish politics is dynamic and 
exciting; and the SNP is in the van."55 
B. TRADITIONAL NATIONALISTS.
The traditional nationalists of the SNP would
concur with the economic nationalist’s assessment that
the United Kingdom’s centralized form of government
does not take into consideration the interests of the 
Scottish people.85 6 Paul H. Scott compares Scotland’s 
relationship with the United Kingdom to that of being 
in bed with an elephant; that is, the
elephant can use its sheer bulk and weight to flatten 
resistance altogether. This can happen even by accident 
without any malicious intention. If there is a conflict 
of interests of tastes, weight is liable to 
predominate. This sort of experience is common whenever 
a country has a neighbor much larger and wealthier than 
itself.87
The question for the traditional nationalists, however,
is whether or not Scottish nationalism should be based
upon an economic rationale. Their answer to those who 
espouse the Salmond and Sillars argument is that the 
aspiration for a free Scotland should not be based upon 
material gain. The Scottish poet Hugh MacDiarmid 
summarizes eloquently their sacrosanct position: "J am 
not interested in economics. I believe, and my whole 
nationalist position is grounded in the belief, that 
where there's a will there's a way, and if we are
85 Margaret Ewing, "Scots’ Two-Eront Eight, " The 
Times, 14 September 1988.
86 Interview with Dr. Robert D, McIntyre, at his 
residence in Stirling, Scotland (UK), 24 March 1995. 
Dr. McIntyre, an MP for Motherwell and Wishaw (1945), 
served as Chairman of the SNP from 1948-1956. He also 
served as President, 1958-1960.
87 Scott, Towards Independence, 49.
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sufficiently intent on having independence,- nothing 
will stand in our way. We are quite prepared to meet 
all the sacrifices, if any, that are required,"ss
The traditional nationalists have certain
fundamental disagreements with an economic perspective 
of Scottish independence. For one, the traditionalists 
have difficulties asserting their aspirations for 
independence on what they would describe as simply 
being short-term economic and social issues. An example 
of a "short-term political issue" would be Margaret 
Thatcher's introduction of the poll tax to Scotland in 
1988 .88 9 While this issue does not fall entirely within 
the scope of this chapter, a few words should be 
recorded. The poll tax, Joanne Robertson notes, became 
the "embodiment of the government’s arrogance and
88 Hugh MacDiarmid, A Political Speech, A 
Transcript from a Recording taken at the 1320 Club 
Symposium Glasgow University, 6 April 1968 (Edinburgh: 
MacDonald Presston Limited, 1972), 5. (Emphasis added.)
89 The purpose of the poll tax (or community 
charge) was to restructure the payment for a 
community’s local services. In abolishing domestic 
rates, Thatcher recalls in the first volume of her 
memoirs that her government would "replace them with a 
community charge at a flat rate on all adults. There 
would be rebates for those on low incomes -- though 
rebates should be less than 100 per cent so that 
everyone should contribute something, and therefore 
have something to lose from electing a spendthrift 
council. This principle of accountability underlay the 
whole reform" (Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street 
Years [London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993], 648). 
"Together," Nicholas Ridley announced before the House 
of Commons, "[these] proposals will provide the 
essential linkage between those who use, pay and vote 
for local services" (Parliamentary Debates [Hansard], 
House of Commons, Sixth Series, Session 1987-1988, 16 
December 1987, col. 1115).
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disregard for Scottish opinion.."90 The economic 
nationalists of the SNP responded to Thatcher’s 
community charge with demonstrations and petition 
drives91 and, moreover, by starting a campaign of non­
payment92 and of asserting that Scotland was fed up 
being treated like "a colony by Mrs. Thatcher and her 
English government..."93 The economic nationalists 
asserted that London was not only using Scotland as a 
guinea pig94 but that, moreover, the Scots were becoming 
aware that the SNP was the only Party which "can stop 
the poll tax and deliver a Scottish Parliament."95
90 Joanne Robertson, "Born of Anger and a New 
Desperation," The Sunday Times-Scotland, 27 August 
1995, 2.
91 "Poll-Tax Non-Payment Call Backed to the Hilt," 
The Scotsman,- 16 September 1988, 4.
92 "Poll Tax: Don’t Pay — The Only Way,' Says 
SNP," SNP News Release, 31 March 1989, 1. For more on 
this point read Rob Edwards, "A Thistle in the Flesh," 
New Statesman and Society, 23 September 1988, 21 and 
Marr, The Battle for Scotland, 179-180.
93 "District Election Results, " SNP News Release, 6 
May 1988, 1.
94 Margaret Ewing, Speech to SNP National 
Conference in Inverness, Scotland (UK), 15 September 
1988.
95 "District Election Results," 1. (Emphasis 
added.) In the District Elections of May 1988, for 
example, the SNP took 25.2 per cent of the vote as 
compared to the Conservative Party's 17.1 per cent of 
the vote (ibid.). For the SNP, the 1988 District 
Elections were of major significance because it 
represented a net increase of over 50 seats for the SNP 
"and most importantly, it displaced the Tories as 
Scotland’s second party" ("New Political Situation — 
'SNP Will Force the Issue, ’" Scottish National Party 
Parliamentary Group News Release, 12 May 1988, 2). As 
well, there was division within the Labour Party over 
the issue of non-payment of the poll tax ("Still Taxing 
Labor Unity, The Scotsman, 6 September 1988, 11). In 
her speech before the SNP Conference in Inverness,
Ewing asserted that the split in the Labor Party over 
the poll tax damaged Labour's claim of representing
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While the SNP’s primary goal in fighting the poll 
tax was to demonstrate its opposition to Westminster 
rule over Scotland,96 97the traditional nationalists 
assert that the SNP should not be construed as an anti­
poll tax party but, rather, as an anti-Unionist Party 
"seeking the reestablishment of a National Scottish 
Parliament.1,97 For Jim Fairlie, the problem with the 
economic nationalists’ argument over the poll tax was 
that the SNP leadership attempted to use the issue of 
the poll tax as an incentive to influence voters to 
vote for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament.98 
The fact of the matter, however, is that while the poll 
tax is now part of the history of British politics, 
Scotland continues to contest for its independence. If 
the poll tax is unable to rally the cry of the Scottish 
electorate, Fairlie argues, what issue, then, would 
rally the people of Scotland to vote for independence? 
Alleviating unemployment? Regaining the assets to North 
Sea oil? While the discovery of oil "contributed" to 
the political success of the SNP in the 1970s,99 "the
Scotland's interests (Ewing, Speech to SNP National 
Conference, lb September 1988).
9fa Jim Fairlie, ’’Fairlie Frankly, ’’ Scots 
Independent, June 1988, 2.
97 Raddy Ramsay, "Scots Independent Forum, " Scots 
Independent, June 1988, 8.
98 Jim Fairlie, "Fairlie Frankly," Scots 
Independent, February 1988, 2.
99 The 1970s proved to be a fruitful decade for the 
SNP in which the Party took a series of electoral wins. 
These wins included the following: Margo MacDonald won 
the Govan by-election in November 1973 (41.0%); Gordon 
Wilson took a close second in the Dundee East by­
election of 1973 (30.2%); and in February of 1974 the 
SNP sent seven MPs to Westminster including Gordon
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knowledge that an independent Scotland would be vastly 
richer, did nothing to stop the loss of nine [SNP] 
seats in 1979 a”100 "The problem is of course that if 
those [economic] ends could be achieved within the 
context of the UK," Fairlie further writes, "the need 
for independence would no longer be there."101 The late 
Donald Stewart102 103once asserted that the SNP’s 
nationalist movement must be based upon something more 
fundamental than mere economic or material gain?03
A key political debate to dominate the SNP in the 
1990s, however, is the "Independence in Europe" 
movement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
issue of European unity is an important one because of 
the significance it would have on how one governs the 
different peoples of Western Europe.104 While Donald 
Stewart agrees that British membership to the EC in the 
1970s signified that "the best days of the UK were 
over...,"105 Sillars made the further point that an
Wilson (Dundee East), Donald Stewart (Western Isles) 
and Margaret Ewing (Moray and Naim) (A Short History of 
the Scottish National Party [Edinburgh: Research 
Department of the Scottish National Party. 1994], 4).
100 Jim Fairlie, "Fairlie Frankly," Scots 
Independentr March 1988, 2.
101 Jim Fairlie, "I Am Not a Nationalist, But...," 
in Rollo, The Scotland We Seek, 9. (Emphasis added.)
102 Donald Stewart was MP for the Western Isles, 
1970-1987. He also served as president of the Party 
between 1982-1987.
103 Donald Stewart, "The Way Forward," in Rollo,
The Scotland We Seek, 5.
104 See Chapter IV of this dissertation.
105 Donald Stewart, A Scot at Westminster (Sydney, 
Nova Scotia [Canada]: The Catalone Press, 1994), 55.
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important argument behind the "Independence in Europe" 
campaign is to give Scotland the opportunity to
strengthen [the Community's] democratic institutions, 
widen its capacity for ideological and political 
change, and subscribe to the debate about what kind of 
Community in may ultimately become,106
Fairlie would agree with Sillars that the state cannot 
live in economic isolation,107 While fellow traditional 
nationalist Jim Lynch, for example, would like to see 
Scotland rebuild its industrial base in its post­
independent phase before establishing an economic 
relationship with the EU,108 Fairlie writes that in an 
interdependent world sovereign states have "accepted 
specific treaty limitations in their law-making 
rights,"109 Fairlie also asserts that it is the 
responsibility of the international community to work 
together "for the betterment of all,"110
The "basic reality" of today's European Union, 
however, is that member states are asked to relinquish 
their power and sovereignty "on a permanent basis",111 
The traditional nationalists assert skepticism about a
106 Sillars, No Turning Back, 5,
10/ Interview with Jim Fairlie, in Perth Scotland 
(UK) 2 December 1994.
108 Interview with Jim Lynch, at the Sheraton Hotel 
in Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 25 March 1995.
109 Jim Fairlie, "Independence in Europe: A 
Discussion Paper," November 1990, 4.
110 Jim Fairlie, Letter to the Glasgow Herald, 30 
September 1994, 1.
111 Jim Fairlie, unpublished letter to The 
Scotsman, 18 September 1991. (Emphasis added.) See also 
Kenny Farquharson, "Precarious Stance on European 
Slippery Slope," Scotland on Sunday, 24 September 1995, 
14.
202
European Union that is becoming far too centralized112 
and on the detrimental effect it would have on Scottish 
sovereignty/13 The TEU, Fairlie laments, is an attempt 
to establish ”a federal government within an 
increasingly centralized European Community/’114 While 
there were merits in merging coal and steel in certain 
states of Western Europe, as the late Donald Stewart 
once argued, "the appetite grew and the current monster 
shows no sign of being satiated/'115 In a paper on 
’’Independence in Europe" (November 1990) , for example,
Fairlie articulates the same concerns of those who 
oppose the TEU in the Conservative Party/16 Like the 
Euroskeptics of the Tory Party, Fairlie argues that a 
"claim of sovereignty" means "representative authority 
in the 'name of the people’ to exercise law-making and 
law-enforcement with a designated territory/'117 118The 
essential problem that Fairlie has with the European 
Union is that it is not simply an agreement on 
economic cooperation; rather, it is a supranational 
agreement in which Community law is superior to state 
law/18 Moreover, Fairlie’s most fundamental objection 
(like those within the Euro-sceptic wing of the
112 Dinwoodie, "SNP at Odds with Poll for 
Europe,"1.
113 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 60, Sixth Series, Session 1983-1984, col. 
703.
114 Jim Fairlie, Letter to the Editor of the 
Perthshire Advertiser, May 1991.
115 Stewart, A Scot at Westminster, 49.
116 See Chapter VI of this dissertation.
117 Fairlie, "Independence in Europe," 4.
118 Ibid., 5,
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Conservative Party) is the establish of European 
Monetary Union in which its implications "cannot be 
divorced from the concept of sovereignty, a concept 
around which the entire constitutional debate in 
Scotland revolves. "ll9 For Fairlie the impications of 
EMU on Scottish sovereignty is an important issue to
contest because
. . . the manipulation of the levers of power will rest 
with the central bank, the financial institutions and 
the bureaucratic structures which will grow up around 
them. There are already demands to give the European 
Parliament increased political control and EMU will 
heighten them further- This could only be at the 
expense of national parliaments and is incompatible 
with any notion of a Confederation of Nation States.120 
Unlike Sillars, then, Fairlie perceives the European 
Community to be not only an "exclusive club" which 
would restrict "trade and economic cooperation with the 
rest of the world," but, moreover, a supranational 
institutions in which its essential aim is to create 
"closer political as well as economic union," acting as 
antithesis to the "SNR's policy of the restoration of 
sovereignty to the Scottish peopled1121 As a 
nationalist, Stewart once wrote, it seems illogical 
striving "to regain power for the people of Scotland,
1,9 Jim Failrie, "Implications for Scotland of 
Economic and Monetary Union," Conference paper 
presented in February 1992. (Emphasis added.)
120 Fairlie, "Independence in Europe," 5.
121 ibid. 2-3. (Emphasis added.) On the same point, 
read Dick Douglas, At the Helm: The Life and Times of 
Dr. Robert D. McIntyre (Portessie: NPFI Publications, 
1995), 95-96.
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[and then] hand over power to a faceless European 
bureaucracy, "l“
Finally, as with the issue of the poll tax, the 
economic nationalists seem to be caught up on the 
economic and political gains of Scotland in Europe. "We 
all know," Fairlie writes, "that what is right and 
correct is not always politically popular or 
fashionable, but if political parties in Scotland are 
to be seen to stand for something other than merely 
their own elevation to positions of power, some 
principles at least must be non-negotiable J'122 23 
Economic nationalists, as Christine Creech laments, 
spend so much time arguing over economic and social 
problems that they fail to acknowledge the true essence 
or spirit of independence and self-determination.124 125The 
traditional nationalists observe that those in the SNP
leadership have
no concern with things of fundamental importance, with 
the great spiritual issues of underlying the mere 
statistics of trade and industry, with the ends to 
which all other things should merely be means, that I 
donTt feel the destiny of Scotland lies with it,’25 
What, then, should be the basis for Scottish
nationalism, if it is not to be asserted from an 
economic perspective? The SNP, which can trace its
122 Stewart, A Scot at Westminster, 49-50.
(Emphasis added.)
123 Jim Fairlie, unpublished letter to The Glasgow 
Herald, 17 August 1994. (Emphasis added.)
124 "A Real Political Agenda for Scotland, " Scots 
Independent, September 1995, 4.
125 MacDiarmid, A Political Speech, 9. (Emphasis 
added.)
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political roots back to 1934,126 advocated the belief 
that
[the] future of Scotland is not In the hands of peace 
conferences and foreign ambassadors and agitated prime 
ministers. The future of Scotland Is In the hands of 
her own peopled27
For the traditionalists of the Party, the SNP was 
established to assert the "belief that self-government 
meant Independence from Westminster In the total 
sense,"128 Sillars might be able to debate the argument 
of how the Commonwealth brought about assimilation in 
the United Kingdom129 or the late John P, Mackintosh 
might have been able to deliberate whether or not the 
Scots possess dual nationality,130 but, for traditional 
nationalists, Scotland is a distinct nation with its 
own history institutions and. language131 in which, for 
example, "unlimited sovereignty of Parliament is a 
distinctively English principle [having] no counterpart
126 For more on the origins of the SNP read, for 
example, Richard J. Finlay, "Pressure Group or 
Political Party: The Nationalist Impact on Scottish 
Politics, 1928-1945," Twentieth Century British 
History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1992): 274-297 and by one of 
its political founders J.M. MacCormick, The Flag In the 
Wind: The Story of the Nationalist Movement In Scotland 
(London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1955).
127 Robert D, McIntyre, "Scotland and the Peace, " 
Scots Independent, June 1945, 1. (Emphasis added.)
128 Richard J, Finlay, Independent and Free:
Scottish Politics and the Origins of the Scottish 
National Party, 1918-1945 (Edinburgh: John Donald 
Publishers, Ltd., 1994), 239. (Emphasis added.)
129 Parliamentary Debates, 3 May 1972, cols., 535­
536.
130 John P. Mackintosh, "The New Appeal of 
Nationalism," New Statesman, 27 September 1974, 408.
131 For example, read Alasdair Gray, Why Should 
Scots Should Rule Scotland (Edinburgh: Canongate Press, 
1992) .
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in Scottish constitutional law,"132 While it is not the 
intention of SNP to change the ways of English 
parliamentary life, argued Dr. Robert D. McIntyre in 
his maiden speech in the House of Commons back in 1945, 
we "come with the intention of returning as soon as 
possible to our own country, where we may, under 
democratic government, achieve the long-needed 
reconstruction of Scotland.’’133
For the traditional nationalists of the SNP, 
sovereignty is not an "abstract” nineteenth century 
concept bearing no relevance in the twentieth.134 
Rather, the Scottish understanding of sovereignty is a 
clear manifestation of popular consent.135 This un­
English form of sovereignty was most clearly and 
eloquently stated in the Declaration of Arbroath 
(1320).136 137The Declaration of Arbroath, which "has been 
often cited as an early and remarkable expression of 
patriotism, 1,137 cites that
if (Lord Robert] should give up what he has begun, and 
agree to make us or our kingdom subject to the King of 
England or the English, we should exert ourselves at 
once to drive him out as our enemy and a subverter of
132 "MacCormick and Another v. The Lord Advocate, " 
Scots Law Times (1953): 262. (Emphasis added.)
133 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 5, Fifth Series, Session 1944-1945, 1 May 
1945, col. 1299. (Emphasis added.)
134 Fairlie, unpublished letter to The Scotsman, 18 
September 1991.
135 J.M. Reid, Scotland’s Progress: The Survival of 
a Nation (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode (Publishers), 
Ltd., 1971), 14.
136 Interview with McIntyre and Scott, Towards 
Independence, 50.
137 A. I. Dunlop, "Arbroath Declaration of Scottish 
Independence," Kilmarnock Standard, 17 September 1949.
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his own rights and ours, and make some other man who 
was well able to defend us as our King; for, as long as 
but a hundred of us remain alive, never will we on any 
conditions be brought under English rule. It is in 
truth not for glory, nor honors that wo are fighting, 
but for freedom — for that alone, which no honest man 
gives up but with life itself.13S
As a 1941 SNP Newsletter makes clear the Party’s creed
advocates Scottish statehood not because it is a
"convenient administrative unit," but is a "form taken 
by communities of free men. When men become enslaved 
nations disappear to reappear again with individual 
freedom. ”* * * 139
While the concept of nationalism has been 
perceived to be an antithesis to the progressive 
development of international relations,140 it has also 
been "the laboratory of liberty."141 The concept of 
self-determination, for the traditionalists of the 
Party, is fundamental because it comes from the 
"gut."142 History is full of examples where national 
groups have asserted their "gut" instinct for
133 The Declaration of Arbroath, edited by Sir
James Fergusson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1970), 9. (Emphasis added.)
139 "Scottish Nationalism and Totalitarian Ant 
Heap," Scottish National Party Newsletter, No. 3 (April 
1941): 1. (Emphasis added.)
140 For example, read Brain Swimme and Thomas 
Berry, The Universe Story (New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1992), 206-222 and George Robertson, "The 
Limits of nationalism," A Speech to the Klingenthal 
Conference of the 21st Century Trust "What is the 
Nation? The Limits of Self-determination,' at the 
Deutsche Bank in Frankfurt Germany on 2 September 1994.
141 George F. Will, Suddenly: The American Idea at 
Home and Abroad (New York: The Free Press, Ltd., 1990), 
53.
M2 Interview with Fairlie.
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statehood J43 The Greeks in the nineteenth century, 
Halliday notes, "rebelled against their Turkish 
imperial masters and claimed their political 
freedom.1,144 And that aspiration for freedom, Halliday 
further emphasizes, does not merit apologies or 
economic justification/45 ’’Freedom,” McIntyre 
eloquently observes, "cannot be bought or sold/’143 144 145 46 For 
better or for worse,147 Scottish independence is sacred 
because every
nation is unique; it is one of the glories of 
nationality as it developed in western Europe during 
the Christian centuries that every citizen can realize 
and take a pride in the peculiar character of his own 
country and people without wishing to impose them on 
the rest of the world. "Who's like us? — nobody!" 
expresses a rational, civilized, and modest attitude 
towards the rest of the world/48
"The burning desire for freedom because it is right, 
and just, and its denial intolerable," as Halliday 
writes, "is an attribute only for those who define 
themselves as nationalists/’149
An important challenge for the traditionalists, 
however, is that the Scottish electorate has been 
"brainwashed" by London suggesting that Scotland would
143 James G. Kellas, Nationalism and Ethnicity 
(London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1989), 53.
144 James Halliday, Scots Independent, September 
1995. (Emphasis added.)
145 James Halliday, Scots Independent, February
1992, 2.
146 Interview with McIntyre.
147 Interview with James Halliday, in St. Andrews, 
Scotland (UK), 3 April 1995.
148 Reid, Scotland's Progress, 9. (Emphasis added.)
149 James Halliday, Scots Independent, January
1993, 2. (Emphasis added.)
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be worse off in a post-independent environment.150 
Whether or not Scotland would be worse off after
independence is not an issue for the traditionalists 
because as AJC Kerr eloquently observes:
I do not carry a Utopian blueprint of the perfect 
Scotland in my mind. Freedom also means freedom to be 
imperfect, to make our own mistakes, to learn from them 
and to correct them the best we can. But that is far 
better and more dignified than girning about the 
injustices a built-in majority inflicts on us, going 
down to Westminster with the begging bowl and girning 
more and more when we come ba.ck empty handed/51
Nevertheless/ a main segment of Scottish voters 
"require more physical satisfaction in the form of 
security and prosperity,"152 While Halliday would 
"gladly sleep on straw" in knowing Scotland to be 
independent from London,153 154the SNP’s political status 
and overall aspiration remain a minority viewpoint in 
Scottish politics,15,1 In the 1992 General Election, for 
example, the SNP was able to capture only 22 per cent 
of the vote resulting in a mere three seats in the 
House of Commons,155 In a 1994 ICM Poll, whereas 44 per 
cent supported devolution, only 38 per cent of the 
electorate supported independence.156 The next section, 
then, ponders whether or not the SNP should resort to
150 "A Real Political Agenda for Scotland," 4,
151 AJC Kerr, "Why I Am a Nationalist, " in Rollo, 
The Scotland We Seek, 14. (Emphasis added.)
152 Halliday, Scots Independent, February 1992, 2,
153 Interview with Halliday,
154 Roger Levy, Scottish Nationalism at the 
Crossroads (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1990) , 
58.
155 Peter Jones, "Time to Think Again, " The 
Scotsman, 21 September 1994.
156 "John Major’s Hogmanay Madness," The Economist, 
7 January 1995, 46.
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promoting devolution as a means to independence or, as 
Fairlie observes, "that [the Party] [should] take [on 
the responsibilities of] independence only when the 
Scots are unmoved by the ’possibility’ of a fall in the 
standard of living in the aftermath of gaining 
independence. ”157
SNP AND THE DEVOLUTION PROCESS
A, ECONOMIC NATIONALISTS
In the 1990s, under the leadership of Alex 
Salmond, the SNP looked again at the merits of the 
devolution process as an attempt to attract Scottish 
voters J58 The SNP’s examination of devolution took on 
more immediate attention when, in December 1995, the 
Labour Party and the Liberal Democratic Party released 
their plan for a Scottish Assembly.159 *Under their 
political scheme, the Scottish Assembly would be made 
up of 129 SMPs (Scottish Member of Parliament) elected 
by proportional representation?00 The Scottish Assembly 
would take powers (now under the auspices of the 
Scottish Office) over education, law and order, health, 
local government, training, transport, industry, and 
the environment.161 The Scottish Assembly would also
157 Fairlie, "Fairlie Frankly," March 1988, 2. 
k’8 Peter MacMahon, "Salmond Shuns the ’Pure Way,
The Scotsman, 20 September 1995, 5.
159 Peter MacMahon and David Scott, "Scotland 
Offered Three Visions of the Future," The Scotsman, 1 
December 1995, 1.
150 Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right
(Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995), 
21.
161 See Appendix I in ibid. , 32-33.
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have the power to raise (or to lower) income tax by 
about 3p to the pound/62
The question here, however,- is whether or not the 
SNP should support a constitutional settlement that 
does not grant Scotland full independence. For the SNP 
leadership the Scottish Assembly, along Liberal 
Democratic and Labour lines, does not give the Scottish 
Assembly the power to get rid of the Trident missile 
or, moreover, offer a direct link to the European Union 
as member state,162 63 Another political concern is that 
the constitutional scheme leaves the West Lothian 
question unsolved164 and, moreover, the question of who 
would "referee" constitutional disputes between 
Edinburgh and London remained in dispute,165 The answer 
to the above question depends upon who within the SNP 
is addressed. The devolution process towards 
independence represents another issue which has divided
the economic and traditional nationalists of the
162 Ibid., 27.
163 MacMahon, "Salmond Shuns ’The Pure Way, ’" 5.
164 The West Lothian Question is addressed in 
Chapter VI of this dissertation.
165 According to the Constitutional Convention: 
"The appropriate roles of both Parliaments in disputes 
will be respected and to facilitate its operation, an 
existing body will be used in the first instance with 
options including the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council" {Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right, 19). 
See also Kenny Farquharson, "Parley Here, Parley 
There," Scotland on Sunday, 3 December 1995, 10 and 
Lord Mackay, "A House Divided Against Itself," The 
Times, 7 February 1996, 18.
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Party/66 The economic nationalists take, for example, a 
gradualist perspective towards independence. In 
examining their position there seems to be three 
important reasons as to why the gradualists assert the 
devolution ’’process"166 67 is an important issue.
The first reason in supporting devolution, Neil 
MacCormick explains, is to restore democracy to 
Scotland.168 In this century, as Isobel Lindsay 
observes, an important element in nationalism has been 
the need to bring about decentralization. Centralized 
states (such as the United Kingdom), Lindsay further 
argues, "are beginning to face an internal challenge 
and it is groups with a long-established 
political/cultural identity which are spear-heading 
this challenge.’’169 170In bringing about a Scottish 
Assembly, economic nationalists perceive an opportunity
to reflect on
[t]he lack of national democratic institutions [which] 
has grievously sapped Scottish self-belief. 
Standardizing forces have eroded the external signs of 
our nationhood, speech, custom and dress, and left us 
confused and adrift. The deferential philosophy of 
dependence on English largesse attacks the quality of 
enterprise, invention and self-reliance in which we 
once took pride. Dependence is in any case something of 
a myth, though a powerful one. There is hardly an area 
of Scottish life that cannot be uplifted and quickened 
by an Assembly/70
166 Peter Jones, "Fault Line that Cuts Across the 
Road to Independence," The Scotsman, 1 February 1995,
14.
167 September 1995 interview with Salmond in Scots 
Independent, 6.
168 MacCormick, "Unrepentant Gradualism," 100,
169 Lindsay, "Nationalism, Community, Democracy, ’’
22.
170 "Why We Must Vote Yes, " The Scotsman, 23 
February 1979, 12.
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While the Constitutional Convention does not grant the 
Scottish Assembly the power to take decisions on 
foreign and defence policy,171 it would put Scotland, as 
George Rosie asserts, on a good start on the road 
towards constitutional reform.172 The Scottish Assembly 
would, Rosie further argues, ”do something to restore 
the pride, energy, and self-reliance of the Scottish 
people. It would allow us to make our own rules. With a 
bit of luck our elected representatives might be able 
to hammer out policies that suit Scotland."173 Stephen 
Maxwell, in other words, assert that the Constitutional 
Convention would bring about an institution mindful of 
"the right of the majority to determine issues of 
public interest.. . ”174 The concept of gradualism, 
MacCormick writes, is a "commitment to democracy, for 
we should seek to go at the speed of the greatest 
majority in promoting constitutional change."175
A second reason as to why the Salmond leadership 
espouses a gradualist line towards a constitutional 
reform is that they, as Sillars notes, are taking 
political stock as to what the polls suggest about the 
issue.176 The polls of 1995 suggest that devolution,
171 Peter MacMahon, "Only Proposal That Reflects 
the Will of People," The Scotsman, 1 December 1995, 7.
172 George Rosie, "Movement of the Scottish 
People," The Scotsman, 29 November 1995, 13.
173 Ibid.
174 Stephen Maxwell, "Scotland's Claim of Right," 
in Edwards, A Claim of Right for Scotland, 121.
(Emphasis added.)
175 MacCormick, "Unrepentant Gradualism," 106. 
(Emphasis added.)
176 Interview with Sillars.
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rather than independence, is the more realistic (or 
politically viable) choice at the moment. The Scottish 
electorate, Peter Kellner notes, want a "different kind 
of marriageF hut not a divorce. ”177 In looking at the 
polls, for example, 30 per cent favor an independent 
Scotland "separate from England and Wales” whereas 46 
per cent would like to a Scottish Parliament within the 
UK "with some tax and spending powers...’’178 In 
maintaining their "marriage" with London, the same poll
also reported that up to 74 per cent of Scots would 
like to keep the British pound as their currency.179 
Kellner notes the currency issue to be a significant
one because "power over currency means power over money 
supply, interest rates and, in the short term, 
competitiveness in the world market.’’180
While there is support for institutional 
reform,181 the Scottish electorate, the Glasgow 
Herald/System Three reported in February 1995, is 
"concerned [more] with jobs and hospital beds than 
[with] a debating chamber on Calton Hill."182 The same 
article, however, reported that the electorate seem to 
categorize the former issues as "short-term" ones. In
177 Peter Kellner, "An Open Marriage, Not a 
Divorce," The Sunday Times-Scotland, 27 August 1995, 4. 
(Emphasis added.)
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid., 5. In the same poll, only 8 per cent of 
believed that an independent Scotland should have a 
separate currency from both Britain and Europe.
180 Ibid.
181 Ibid.
182 Dinwoodie, "Shifting Scenery as the Play Goes
On," 6.
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the long-term the poll indicates that the electorate is 
"more open to change,"183 When the same poll asked the 
electorate to comment on John Major’s dismal view of 
the Scottish Assembly as a move towards separatism,184 
the Scottish electorate were said to "see not a
nightmare but a possibility, maybe even an 
opportunity, ”185 With 47 per cent accepting the idea of 
the UK breaking up into an island of "disparate 
nations," "it is one [slippery slope] many seettl to be 
prepared to put a tentative foot on.."186
As a gradualist towards independence, then, 
Salmond believes that by addressing these types of 
economic and social issues, the SNP can begin the 
process in reaching out to those "who are not yet 
convinced of the argument for Scottish independence."187 
As Billy Wolfe188 observed, it is important for the SNP 
to address an economic argument for independence 
because such a process helps "stimulate our fellow 
Scots into thinking in terms of Scottish solutions for 
Scottish problems in order ’to save Scotland from 
national extinction,..’"189 Wolfe summarized by also 
noting that
153 Ibid.
184 See Chapter VI of this dissertation and "John 
Major’s Hogmanay Madness," 46.
185 Dinwoodie, "Shifting Scenery as the Play Goes 
On," 6.
186 Ibid.
187 MacMahon, "Salmond Shuns ’The Pure Way," 5.
188 Billy Wolfe was Chairman of the SNP, 1969-1979,
189 Billy Wolfe, "General Election Crusade, " Scots 
Independent, August 1978, 5.
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I am in favor of the Party examining the fabric of life 
in Scotland and drafting policies with a view to making 
proposals for improving that fabric, not only when we 
have self-government hut also In the current political 
context J90
"Profound movements of opinion," Gordon Wilson190 91 once 
observed, "do not come from a vacuum. They derive from 
a people's perception of events over the long term."192
Finally, an Assembly offers the SNP the 
opportunity to test Roseanna Cunningham's assertion 
that a devolved Assembly cannot "satisfy our needs."193 
This can only be done, Wolfe argues, by the SNP 
demonstrating responsibility in the affairs of 
government through offering sound policy proposals.194 
It also means, Dick Douglas argues, that the SNP must 
seize the moment of every political opportunity that 
arises.195 Winnie Ewing196 is pragmatic in the sense that 
the SNP must use every political gain as a way "to work 
for the next gain."197 After all, as Margaret Ewing
190 Billy Wolfe, Scotland Lives: The Quest for 
Independence (Edinburgh: Reprographic, 1973), 131. 
(Emphasis added.)
191 Gordon Wilson served as an SNP MP for Dundee 
East, 1974-1987. He was also SNP National Secretary, 
1964-1971; Vice Chairman, 1973-1973; Senior Vice 
Chairman, 1973-1974; and National Convener, 1979-1990.
192 Gordon Wilson, The Scottish Paradox, The Lang 
Lecture at the University of St. Andrews (Edinburgh:
SNP Publications, 1988), 17. (Emphasis added.)
193 Roseanna Cunningham, "Use It, Use It, Use It!," 
The New Politics for Independence, SNP Conference Issue 
(1995) : 4.
194 Wolfe, "General Election Crusade," 5.
195 James Rouguie, "Ewing Opens Up Split Over Home 
Rule," The Scotsman, 22 September 1995, 1.
196 Winnie Ewing is SNP member of European 
Parliament since 1975. She also serves as President of 
the SNP.
197 Peter Jones, "Doing What Comes Gradually, " The 
Scotsman, 31 January 1995, 13.
217
noted in her 1995 address before the SNP Conference in
Perth, the Scottish people do not want to belong to a 
nation (or to a Party for that matter) that "whinges" 
and "whines” all the timed9S The role of our nation," 
Ewing argues instead, "seeks, and our Parliament will 
seek, to play a positive role."198 9  For the first time, 
the Scottish people, Margaret Ewing asserts,
want to work together for the reconstruction of our 
country and that work cannot begin too soon. Our people 
realize that freedom means taking on responsibilities 
for our own problems, not passing on the buck to 
others.200
In creating a devolved Assembly, the SNP, Levy argues, 
would not only have "another platform from which to 
argue its case, " but be involved "in the exercise of 
some limited executive power,"201
As Margaret Ewing, however, asserts:
... I will not hinder the real potential to establish a 
real parliament. But until my dying day I will always 
champion the cause of Scottish freedom. On the 
constitutional basis of the people's sovereignty only 
the people can set the boundaries of their freedom; and 
it might help if the constitutional debate were 
returned to a Scottish voice,202
For the gradualists, then, the argument as to whether 
or not Scotland will be independent in ten, twenty, or 
even fifty years is not an issue203 for as Salmond
198 Margaret Ewing, Speech to 1995 SNP Conference, 
in Perth, Scotland (UK), 21 September 1995, SNP News 
Release.
199 Ibid,
200 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
201 Levy, Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads,
59.
202 Ewing, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference,
(Emphasis added.)
203 Rouguie, "Ewing Opens Up Split Over Home Rule, "
1.
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asserts, "the people, not the politicians, will choose 
when independence comes."204 "Our job," Salmond 
continues, "is to accelerate the process — by the 
force of our argument certainly but also by the face 
that we present to Scotland every day."205
B. TRADITIONAL NATIONALISTS
Traditional nationalists like Christine Creech, 
Jim Fairlie, and Chris McLean, 206 oppose the gradualist 
understanding towards independence for several reasons. 
First of all, devolution is designed to maintain the 
authority of Westminster parliament. 207 As McLean 
asserts, any amendment to the powers of the Assembly 
would require Westminster consent.208 Devolution, McLean 
writes, "entails maintenance of a bilateral political 
relationship with England, and as with any such 
relationship any alteration in the terms must be agreed 
by both parties."209 Because this piece of legislation 
is mutable, it does not seem surprising when Alex Neil 
accuses the Labour Shadow Scottish Secretary George 
Robertson of be "intellectually dishonest" about 
devolution.210 Robertson, the Scottish traditionalists
204 Alex Salmond, Speech to SNP National 
Conference, in Perth, Scotland (UK), 22 September 1995, 
SNP News Release.
205 Ibid.
206 Chris McLean served as Press Officer of the
SNP.
207 Chris McLean, "Claim of Right or Cap in Hand, " 
in Edwards, A Claim of Right for Scotland, 110.
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid.
210 Alex Neil "A Charade of No Substance, " The New 
Politics for Independence, Party Conference Issue 
(1995): 8.
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argue, is trying "to dress up devolution as a transfer 
of power from London to Scotland, when the real power 
will be in London."211 Devolution, for the purists of 
the Party, is merely a "blind alley."212 It is a "blind 
alley" because a Labour government can place "belt and 
braces on any Assembly, and ... maJce it as difficult as 
possible for it to expand is powers."213 Christine 
Creech warns her SNP colleagues:
This is a Unionist Parliament. It will be custom built 
in London as an independent straight jacket. We should 
not put our arms voluntarily in the restraints before 
these are tied behind our backs.214
For Fairlie, then, "devolution and independence are not 
different degrees of the same thing"215 for there is 
simply "no backdoor way to Independence,"216 No self- 
respecting nationalist, the traditionalists of the 
Party argue, should be expected to accept such a 
proposal ,217
The traditionalists of the Party are also opposed 
to devolution because the House of Commons has always 
failed to deliver on the issue of Home Rule. Since
1889, Scott notes, the House of Commons has introduced
211 Ibid.
212 Kenny Farquharson, "Step-by-step Stumbling 
Block," Scotland on Sundayf 24 September 1995, 6.
213 Neil, "A Charade of No Substance, "8 and 
Interview with Sillars.
2H Creech, "Devolution — A Unionist Parliament," 
7. (Emphasis added.)
215 In conversation with Fairlie, 22 September 
1995. See also Jim Fairlie, "Nationalists Right to 
Oppose Devolution," The Scotsman, 10 January 1995, 14. 
(Emphasis added.)
216 Neil, "A Charade of No Substance," 8.
217 Levy, Scottish Nationalism at the Crossroads, 
59 and Stewart, "The Way Forward," 3.
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no less than 34 Home Rule bills of which each failed to 
acquire the political consent of the English political 
parties/18 As Scott explains:
We have had both Labour and Liberal Democrat 
governments in the past who were, in theory, committed 
to Scottish Home Rule, but failed to enact it. If these 
parties were to introduce a Bill, every UK Department 
of State would be careful at the drafting state to see 
that it lost as little of its power and influence as 
possible. During the debates in Parliament, the Bill 
would be at the mercy of the whims and bright ideas 
which happened to catch the fancy of the overwhelming 
English majority in both Houses,218 19
In particular, the traditional wing of the Party notes 
that there is a deep mistrust between SNP and 
Labour. 220 Labour sees the SNP as a political threat 
because without Scotland, Scott observes, Tony Blair 
cannot hope to form a government in Westminster.221 "The 
[real] threat [the SNP] pose[s]," Lindsay notes, 
however, "is not just a threat to seats, it is a threat 
to fixed ideas, to long established certainties,"222 The 
Labour Party is in rivalry with the SNP, Fairlie 
writes, because its leadership perceives the latter to 
be a threat to "the one thing that nationalists seek to 
dismantle -- the British state,"223 It is therefore not 
surprising when in answering Lorraine Mann’s question 
at The Scotsman's Great Debate (1995) Robertson noted
218 Scott, Scotland in Europe, 50.
219 Ibid., 51. (Emphasis added.)
220 Interview with Lynch.
221 Scott, "Europe Adds Urgency to the Case for 
Independence, " 14.
222 Lindsay, "Nationalism, Community, and 
Democracy," 21.
223 Jim Fairlie, "Value of an Assembly as a 
Platform," The Scotsman, 2 February 1995, 10. (Emphasis 
added.)
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that if he knew that devolution would lead to
independence he would not be for the Scottish 
Assembly.224 "George’s second preference,-" as Salmond 
notes, "is for the status quo. He just doesn’t like to 
admit it in public."225 If this is the case, how can the 
SNP leadership hope to work with Labour'?226
In answering this question, there are those among 
the fundamentalist wing of the SNP who, not out of 
choice, have taken a pragmatic assessment of devolution 
and the Labour Party. 227 Halliday, for example, writes 
the Labour Party "has been entrusted with the support 
of the Scottish electoral majority"228 for the simple 
reason that Tony Blair is "promising to do things."229 
As the poll results cited above appear to indicate
The Union is under no imminent threat. The SNP has been 
done down, tied down and spent down once again. , ,230 
While this might be the case, the polls also seem to 
argue that the Scottish electorate desire 
constitutional reform and that the Labour Party has 
made devolution (among other issues) a part of its 
electoral agenda.231 Margaret Ewing, who describes
224 Ewen MacAskill, "Passions Run High Over Way 
Ahead," The Scotsman, 13 February 1995, 1.
225 Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference.
226 Creech, "Devolution — A Unionist Parliament, "
6-7.
227 Interview with Lynch, See also Jones, "Fault 
Line that Cuts Across the Road to Independence," 6.
228 James Halliday, Scots Independent, January 
1993, 2.
229 Interview with Lynch.
230 James Halliday, Scots Independent, May 1992, 2,
231 "Something for Everyone to be Read among the 
Runes, Glasgow Herald, 9 February 1995, 6.
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herself as a fundamentalist at heart, 232 believes that 
if Labour wants to make a difference in Scottish 
politics that if they "want to deliver, then let them 
deliver J'233 The burden of proof is, therefore, on Blair 
to disprove Salmond’s assertion and many others in the
SNP that "Labour cannot be trusted on the 
constitution. "234 Those with such views warn, however, 
that because the Blair leadership have set high 
expectations for themselves, they essentially will 
"have no hiding place" from the electorate’s and, 
moreover, the SNP’s wrath if they fail to deliver their 
promises .235
In putting the politics of devolution aside, the 
more important point about this debate between the 
gradualists and fundamentalists is that it is 
ideological one, 236 which strikes at the very core of 
this dissertation. As with the European Union, the 
internal struggle within the SNP over devolution is not 
just an argument about economic/political gains, but is 
about national integrity. Traditionalists like Fairlie 
seem unable to concur with Halliday’s or, more 
importantly, with Salmond’s assessment of devolution 
for the simple reason that the gradualists are playing
232 Joanne Robertson, "Best of Enemies," The Sunday 
Times-- Scotland, 5 February 1995, 2.
233 Ewing, "Learn from History," 10. (Emphasis 
added.)
234 Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference.
(Emphasis in the original.)
235 Interview with Lynch.
236 "Skinning the Cat of Independence, " The 
Scotsman, 1 February 1995.
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"politics as usual" by working with a party that is set 
at maintaining Westminster rule. The traditionalists 
are skeptical of a leadership which believes that the 
SNP can win its argument for independence by "bribing” 
the electorate with economic carrots. As with Europe,
the traditionalists assert that there can be no 
"halfway houses" to independence. 237 Nationalism "on 
condition,” Stewart once observed, is a "betrayal" to 
the quest for Scottish independence238 for it leaves out 
in the cold all those who have worked passionately for 
its reality. 239 "The SNP," Stewart further wrote, "must 
be proud to state our objectives without reservations 
or ca veats. "240
After the dismal results of the 197 9 referendum,241 
the SNP vowed that it would "campaign for independence 
and nothing else."242 In 1983, the SNP shifted to being 
"neutral" over the issue243 and then, in 1990, it 
shifted its position back to recognizing that the 
"mandate to negotiate independence might be gained not 
only at a Westminster elections, but also at any
237 Stewart, "The Way Forward," 3.
238 Ibid.
239 Farquharson, "Step-by-Step Stumbling Block," 6.
240 Stewart, "The Way Forward," 3. (Emphasis 
added.)
241 For more on the 1979 referendum, read John 
Bocel, David Denver, and Allan Macartney, eds., The 
Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979 (Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen University Press, 1981), Levy, Scottish 
Nationalism at the Crossroadsf 58-90 and Marr, The 
Battle for Scotland, 121-164.
242 Jones, "Fault Line That Cuts Across the Road to 
Independence," 6.
243 Ibid.
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election for any future assembly."244 The point for the 
traditionalists, however,- is that, for reasons 
described above,
either you are a nationalist and accept the sovereignty 
of the Scottish people, or you are a Unionist and 
accept the sovereignty of the British parliament. You 
cannot have it both ways -- both cannot be sovereign.2''5 
For McLean, independence is an "explicit rejection of 
authority of Westminster; the basis of the claim is the 
Scottish people are sovereign, not the English 
parliament."2^ While "purity of political line does not 
always play well with the public, "247 the
traditionalists assert that "we cannot grumble, because 
we must emphasize our commitment to independence in all 
circumstances; and, to the uncommitted, this must seem 
[fortunately or unfortunately] like single-issue 
politics. "248
CONCLUSION
This chapter examined the battle of ideas within 
the SNP over the issues of Scotland’s role in the
European Union and the establishment of a Scottish 
Assembly. The economic nationalists see the European 
Union as a working panacea to Edinburgh’s no longer 
relevant relationship to London. In being part of the 
European Union, Scotland would enjoy equal status with
244 Alex Salmond, "Truth and Devolution, " Scotland 
on Sunday, 5 February 1995, 6.
245 McLean, "Claim of Right or Cap in Hand," 112. 
(Emphasis added.)
246 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
247 "Skinning the Cat of Independence," 10.
248 James Halliday, Scots Independent, November 
1992, 2. (Emphasis added.)
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that of the other member states and, moreover, welcome 
the economic gains from being part of a major trading 
bloc. In respect to devolution, the economic 
nationalists take on a gradualist perspective in which 
the Scottish Assembly is perceived to be a means to 
bringing about full independence. While the SNP 
leadership remains dubious about Labour's ability to 
bring about devolution,249 250 251Salmond is convinced that the 
Assembly is valuable platform from which to contest the 
” independence ticket. "25°
The traditionalists, on the other hand, are 
dubious of the "Independence in Europe" campaign 
because they perceive the SNP leadership not only 
replacing one centralized form of government with that 
of another, but trying to justify the need to base the 
argument for Scottish independence on economic 
reasoning. While Scotland needs to maintain its links 
with an interdependent world, Scotland wins its 
argument for independence not because of North Sea oil 
or for the poll tax, but because it is (for better or 
for worse) honorable and right. While there are those 
among the traditionalists who believe that devolution 
"could carry us up to the point of independence, 1,251 
others remain firm in their belief that there can be no 
"political waffling" over independence. For the
249 September 199b interview with Salmond in Scots 
Independent, 6-7.
250 Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference.
251 Halliday, Scots Independent, May 1992, 2. 
(Emphasis added.)
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traditionalists, the Labour Party wishes to preserve 
the Union and protect itself from political force which 
they deem as an impediment to its political agenda,252
In respect to the End of History paradigm,253 
Fukuyama is correct in observing that Scottish 
nationalism does not represent in any empirical fashion 
an antithesis to the principles of liberal democracy,254 
And, indeed, Andrew Marr is correct in pointing out to 
Fukuyama that a main theme in Scottish politics is
about the creation of new democratic
institutions,255 But this is not the real issue, The 
real challenge to Fukuyama is that the "traditionalist” 
position challenges the "politics as usual" position 
and rather emphasizes that ideas are still in 
"motion,"256 As this chapter attempted to demonstrate, 
the SNP represents an ideological challenge to how the 
Scots should be governed for the Salmond leadership 
challenges Westminster’s definition of sovereignty and, 
moreover, debates among themselves over what role 
Scotland should play in what can be conceived as a 
significant examination of how Europe is to be governed 
at the end of the twentieth century.
252 For example, see Peter MacMahon, "Memo Seeks 
Exposure of SNP ’Extremists,’" The Scotsman, 20 
September 1995, 5.
253 See Chapter II of this dissertation.
254 Andrew Marr’s interview with Francis Fukuyama, 
The Big Ideas (BBC 2), 31 January 1996.
255 Ibid,
256 Michael Foley, "Introduction," in Michael 
Foley, ed., Ideas that Shape Politics (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1994), 2.
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Economic and traditional nationalists of the SNP 
might very much believe that Scotland’s relationship to 
the "British state" is no longer relevant to its
cultural and economic needs. Within the framework of a
democratic state, however, the SNP has made its life’s 
work to contest elections until it does win a majority 
of the hopes and aspirations of the Scottish people. 
The SNP is in no hurry for independence will come when 
the Scottish electorate vote for it. After all, as 
Salmond asserts correctly:
This is not a game. I believe that this party has the 
ability to change this country, to change Scotland — 
and that we alone can. That is our task. It is more 
important than you or me or any person in this hall or 
any one person in the whole of Scotland. To achieve it 
will require passion and commitment combined with 
pragmatism and iron self discipline.257
257 Salmond, 1995 Speech to SNP Conference.
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CHAPTER VI
STRANDS OF THOUGHT WITHIN THE 
BRITISH CONSERVATIVE AND UNIONIST PARTY REGARDING 
DEVOLUTION AND BRITAIN’S ROLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
INTRODUCTION
The tension between the compatibility of economic 
maximization and the continuing role of national 
identity and state sovereignty in the United Kingdom
also manifests itself within the various strands of
political thought of the British Conservative and 
Unionist Party,1 The ideological divide between the 
Tory2 factions can be vividly seen, for example, in 
the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty. In 
the ratification process. Euro-skeptic3 4Tories like 
Sir Teddy Taylor and Lord Rees-Mogg used various legal 
and political tactics to impede the Government’s 
Maastricht legislation/ The Tory leadership responded
1 Andrew Gamble and Steve Ludlam, "Tories Do the 
Splits," Red Pepper, No. 11 (April 1995): 16-17.
2 In British political history, the word Tory was 
first used during the Exclusion Crisis (1679-1681) to 
describe those who opposed the exclusion of the Duke of 
York (James II). After 1760, the term refers to those 
who pledged allegiance to George III, accepted the 
established order in Church and State, and, later on, 
opposed the Reform Bill of 1832. The modern
Conservative Party is based on the principles of 
Toryism which a few of its basic beliefs are analyzed 
in the text below.
3 According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, a 
skeptic is someone who is "given to questioning truth 
of fact(s) and soundness of inference(s), critical, 
incredulous."
4 David Baker, Andrew Gamble, and Steve Ludlam,
"The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993; 
Conservative Divisions and British Ratification," 
Parliamentary Affairs: Contemporary Journal of 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1994): 38.
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to Party dissent by challenging the latter to either 
support Major’s European policy or to face the 
consequences of "playing in the hands of those who 
would destroy the livelihoods of the people of this 
country, 1,5 and, moreover, by making the question of 
ratification an issue of confidence in the Government/
The pro-European Tories are made up of John Major 
and those in the Cabinet who supports his position on 
Europe. Other related pro-Europe factions such as the 
Tory Reform Group (led by David Hunt) and the 
Conservative Group for Europe (led by Lord Howe) also 
support Major’s European policies.5 6 7 For the Prime
5 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of 
Commons, Vol. 229, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 22 
July 1993, col. 601.
6 In an attempt to defeat the Labour Party’s 
amendment on the social chapter, Major solicited the 
support of the Ulster Unionists in which the Government 
offered them a series of concessions "including the 
creation of a Commons committee with the right to look 
at security in the [Northern Irish] province" (Philip 
Stephens, "Major Ready to Defy Commons on Social 
Chapter," The Financial Times, 23 July 1993, 1). 
Nevertheless, the Government was defeated 324 to 316 on 
the 22 July 1993. Major then tabled a vote of 
confidence which stated: "That the House has confidence 
in the policy of Her Majesty’s Government on the 
adoption of the Protocol on Social Policy"
(Parliamentary Debates, 22 July 1993, cols. 606-611). 
The Government won the confidence vote 339-299 on the 
23 July 1993 (Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, "The 
Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht," 59).
7 "Scent of Blood Starts Civil War," The Sunday 
Times, 18 June 1995, 13. The various factions of the 
Tory Party understand the term "pro-Europe"
differently. For the Tory Reform Group, "pro-Europe" 
means the development of a federal Europe and (as a 
must) the establishment of the EMU (ibid). European 
Reform Group Tories include Edwina Currie, Ted Heath, 
and David Hunt. Lord Howe’s group, Conservative Group 
for Europe, has similar policy goals with that of the 
Tory leadership (ibid). Conservative Group for Europe 
Tories include Lord Howe and Michael Heseltine. In this
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Minister, the UK benefits from EU membership because of 
the establishment of a single market and the promotion 
of free trade. The Party leadership perceived itself as 
protecting British sovereignty, along economic lines, 
by securing for the United Kingdom opt-out clauses on 
the single currency and the social chapter. John Major 
was also able to secure an intergovernmental approach 
to Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) and Home and 
Judicial Affairs (HJA). Baker has argued that the above 
"national" accomplishments were an attempt to appease 
the wrath of the Tory’s Euro-skeptics.8
The Euro-skeptics’ fundamental objection to the 
Maastricht Treaty is its federalist agenda. For the 
Euro-skeptics, the European Union has moved beyond the 
original intent of the Treaty of Rome which was the 
development of a Common Market. While Euro-skeptics 
like Norman Lamont and John Redwood are in favor of 
Britain maintaining its economic links to Europe,9 they 
also believe that the European debate has a profound
chapter, the term "pro-Europe" describes the policy 
goals of John Major and those in (and outside) the 
Cabinet who support the Prime Minister. Read, for 
example, Michael Heseltine, The Challenge of Europe:
Can Britain Win? (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1989) , Geoffrey Howe, Nationalism and the Nation-State, 
The Rede Lecture, 1994 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), Gareth Smyth, "Heath’s Land," New 
Statesman and Society. 26 May 1995, vi-vii and Hugo 
Young, "No, Prime Minister," Marxism Today, November 
1988, 16-23.
8 Baker, Gamble, and Ludlam, "The Parliamentary 
Siege of Maastricht," 38.
9 "Scent of a Bloody Civil War,” 13. See Norman 
Lamont, "Why Redwood is the Right Man for Europe," The 
Times. 27 June 1995, 18 and John Redwood, "Saving 
Europe from Itself," The Times. 29 March 1996, 18.
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impact on principles they, as a Party, hold dear. While 
Major was able to secure opt-out clauses for the UK and 
maintain an intergovernmental framework for CFSP and 
HJA, the Euro-skeptics assert that the Government 
underestimates the constitutional consequences of the 
TEU. For the Euro-skeptics, the concept of sovereignty 
is not simply an abstract principle,10 but, more 
importantly, a critical issue of "who decides."11 As 
this chapter demonstrates, the debate over TEU is not 
just about economic maximization, but, rather, a 
fundamental examination of how the continent of Europe 
(in general) is to govern itself at the end of the 
twentieth century. In particular, the TEU, for Lady 
Thatcher, is a debate about
being British and it is about what we feei for our 
country, our parliament, and our traditions and our 
liberties. Because of our history, that feeling is 
perhaps stronger here than anywhere else in Europe, 
and it must determine the way in which our government 
approa ch s u ch ma. 11 ers.12
The issues of sovereignty and self-determination are in 
such "flux"13 that the Euro-skeptics very much believe 
that the people of Britain should be entitled to
10 Chapter ill discusses the theoretical aspect of 
the concept of sovereignty.
11 Nicholas Ridley, My Style of Government: The 
Thatcher Years (London: Hutchinson, 1991), 138. 
(Emphasis added.)
12 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 199, Sixth Series, Session 1991-1992, 20 
November 1991, col. 292. (Emphasis added.)
13 Michael Foley, "Introduction," in Michael Foley, 
ed., Ideas that Shape Politics (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1994), 2.
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determine the future of Britain’s role in Europe
through a r p f p r e ndum.14
This chapter also deals with the issue of
devolution . The Conservative Party has played a
considerable amount of "politics" on this particular
debate. The British newspapers are filled, for example, 
with stories of the Tory leadership’s opposition to the 
Labour Party’s proposed Scottish Assembly for it fears 
that it could lead to full Scottish independence and 
that it would add another layer of administration and 
taxation on the people of Scotland.15 While the 
Conservative Party enjoys an overall consensus 
regarding the sanctity of the United Kingdom,16 there 
are those in the Conservative Party (for example, 
Malcolm Rifkind and Lord Cockfield) who conclude that 
the Tory leadership should not dismiss the concept of 
devolution altogether.17 The Scottish Local Elections 
and the Perth and Kinross by-election (April and May of 
1995 respectively), for example, suggest the 
possibility of growing anti-Tory unrest within Scottish
14 Interview with Bill Walker, at Constituency 
Office in Blairgowrie, Scotland (UK), 18 August 1995. 
Walker is Tory MP for North Tayside. See also Joanna 
Bale, "Goldsmith Promises to Fight for a Referendum," 
The Times, 4 December 1995, 2.
15 "The Prime Minister, " The Scottish Leader, 
Autumn 1995, 2. See also "Nationalism — A Dangerous 
Fiasco," The Scottish Leader, Autumn 1995, 1.
16 Phil Gallic, in correspondence with the author, 
16 November 1994. Gallie is Tory MP for Ayr. See also 
the Former Scottish Secretary Ian Lang’s interview in 
Robbie Dinwoodie, "Devolution? It's a Trap," The 
Glasgow Herald, 14 January 1995, 10.
17 Andrew Evans, "Only Devolution Can Save Union, 
Says Tory Peer," The Scotsman, 20 April 1995, 8.
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politics. The poor election results prompted certain 
Scottish Tories like John Young of the Cathcart 
Conservative Association to invite the Tory leadership 
to reexamine Scottish government and offer pragmatic 
suggestions in making it more accountable to the
Scottish electorate.
For the Conservative Party,- as this chapter 
demonstrates, the issue of devolution goes beyond the 
mere argument of mechanics and responsibilities of 
government. Unlike the other parties of the UK, the 
Tories perceive themselves to be the guardians of 
Britain’s historic institutions.18 For the Tories, the 
Union is like a "marriage" in which Major pledges to 
uphold ’’for better or for worse, for richer or for 
poorer.”19 The Tories agree that only the Scottish 
people can decide (through parliamentary elections) as 
to whether or not they wish to remain within the United 
Kingdom.20 However, the proposed Scottish Assembly 
(along Labour Party lines) would only intensify the
38 Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke 
to Eliot, Seventh Revised Edition (Washington, DC: 
Regenery Gateway, Inc., 1987), 270. For more on the 
history of the British Conservative Party, read Robert 
Blake, The Conservative Party: From Peel to Thatcher, 
New and Revised Edition (London: Methuen Press, Ltd., 
1985) and Frank O’Gorman, British Conservatism: From 
Burke to Thatcher (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1986).
19 Interview with Ian Stewa.rt at Scottish- 
Conservative and Unionist Headquarters in Edinburgh, 
Scotland (UK), 29 August 1995. Stewart is Research 
Officer for the Scottish Conservative Association.
20 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years 
(London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 624.
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"political" problems of the Union and, thus, could 
result in its breakup?1 As Allan Stewart laments
. . . the business community and wealth creators in 
Scotland would have the most to fear not from a one-off 
constitutional change, but from the fact that a 
constitutional change such as this would, in no sense be 
the end of the road. There is a simple reason why it 
would not be the end of the road. If the arrangements 
were perceived to be working well, the Scottish 
National Party would say, "Make them work better. Let’s 
have full independence." If the arrangements were 
perceived to be working badly, as it is my belief that 
they would, the SNP would be even better position and 
could say, "We have tried this half-way house, 0 people 
of Scotland, and it does not work. Westminster is not 
giving us enough money. It is all the fault of 
Westminster... Give us more power."21 2 23
In carrying the marriage analogy further, as Ian 
Stewart comments, whereas independence is seen as a 
"divorce," devolution is merely a "trial separation.5,23
This case study addresses several questions. In 
discussing Tory ideological divisions over the European 
Union, for example, what have the various factions 
offered as a realistic policy regarding Britain’s best 
interest in Europe and why? In regards to the 
devolution process why does the Tory Party appreciate 
the Union to be a sacrosanct entity? The assessment of 
the various answers to these questions documents the 
argument that there are certain factions within the 
Tory Party which adamantly accept that there are
21 Ian Stewart, Scotland's Future; The Scottish 
Constitutional Issue (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Central Office, 1995). See also Peter 
Lynch, "Labour Answers the West Lothian Question," The 
Glasgow Heraldt 20 January 1996, 19.
22 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 203, Sixth Series, Session 1991-1992, 7 
February 1992, cols. 613-614. (Emphasis added.)
23 Interview with Stewart.
235
fundamental issues relating to the identity, integrity, 
and sovereignty of the state overriding the advantages 
of economic and political maximization.
EUROPE AND THE TORY PARTY: ECONOMICS V. SOVEREIGNTY
Between December 1991 and July 1993 the various 
factions of the Tory Party fought over the possible 
significance of Britain's ratification of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU). The principle issues that the 
factions debated included the establishment of a single 
currency24 and the intergovernmental dimension of CFSP 
and HJA. Exacerbating the divisions between the 
different Tory factions was the need to consider the 
effects the TEU (and in particular the single currency) 
would have on parliamentary sovereignty for as 
Heseltine observed
[i]n our interdependent world, and particularly within 
an increasingly convergent European Community, 
[sovereignty] is a barrier to understanding. 
Sovereignty can be impotent. A man in the desert is 
free and sovereign. He is beyond the reach of any alien 
authority, but he is powerless. To have value, 
sovereignty must be capable of being used.25
The analysis below examines each of the factions' 
position in turn.
According to Francis Fukuyama, states in a post­
End of History environment preoccupy themselves with 
economic activity.26 If such an assertion is correct, it
24 See, for example, Andrew Marr, "Make Way for 
the Globe-trotting Trader," The Independent, 16 March 
1995 and William Rees-Mogg, "Virtual Unreality, The 
Times , 1 June 1995, 20.
25 Heseltine, The Challenge of Europe, 211.
26 Francis Fukuyama,, Trust; The Social Virtues and 
the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press,
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seems reasonable then for John Major’s Government to 
emphasize the economic perspective of Britain’s 
relationship with the European Union. What is important 
now in European politics is not whether or not the 
continent will be democratic,-27 but that the European 
Union makes a firm commitment to free trade and to the 
establishment of a single market.28 It is therefore of 
little surprise that in this context the 1992 British 
presidency of the EU made the completion of the single 
market its central goal.29 Under the British presidency, 
for example, the EU member states agreed to a series of 
directives which would facilitate progress towards a 
single market. The directives dealt with issues such as 
excise duties, the value added tax, and the 
pharmaceutical industry.30 The 1992 British presidency 
concluded at the Edinburgh European Council in December 
1992 in which it emphasized that the member states had 
agreed "in identifying the priorities and practical 
steps necessary to ensure that the internal market 
works fairly and effectively and without undue burdens 
on business, notably small and medium-sized 
enterprises. ”31
Ltd., 1995), xiii. For more on this point, see Chapter 
II of this dissertation.
27 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, at the RAND 
Corporation in Washington, DC (USA), 16 December 1993.
28 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 214, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 24 
November 1992, col. 760.
29 Ibid,
30 Ibid,
31 "Conclusions of the Presidency, " European 
Council in Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992. See also 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Vol.
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The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986, which 
established the legal basis of Europe’s single market 
program,32 outlined the steps towards the establishment 
of the single market and the "elimination of trade 
barriers,"33 As in every good End of History society, 
Heseltine observes that Britain can "achieve more" for
its people "within a more competitive European market 
than [it] can hope for within a collection of purely 
national markets."34 One of Major’s more important 
concerns for Britain in the European Union is not "to 
reduce the number of currencies, but to increase the 
number of jobs."35 Like Major, Edward Heath believes 
that Britain’s relationship to the EU is not only
216, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 14 December 1992, 
col, 23,
42 Robert Wester writes that in the negotiations of 
the SEA the Thatcher Government "played a decisive 
role" ("United Kingdom and European Political Union," 
in Finn Laursen and Sophie Vanhoonacker, eds, The 
Inter-governmental Conference on Political Union: 
Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International 
Identity of the European Community [Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992], 193). 
See Chapter IV of this dissertation and Thatcher, The 
Downing Street Years, 555-557.
33 Geoffrey Smith, "Britain in the New Europe, " 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Fall 1992): 166. For 
more on the SEA, read Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating 
the Single European Act," in Robert Keohane and Stanley 
Hoffmann, eds., The New European Community:
Decisionmaking and Institutional Change (Boulder: 
Westview Press, Inc., 1991), 41-85 and William Nicoll 
and Trevor C. Salmon, Understanding the European 
Communities (New York: Philip Allan, 1990), 199-201.
34 Heseltine, The Challenge of Europe, 77, On the
same point, read William Pfaff, "Nations Can Resolve to 
Act, But Europe Isn’t a Nation," International Herald 
Tribune. 10 February 1994, 6.
35 John Major, "Raise Your Eyes, There is a Land 
Beyond," The Economist, 25 September 1993, 23.
(Emphasis added.)
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about ’’shaping our role in the world, " but about 
solving the "practical, everyday concerns of ordinary 
peopled'36 In preserving Britain’s economic interest, 
Major further argues that this goal can only be 
achieved if British companies maintain their "vital" 
links in the European market.37 "It is clear," the 
Financial Times writes, "that the Community will not 
last long if it becomes a vast machine for creating 
unemployment. "3S
Major’s economic perspective to the European Union 
also asserts that the single market should not isolate 
itself from the emerging democracies of Eastern 
Europe?9 Major believes that the European Union should 
support extending membership to the Visegrad states of 
Eastern Europe.40 Major observes that European support 
for enlargement in the East would not only provide for 
security, but for trade and prosperity,41 42In other 
words, Major’s objective for European unity is "to 
enable the peoples of Europe to live more harmoniously 
together and to enjoy greater prosperity and 
influence.”4" This means, former Tory Chancellor of the
36 Edward Heath, "1 Put the National Interest 
First," The Independent, 13 December 1995, 17. 
{Emphasis added.)
37 Parliamentary Debates, 22 July 1993, col. 526.
38 "Get Europe to Work, " Financial Times, 20 May 
1993, 19.
39 John Major, "Why We Need Europe, " Newsweek, 14 
December 1992, 24.
10 Parliamentary Debates, 14 December 1992, col.
24.
41 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
42 Smith, "Britain in the New Europe," 166. 
(Emphasis added.)
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Exchequer Nigel Lawson argues, that the EU must "open 
up its markets to agricultural produce, steel, and 
textiles from Central and Eastern Europe,"43 "We must 
not," Major warns, "replace those physical barriers 
with invisible tariff walls and a tangle of trade 
restrictions . ”44 45
The Major Government understood that the 
development of the single market would protect the UK’s 
national interests because its active participation 
places Britain in "the heart of Europe, 5,45 and that, 
therefore, it would serve as an opportunity to maximize 
the performance of the UK economy. This task could only 
be accomplished by Britain being directly involved in 
Europe for, like Jim Sillars’ argument for Scottish 
independence in Europe,46 Major did not believe it 
"credible" for the UK "to sit on the sidelines of 
Europe and let other people determine policies. That is 
frankly no way for the United Kingdom to behave."47 
Major further explains in the House of Commons:
There are, in truth, only three ways of dealing with 
the Community: We can leave it, and no doubt we would 
survive, but we would be diminished in influence and
43 Nigel Lawson, The view from No, 11: Memoirs of a 
Tory Radical (London: Corgi Editions, 1993), 1033.
44 Major, "Why We Need Europe," 25.
45 Ian Lang, The Fulfilled. Society (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Central Office, 
1993), 13.
46 See Chapter V of this dissertation and Jim 
Sillars, No Turning Back: The Case for Scottish 
Independence within the European Community and How We 
Face the Challenge of 1992, August 1988, 5.
47 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 213, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 4 
November 1992, col. 284. (Emphasis added.)
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prosperity; we can stay in it grudgingly,- in which 
others will lead it; or we can play a leading role In 
it, and that is the right policy. It does not mean 
accepting every Idea marked with a European label. It 
does mean trying to build the sort of Europe that we 
believe in. . .4S
Like Sillars, Major perceives the EU to be "an 
inescapable framework for real life and proposed.. . to 
put Britain at the heart of it."48 9 While Major 
supported the need for the single market/ however, he 
sought out to protect the UK’s economic and political 
interests50 by securing for Great Britain opt-out 
clauses to the single currency and the social chapter.
Unlike the Euro-skeptics, Major seems to look at 
the UK’s opt-out clause to the single currency from a 
practical perspective. For Major, an important point
behind the opt-out clause to the single currency is to
reserve this (and a future) Parliament’s right to
determine whether or not such a monetary framework
would maximize the UK’s economy in the European
market.51 Ma j or wishes to reserve Britain’s right to
48 Parliamentary Debates/ 20 November 1991/ col.
270. (Emphasis added.) Like Major, Sillars observes 
that ”[l]ike it or not/ we are in the European 
Community. We either sit in a corner snarling and 
growling , always looking for errors through a jaundiced 
eye, or we approach our new situation in a constructive 
fashion.... [W]e should strive to make the Community 
work more effectively, strengthen its democratic 
institutions, widen its capacity for ideological and 
political change, and subscribe to the debate about 
what kind of Community it may ultimately become1' 
(Sillars, No Turning Back, 5 [Emphasis added.]).
49 Hugo Young, "Prime Minister, ” in Dennis Kavanagh 
and Anthony Seldom, eds., The Major Effect (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1994), 23. (Emphasis added.)
50 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 200, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 11 
December 1991, col. 862.
51 Ibid., col. 875,
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vote on the single currency because he wants to 
ascertain whether such a scheme could yield economic 
benefits for the UK/2 In theory, the establishment of a 
single currency would mean stable prices and poorer EU 
states "would have a better chance of catching up if 
they are able to link their own development efforts to 
those of the Community/’52 3 The benefits of a single 
currency would, if successful, mean "low inflation 
across the whole of Europe/'54 Single currency 
membership would provide for the UK favorable 
conditions in mending its prospects for improved 
"employment, interest rates, inward investment, ... and 
price levels/’55 56
However, Major also recognizes that there are 
economic difficulties in establishing a single 
currency. Not only are there economic complexities in 
the three stages establishing EMU,50 but "unanticipated"
52 John Major, "You Can Judge Me on My Record, " The 
Daily Telegraph, 3 July 1995, 18.
53 European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities), 35.
54 Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col.
875.
55 "Fireworks over Europe, " Yorkshire Post, 9 June 
1995, 10. On the same point, see Joy Copley, "Fresh Row 
Over Single Currency," The Scotsman, 9 June 1995, 9.
56 This pressure was exacerbated by the economic 
complexities of creating the EMU which included three 
stages. First, there would be a need for member states 
to eliminate all residual capital controls, to join the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and to harden its ERM 
commitment; second, there would be a need for the 
European Monetary System (EMS) to develop a common set 
of macroeconomic policies adopted by national 
authorities; and three, there would then be the 
development of the single currency and a European 
Central Bank (ECB). (Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey A. 
Frieden, "The Political Economy of European Monetary
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events and "political” opposition have "intervened to 
interrupt the momentum of monetary unification."57 The 
Bundesbank, in implementing strict monetary policies 
resulting from the costs of German unification,58 is 
taking an economic risk regarding the EMU because there 
is simply "no guarantee that these institutional 
arrangements would perform as smoothly and as 
beneficially for Germany as its domestic arrangements 
have."59 The British pound and the Italian lira failed 
to converge with the rest of the other currencies in 
the EMS.60 In June 1991, Thatcher admitted to her 
Government’s mistake in trying to "shadow" the 
deutschmark "pursuing the objective of a stable 
exchange rate at the expense of monetary discipline."61 
This objective, argues Thatcher, "produced inflation 
which was the underlying cause of the recession."62 
Eastern Europe would have a difficult time joining the 
EU’s single market with a single currency because, as
Unification: An Analytical Evaluation," in Jeffrey A. 
Frieden and David A. Lake, eds, International Political 
Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. Third 
Edition [London: Routledge, 1995], 269.)
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid..
59 Jeffrey J. Anderson and John B, Goodman, "Mars 
and Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War 
Europe," in Robert 0. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye and 
Stanley Hoffmann, eds, After the Cold War:
International Institutions and State Strategies Europe, 
1989-1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 
53.
60 Eichengreen and Frieden, "The Political Economy 
of European Monetary Unification," 267.
61 Margaret Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and 
Europe," The Sunday Times, 28 May 1995, Sec. 3, 3.
62 Ibid.
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mentioned. above, it would require ’’strict budget 
discipline" and the "convergence of the economies."63
Finally, Major also looks at the political 
difficulties of the single currency from a practical 
perspective. This perspective is considerably different 
from that of the Euro-skeptics which, as will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter, looks 
at the constitutional implications of the single 
currency. For current purposes, it may be noted that 
the constitutional consequences of the single currency 
are important to examine because, for the Euro­
skeptics, the EU’s proposed monetary arrangement would 
limit a state’s monetary autonomy.64 While this might 
be the case, the Major Government does not agree with 
the Tory Euro-skeptics that it is in Britain’s 
national interest to decide once and for all to opt- 
out of the single currency altogether.65 The TEU 
Protocol on Certain Provisions relating to Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland states, for example, that 
the UK, upon implementing its opt-out clause to the 
single currency, forfeits any vote in selecting the 
President, Vice-president, and Executive Board of the
63 Leo Murray, "Europe at the Crossroads, ” 
Contemporary Review, March 1995, 115. See also: Karsten 
Prager and Adam Zagorin, "Jacques Delors: A Call for 
Public Support," Time, 28 December 1992, 25.
64 Eichengreen and Frieden, "The Political Economy 
of European Monetary Unification," 267.
65 Panorama Program on the Conservative Party 
Leadership Contest on 3 July 1995.
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ECB/6 The Protocol also states that the United Kingdom 
"shall be excluded from any calculation of a qualified 
majority under Article 109k(5),"66 7 In opting out of a 
single currency the UK government could contribute to 
the further creation of a "two-tier" Europe?8 The 
problem with just being outside a single currency 
framework, as Lord Howe once observed back in 1991, is 
that it would place Britain in "isolation" from the 
other members of the Community:
The real threat is that of leaving ourselves with no 
say in the monetary arrangements that the rest of 
Europe chooses for itself, with Britain once again 
scrambling to join the club later, after the rules have 
been set out and after the power has been distributed 
by others to our disadvantage. That would be the worst 
possible outcome/9
Major agrees with the anti-Europeans of the Tory Party 
that to proceed with a single currency without further 
thinking through its economic and political 
complications would be "folly,"70 At the December 199.5 
Madrid Conference, for example, Major noted that he 
would like to see the EU launch a study that would not 
only analyze "the impact a single currency would have 
on the EU’s single market," but the "’cohesiveness’ of 
the EU in the event of a handful of countries breaking
66 Point 7 of the Protocol on Certain Provisions 
Relating to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland of the TEU.
67 Ibid,
68 John Cole, "Are We In or Out of Europe, " New 
Statesman and. Society, 19 February 1993, 9.
69 Parliamentary Debates, (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 180, Sixth Series, Session 1990-1991, 13 
November 1990, col. 464.
70 Major, "You Can Judge Me on My Record," 18.
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away to launch a single currency/'71 In negotiating with 
the EU over the single currency, however, Major said to 
the House of Commons that the opt-out clause is for
Britain
a choice that is fully there for us to make at the same 
time and in the same fashion as other countries, except 
that we have the additional option of deciding that it 
would, not be right for this country.72
For Major, Britain’s choice for an opt-out to the 
single currency encourages the development of a type of 
Europe "which does not impose undue conformity, but 
encourages flexibility."73 74As mentioned above, what is 
even more important for Major is that by being part of 
the European Union the UK can protect its national 
interest
by exercising its influence and authority, by
persuading, by pushing, by fighting for its interest, 
and sometimes, by digging our toes in and saying no as 
we did over the social chapter and the single
74currency.
The Major Government’s other opt-out clause 
pertains to that of the social chapter. While the 
Government’s Opposition finds it difficult to 
understand Major’s reservations with the social 
chapter,75 the Conservative Party notes that this part
71 Nicholas Wood and Philip Webster, "Major Puts 
Brakes on Europe’s Drive for Single Currency," The 
Times, 13 December 1995, 2.
72 Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col,
866.
73 John Major, "Europe: A Future that Works," 
European Access, No. 5 (October 1994), 6.
74 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 214, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 4 
November 1992, col. 285. (Emphasis added.)
75 If the goal of the Tory leadership is to develop 
a single market, proponents of the social chapter
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of the Treaty is a plethora of social provisions which 
contradict Britain’s industrial mindset?6 Unlike the 
Euro-skeptics, the Major Government is opposed to the 
implementation of the social chapter not because of its 
constitutional implications but, from a practical 
perspective, it would force the UK to adopt European 
guidelines across the board over issues related to 
workers rights and the minimum wage,76 7 Major also 
objects to other components of the social chapter which 
include the establishment of new trade union powers, 
restrictions on employers’ rights in job recruitment, 
and new directives on flexible job opportunities,78
The point here is this. Prime Minister John Major 
is a proponent of the economic maximization of the 
single market because it gives the UK access to the 
European and international business world. For Major, 
however, the social chapter is detrimental to the UK’s
believe that such provisions would guarantee equality 
between workers across Europe (Parliamentary Debates,
11 December 1991, col. 863). If part of the social 
chapter, the UK "has a chance to influence [its] 
political and economic destiny rather than being pushed 
to the periphery"("The Only Show in Town," New 
Statesmen and Society, 21 May 1993, 5). By being 
outside the social chapter, the then leader of the 
Labour party Neil Kinnock argued, the Tory leadership 
deliberately hurts the interests of British workers 
(Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 863).
76 Michael Angus, "Avoid a Chapter of Disasters, ” 
The Times, 22 July 1993, 16.
77 Glenn Frankel, "Major Claims EC Victory for 
Britain," The Washington Post, 12 December 1991, A 52.
78 Ibid, See Articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Agreement 
on Social Policy Concluded Between the Member States of 
the European Community with the Exception of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the 
TEU.
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economic interests/9 In protecting British interests 
from a practical point of view, the Tory leadership 
which is sympathetic to Major’s beliefs argues that the 
UK has been able to attract 4 0 per cent of foreign
investment inside the EU because Britain is outside the 
confines of the social chapter/0 The UK ’’has the 
leading edge in the marketplace in Europe” because of 
low inflation,- low interest rates,- and competitive 
labor costs/1 The Tory Party estimates that the 
production and wage costs for General Motors in the UK 
is $18,9 per hour as compared to $24,9 in Germany/2 
With the advantage of the single market,- fellow 
Conservative MP Edwina Currie argues, Peugot cars are 
made in Coventry, Honda in Swindon, and Ford in 
Halewood/3 By being outside the social chapter, British 
businesses would be able "to keep their own costs down * * * * *
79 Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col. 
864. See also Philip Stephens, "Major Ready to Defy 
Commons on Social Chapter," Financial Times, 23 July 
1993, 1,
80 Malcolm Rif kind, Speech to the University of St, 
Andrews Conservative and Unionist Association, in St. 
Andrews, Scotland (UK), 23 February 1996.
sl Parliamentary Debates, 22 July 1993, col. 628 . 
See also Anatole Kalestsky, "Britain's Coming Boom," in 
Dudley Fishburn, ed., The World in 1993 (London: The 
Economist Publications, 1992), 24-25.
82 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 216, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 14 
January 1993, col. 563.
83 Parliam.entary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 217, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 18 
January 1993, col. 70. See also Barry Hildenbrand, 
"Ready, But No Longer So Willing," Time, 5 October 
1992, 28-29.
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and [attract] foreign investment from Japan and 
elsewhere that might otherwise go to the Continent."84
Major believed he was protecting the UK’s national 
interest by securing an intergovernmental dimension to 
the TEU’s CFSP and HJA. Securing an intergovernmental 
dimension for these two areas of state competency 
illustrates the point that while the UK was interested 
in economic integration, it was weary of political 
integration. While weary of political integration, 
however, Major accepted minimalist political 
concessions by allocating CFSP and HJ$ as the second 
and third pillars of the TEU and, in doing so, the 
other member states agreed to cooperation in these two 
areas "outside the Treaty of Rome.’’85 For Major, this is 
important for the issue of state sovereignty because 
cooperation (along intergovernmental lines] ’’means that 
the Commission will not have sole right of initiative 
and the European Court of Justice will have no 
jurisdiction."86 In respect to HJA, the member states 
agreed to cooperate and coordinate efforts in 
combatting terrorism and drug trafficking.87 As Major 
noted in the House of Commons, the issues of terrorism
84 Frankel, "Major Claims EC Victory for Britain,"
A 52.
85 Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col.
859.
86 Ibid.
87 See Title VI, Article K1 of the Provisions on 
Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs 
in the TEU.
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and drug trafficking merit "a wide range of common 
policies and areas of close cooperation”88 because
International crime knows no frontiers. Terrorists and 
other criminals must not be allowed to escape justice 
or to retire abroad with the proceeds of their crime. 
This text gives us the new basis for cooperation with 
our partners in bringing these criminals to justice.89 90
However, HJA provisions protect Britain’s right to 
maintain its own frontier controls to fight terrorism 
and illegal immigration for it would be "irresponsible 
to weaken our controls, and we are not prepared to do 
so. . . r,9° Article K2 (2) of HJA, moreover, cites that 
this Title
shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon member states with regard to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguard of 
internal security.91
This is an important article because it recognizes the 
importance of state security and the difficulties 
member states have had in controlling their internal 
frontiers from acts of terrorism and violence.92
The origins of CFSP can be traced back to European 
Political Cooperation (EPC). Many of its instruments of 
decision making (for example, unanimity) were 
integrated into the CFSP framework. While EPC decisions
88 Major, "Europe: A Future that Works," 8.
89 Parliamentary Debates, 11 December 1991, col.
860.
90 Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1991, col. 
280. (Emphasis added.)
91 Article K2 (2) of the TEU.
92 Andrew Duff, "The Main Reforms, " in Andrew Duff, 
John Pinder and Roy Price, eds., Maastricht and Beyond: 
Building the European Union (London: Routledge, 1994), 
25.
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were limited to the economic and political realm,-5'3 Hurd 
notes that its intergovernmental approach obtained the 
political consensus of member states with various 
foreign policy objectives/4 The more important point 
behind the CFSP process is that it maintains the 
sovereignty of the member states for, as Major argues, 
it attempts "to strike the right balance between closer 
cooperation and a proper respect for national 
institutions and traditions/’93 94 5 Hurd concurs by noting 
that the principle behind CFSP
isz and will remain, a simple one. Where we can work 
together as Europeansr we do so; where we cannot work 
together, for lack of agreement or where there is no 
need to do so, we are free to go our own way.96 97
Like HJA, CFSP is outside the legal realm of the EU 
framework/7 While the European Commission "does not 
have the sole right of initiative, as it does in most
93 Gabriella Graselli, "Western Europe’s Security 
after Maastricht./’ European Access, No. 5 (October 
1992): 7. For more on the EPC, read Kathleen M.
Spieker, "A Community Perspective on the Integration of 
EC External Relations and European Political 
Cooperation in Pre-Maastricht Community: Case Studies 
Manifested Through Economic Sanctions and Trade Used as 
Political Instruments," Ph.D Dissertation, University 
of St. Andrews, 1994 and Sophie Vanhoonacker, "A 
Critical Issue: From European Political Cooperation to 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy," in Laursen and 
Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference on 
Political Union, 25-37.
94 Douglas Hurd, "Developing a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 3 
(1994): 422.
95 John Major, The Evolution of Europe (London: 
Conservative Political Center, 1991), 12.
96 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 222, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 30 
March 1993, col. 170. (Emphasis added.)
97 Hurd, "Developing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy," 422.
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areas under the treaty, ll98 the crucial point for the
Tory Party leadership is that in protecting state
sovereignty Article J8{2) 
European Council ’’shall
the clearly states that 
act unanimously. A
minimalist concession for the Government seems to lie
in Article J3(2) which states the European Council will
’’define those matters on which decisions are to be 
taken by a qualified majority.’’98 99 100 "Once agreed," Hurd 
writes, "common positions and joint actions will now be 
international legal obligations."101 102
For John Major, CFSP’s intergovernmental approach 
is "consistent" with the UK’s foreign policy 
objectives J02 Under the terms of the Treaty,- for 
example, Britain retains the right to pursue foreign 
policy objectives (such as the Falklands and Hong Kong) 
outside the political domain of CFSP.103 The TEU’s 
Declaration on dependent territories states
The Conference, noting 
circumstances divergences
that in exceptional 
may arise between the 
interests of the Union and those of the overseas 
countries and territories..., agrees that the Council 
will seek to reach solution which accords with the 
position of the Union. However, in the event that this 
proves impossible, the Conference agrees that the 
member states may act separately in the interests of 
the said overseas countries and territories, without 
this affecting the Community's interests. The member 
state concerned will give notice to the Council and the
98 Ibid., 425.
99 Article J8(2) of the TEU.
100 Title V, Article J (3) 2 of the TEU.
101 Hurd, "Developing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy," 425.
102 Wester, "The UK and European Political Union, "
197.
103 Hurd, "Developing the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy," 423. See also Parliamentary Debates, 
30 March 1993, col. 176.
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Commission where such a divergence of interests is 
likely to occur and, when separate action proves 
unavoidable, make it clear that it is acting in the 
interests of an overseas territory mentioned above.104 
The other British dimension to CFSP is the preservation
of the Atlantic Alliance. In the Maastricht 
negotiations,- for example, Major was able to convince
the other member states of the EU to make the West
European Union "the defence component of the European 
Union, while at the same time being the instrument of 
the European pillar of NATO."105 Article B(4) of the 
TEU’s Declaration on Western European Union states the 
following:
Accordingly WEU is prepared to develop further the 
close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to 
strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions 
of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This will be 
undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency 
and complementarity between the emerging European 
security and defence identity and the Alliance. WEU 
will act in conformity with the positions adopted in 
the Atlantic Alliance,106
The Major Government is adamant about the maintenance 
of the Atlantic relationship because "it is about the
104 Declaration on the Representation of the 
Interests of the Overseas Countries and Territories 
Referred to in Article 227 (3) and (5) (a) and (b) of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community of the TEU. 
(Emphasis added.)
105 Graselli, "Western Europe’s Security after 
Maastricht," 7. See also Title V, Article J4 of the TEU 
and Article B(4) of the Declaration of Western European 
Union.
106 Article B(4) of the TEU’s Declaration on 
Western European Union. See also Wester, "The UK and 
European Political Union," 199 and Parliamentary 
Debates, 4 November 1992, col. 293.
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defence of common interests,”107 108which has been (and is) 
"a key element of European identity. "los
In negotiating the Maastricht Treaty, then, John 
Major took a pragmatic approach to Britain’s 
understanding of the TEU by pushing for the completion 
of the single market and in opting out of the social 
chapter in which the latter was deemed to be 
incompatible to Britain’s business culture. In dealing 
with the single currency. Major also takes a practical 
approach. As will be analyzed later in this chapter, 
there are those in the Conservative Party who like the
Government to introduce a referendum to decide the 
issue one way or the other. For the Tory leadership, 
the idea of a referendum is "hypothetical"109 because 
there is still no certainty as to whether a single 
currency is feasible.110 In February 1996 Foreign 
Secretary Malcolm Rifkind asserted that the Government 
is opposed to an early opt-out to the single currency 
for, as mentioned earlier, it wants to determine what 
detrimental effects Britain and others would face if 
outside the monetary framework.111 As well, John Major 
believes that such a move would only serve to impede
107 lain Duncan Smith, "Going with the Grain of 
History," The Times, 31 March 1995, 16.
108 Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security 
and Defence, 5 October 1991, in Laursen and 
Vanhoonacker, The Intergovernmental Conference, 412.
(Emphasis added.)
109 Rifkind, Speech given at the University of St. 
Andrews Conservative and Unionist Association.
110 Nicholas Wood, "We May Never Join EMU —
Major," The Times. 9 June 1995, 1.
111 See also Peter Riddell, "A_t Young Malcolm's 
The Times, 12 February 1996, 18.Feet,"
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Britain’s negotiating power at the next 
Intergovernmental Conference in 1996.112 113 114
Unlike the Tory leadership, the Euro-skeptics of 
the Party do not seem to overtly concerned with Major’s 
practical perspective to Britain’s understanding of the 
TEU. Euro-skeptic Tories like Michael Spicer, Sir Teddy 
Taylor, and Lord Rees-Mogg are more concerned with the 
TEU’s constitutional implications. As a staunch 
defender of parliamentary sovereignty, for example,
Thatcher observes that Britain’s debate over its future
role in Europe is
a very serious debate. There are enormously serious 
issues affecting the future rights of the House and its 
future responsibilities. When we are talking about the 
rights and responsibilities of the House, what we are 
really talking about are the rights of our 
constituents, and they need to be treated very 
seriously indeed,
While Major is concerned over the economic 
ramifications of the establishment of a "frankreich,nin 
for Euro-skeptic Tories the debate is a fundamental one 
because it does not merely about economic maximization 
or number crunching; rather, it is about the protection 
of Britain's historic institutions and traditions.
For the Euro-skeptics, the crucial argument they 
have over the Maastricht Treaty centers around Major's 
ambivalence as to whether or not to implement the opt-
112 Andrew Grice and Michael Prescott, "Major Drops 
Bid to Curb Brussels," The Sunday Times, 21 May 1995, 
24.
113 Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1991, col. 
291. (Emphasis added.)
114 James Landale and Nicholas Wood, "Single 
Currency 'Threatens to Break Up EU, ’’’ The Times, 21 
February 1996, 9.
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out clause to the single currency. To reiterate, the 
monetary dimension of the EMU is a controversial aspect 
of the 1992 program because it "involves agreeing to 
irrevocably fixed exchange rates or the establishment 
of a single currency."113 * 15 For Spicer, the word 
"irrevocable" is objectionable because it
means unalterable, gone beyond recall, in other words, 
for ever. It is impossible, in my view, to exaggerate 
the significance of the inclusion of this notion of 
eternity into the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. 
It is what sets Maastricht apart from everything that 
has gone before. If it were to be ratified it would, 
indeed, quite literally be the point of no return,116 
Fellow Conservative MP Edwina Currie, however, finds 
the word "irrevocable" to be a meaningless one because 
every piece of legislation "that passes through this 
House is irrevocable until it is changed."117 Currie 
also argues that not only has the UK signed treaties 
(such as the North Atlantic Treaty) using similar 
language,118 but, as Heath asserts, the Euro-skeptics1 
bickering over the use of words like "federal" and 
"irrevocable" does not help EuropeTs perception that 
the UK is not a "constructive" player in the European 
Union.119 Currie summarizes her belief in the House of 
Commons that the UK must not be afraid to "join in and
113 Barry Harrison and Nigel Healey, "European
Monetary Union: Off-Course, But Still Afloat,"
Contemporary Review, March 1995, 120.
116 Michael Spicer, A Treaty Too Far: A New Policy 
for Europe, Foreword by The Rt. Hon. Lady Thatcher 
(London: Fourth Estate, Ltd., 1992), 13. (Emphasis 
added.)
117 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 216, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 13 
January 1993, col. 980.
118 Ibid., col, 981,
119 Heath, "I Put the National Interest First," 17.
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he part of alliances, and do our utmost to make thorn, 
work, in our interests d20
In response to Currie, Spicer asserts that his 
overall argument is not whether or not Great Britain 
should form or participate in the creation of alliances 
with other states in the international community/21 
Fellow Euro-skeptic John Redwood, for example, believes 
that the UK’s essential foreign policy objectives for 
the 1990s is to create stronger links with the United 
States and the Far East/22 The more important point 
that Spicer makes, however, is Currie’s complete 
misunderstanding of ’’the whole thrust of this treaty 
and the Treaty of Rome/’120 121 122 23 Once the transfer of a state 
power to coin currency is relinquished, Spicer argues, 
"it has taken the essential step towards giving away 
sovereignty and the control of its economy/’124 125"That,” 
Spicer warns "has profound implications for the 
sovereignty,- rights and history of this Parliament Z25
If the UK were to decide to join a single 
currency, the Euro-skeptics argue, it would have to 
adhere to the decisions of the ECB, which has no 
accountability to the member states’ political
120 Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, col. 
981. (Emphasis added.)
121 Ibid,
122 Nicholas Wood, "Redwood Says EU is Repressing 
Britain’s Potential," The Times, 27 September 1995, 2.
123 Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, col.
124 Ibid., col. 980
125 Ibid., cols. 980-981. (Emphasis added.)
981.
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authorities,126 127Article 7 of the Protocol on ECB 
stipulates, for example, that neither the ECB, nor a 
national central bank, "shall seek or take Instructions 
from Community Institutions or bodies, or from any 
government of a member state or from any other body, "12? 
Article 7 of the TEU also stipulates that the
...Community institutions and bodies and the
governments of the member states undertake to respect 
this principle and not to seek to influence the members 
of the decision making bodies of the ECB or of the 
national central banks in the performance of their 
tasks,128
The establishment of a single currency is seen by Lady 
Thatcher as a "conveyor belt to federalism"129 because, 
for all practical purposes, the implementation of a 
single currency requires the establishment of a single 
tax structure. As Spicer notes in the House of Commons:
There will be misery and political disruption 
throughout the new state unless a single central 
compensatory authority with taxation and expenditure 
powers is established in association with a single 
currency, ft is logical as night follows day that the 
establishment of a single currency should involve the 
establishment of a single taxation authority and single 
economic authority. If that is not the foundation, the 
makings and the essence of a new sovereign state, I do 
not know what is.130
Christopher Gill, who is a Conservative MP for Ludlow, 
said before the Bruges Group in February 1995:
Under a single currency, there would be but one 
Chancellor of the Exchequer; and I hazard a guess that
126 Harrison and Healey, "European Monetary Union, "
123.
127 Chapter III, Article 7 of the Protocol on the 
European Central Bank of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)
128 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
129 Parliamentary Debates, 20 November 1991, col,
294.
130 Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, cols. 
983-984. (Emphasis added.)
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the same Chancellor would not be residing at 11 Downing 
Street! Economic policy would be decided by the Council 
of Ministers, relegating national Parliaments to the 
status of rate-capped National Assemblies J31
The "prospect of central bankers in Frankfurt governing 
our economies," Euro-skeptic colleague Bill Cash 
concludes, "will undermine the basis of democracy in 
Europe, ”131 32
Like Major, the Euro-skeptics object to the social 
chapter. Spicer, however, perceives that the 
establishment of the social chapter is not only 
detrimental to the British business community but that 
it threatens the sanctity of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Like the single currency, the issue of the social 
chapter is of fundamental importance for, as Thatcher 
noted in her Bruges speech
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of 
the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a 
European level with a European superstate exercising a 
new dominance from Brussels,133 134
Spicer explains that the essential problem with the 
social chapter can be traced back to the Single 
European Act of 1986. Spicer notes the SEA placed two 
important articles "which the Commission can [use to] 
sidestep the power of the veto of the member states-."131
131 Christopher Gill, Speaking Out on Europe, with 
an Introduction by Martin Holmes, Bruges Group 
Occasional Paper No. 18, 6.
132 Bill Cash, "The Tide Turning Against Federal 
Europe," Parliamentary Brief, Vo], 2, No. 8 (May/June 
1994); 72. (Emphasis added.)
133 Margaret Thatcher, "Britain’s Policies Towards 
Europe, Trade and Defence," Speech Given at the College 
of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, 20 September 1988,
British Information Services, No. 50/88. (Emphasis 
added.)
134 Spicer, A Treaty Too Far, 46,
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These articles, 100A and 118A, deal with single market 
measures and health and safety work respectively.135 For 
Spicer, the Commission can impose upon Britain the 
constraints of the social chapter through defining 
these measures as "health and safety.’’136 According to 
Spicer, because the Commission can require Britain 
(under Article 118A of the SEA) to comply to these 
directives, such compliance impedes "consent of the 
British Government"137 As Article 100A makes clear 
these provisions will be decided by qualified majority 
voting.138 Like the SEA, the Euro-skeptics also object 
to the social chapter because it too "endorses 
collective bargaining."139 Article 3 of the social 
chapter not only requires the EU to consult unions and 
employees about the content of Community directives, 
but, according to Article 4 (1), "Should management
and labor so desire, the dialogue between them at 
Community level may lead to contractual relations, 
including agreements."140
135 "The Single European Act, " Bulletin oT the 
European Communitiesf Supplement 2/86 (Luxembourg; 
Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities), 12-13.
136 Spicer, A Treaty Too Far, 46.
137 Ibid.
138 "Single European Act," 12.
139 David Goodhart, "Technical Document Raises Ire 
and Passion," Financial Times, 23 July 1993, 7.
140 See Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement on Social 
Policy Concluded between the Member States of the 
European Community with the Exception of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the 
TEU. Compare with Article 118 B in "Single European 
Act," 13.
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With the next Intergovernmental Conference coming 
up in 1996, Euro-skeptic Tories are concerned that 
certain EU member states wish to extend EU’s authority 
into areas like CFSP and other social issues?41 In 
respect to CFSP, the Euro-skeptics have no objections 
to cooperating with other states in the international 
community?42 However, Spicer examines Article Jl(4) in 
which
The member states shall support the Union’s external 
and security policy actively and unreservedly in a 
spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall 
refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its 
effectiveness as a cohesive force in international 
relations. The Council shall ensure that these are 
principles are complied with?43
This last sentence, Spicer comments, "may appear to 
safeguard the member states’ authority, at least in the 
field of applying the foreign policy of the Union, ”* 142 143 144 
but, as Spicer continues his line of argument, it "does 
not equate with a national right of veto,"145 *In the 
Declaration on Voting in the Field of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, the member states of the 
TEU agree
that, with regard to Council decisions requiring 
unanimity, member states will, to the extent possible, 
avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified 
majority exists in favor of that decision?46
145 Noel Malcolm, "The Case Against ’Europe’," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 2 (March/April 1995): 66­
68. See also Parliamentary Debates, 30 March 1993, col. 
172.
142 Parliamentary Debates, 30 March 1993, col. 170.
143 Article Jl(4) of the TEU Spicer quotes ,
144 Spicer, A Treaty Too Far, 125.
145 Ibid,
146 Declaration on Voting in the Field of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the TEU,
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The Declaration,- Spicer writes,, is detrimental to 
parliamentary sovereignty because it "amounts to an 
agreement by member states not to employ their veto and 
effectively represents a reversal of the Luxembourg 
Compromise."147 Under Title V, Lord Rees-Mogg argues 
"foreign policy becomes the responsibility of the 
European Union."148 While principles will be adapted by 
unanimity and its implementation be adapted by 
qualified majority vote, these "policies are binding 
and can only be changed through the same procedures in 
the European Union."149 150 151
The next question, however, is this. If Tories 
like Cash and Thatcher are adamantly opposed to the 
creation of a federal Europe, why did they support the 
ratification of the SEA in 1986? As Ian Taylor pointed 
out, for example, it was in the SEA that one can find 
reference to the single currency and to the 
establishment of a social policy?50 Ian Taylor also 
made the point that when the UK joined the EC in the 
1970s, it was joining an institution that had all the 
makings of more than just a free trade area?51 In the 
House of Commons, Ian Taylor argued:
For heaven's sake, we left a free trade area to join 
the Community.... We knew what the institutional 
structure was when we joined. We knew that the 
Community's ambitions covered a range of issues and
147 Spicer, A Treaty Too Far, 12b.
148 William Rees-Mogg, "Democracy at Stake, " The 
Times, 22 July 1993, 16.
149 Ibid.
150 Parliamentary Debates, 14 January 1993, col.
1115.
151 Ibid., col. 1116.
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could not ho achieved by free trade alone. The 
institutional structure has been apparent since we 
joined, and we knew what we were in for. Indeed the 
words "European Community" have been used in all except 
legal documents in the Community since 1978. We had 
nearly ten years warning of what we were doing when we 
signed the Single European Actd52
According to Ridley, Thatcher underestimated the 
constitutional ramifications of the SEA?53 Thatcher 
notes that, like Major, she took a practical position 
to the SEA hy concentrating her efforts in bringing 
about the single market, thus hoping to revive the 
Community's "liberal, free trade, deregulatory 
purpose?'152 * 54 While the signing of the SEA marked "the 
first time British law could be changed by a majority 
of other countries, "155 Thatcher agreed to qualified 
majority voting because it was perceived at the time to 
be the optimal approach in bringing about the single 
market’s successful completion.156 After departing No. 
10 Downing Street, however, Thatcher writes that one of 
the few things that she regrets was her failure to come 
"to grips with the rapidly changing scene in Europe."157 
In leaving office, Thatcher observes, "the groundwork 
was being laid for what would be the Maastricht Treaty, 
designed to set in place the framework for a federal
152 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
sj Ridley, My Style of Government, 143.
154 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 547.
155 The transcript of the Radio 4 program can be 
found in "Thatcher Urges a Return to True 
Conservatism," The Times, 13 June 1995, 8. Thatcher 
corrects James Naughtie (the presenter of the program) 
by noting that qualified majority voting was already in 
the Treaty of Rome (ibid.).
156 Ibid.
157 Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and 
Europe," Sec. 3, 3.
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United States of Europe,"158 The ERM was "being used for 
a purpose of which I not only disapproved but which I 
had made clear within government I would never 
implement,"159 Her only hope in leaving office was "in 
those [in the Party] who still carried on the battle of 
ideas,”160 Like Thatcher f Cash also underestimated the 
consequences of the SEA. Cash believed that the SEA was 
primarily about commercial and trading policies and "a 
sensible way in which to reduce barriers to trade and 
to increase free trade throughout Europe."161 Cash's 
objection to the TEU, however, is that it is based upon 
the fundamental belief that it "is primarily about 
government,-"162 "the primary political impetus of which 
is to be at the European level, and the political 
parties at that level are intended to replace the 
national Parliaments,163
The essential point for Euro-skeptics like Norman 
Lamont is that the EC Britain joined in the 1970s is 
very much different from the Europe today. In that 
previous era, the emphasis in EC affairs was in 
economics; "the need for access to a larger market and 
the need to achieve economies of scale,"164 Today’s 
Europe emphasizes the political aspect of integration.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
161 Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, col.
939
162 Ibid, (Emphasis added,)
163 Ibid,, col, 940.
164 Norman Lamont, "Europe and No Further, " The 
Independentf 12 October 1994, 19.
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Iii arranging the special arrangements for Britain in 
the TEU, Lamont realized that there was "not a shred of 
evidence at Maastricht or since then that anyone 
accepts our view of Europe.”105 He continues noting that 
the "plain fact is that the 11 other members want a 
European Union that is a European state, whether they 
express in these precise terms or not.1,166
In late January 1993, there were those among the 
Euro-skeptics of the Party who attempted to take 
certain legislative measures which would not only 
impede the ratification process of the TEU, but, 
moreover, would demonstrate their sacrosanct commitment 
to parliamentary sovereignty. In this specific episode, 
a group of Euro-skeptic Tories came out to support a 
tabled Labor Party amendment which would have forced 
the Tory leadership to include the social chapter in 
the Maastricht Bill.165 166 67 They supported the amendment not 
because they defended the need for social chapter per 
se, but that "it would not [then] be possible for the 
United Kingdom to ratify the treaty."168 "Anything we 
can do to make it more difficult to go ahead with 
Maastricht," Sir Teddy Taylor said, "is well 
worth whi le."169
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid.
167 Nicholas Wood, "Tory Rebels Back Social 
Chapter," The Times, 21 January 1993, 8.
168 Ibid.
169 As reported in Philip Webster, "Tebitt Backs 
Labor to Spur Maastricht Revolt," The Times, 10 
February 1993, 1. (Emphasis added.)
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In defending the inclusion of the social protocol 
— and, more importantly, its work on the single market 
—the Tory leadership challenged the Labour Party’s 
amendment/70 Their argument was that the social 
protocol was not subject to parliamentary approval 
because Parliament’s only obligation is to "incorporate 
into domestic law those portions of the treaty that 
give rise to obligations on the United Kingdom. . 170 71
The social protocol, which "expressly states that it 
does not affect domestic law,"172 falls "into the 
category of foreign undertakings that remain[s] the 
preserve of the executive under the Crown 
prerogative. ”173 174
Euro-skeptic Tories like Bill Cash strongly 
objected to the Government’s line of legal reasoning 
because by invoking royal prerogative on the social 
chapter, it "betrays" the need for parliament,1'14 The 
debate over Labour's amendment on the social protocol 
became for Cash a matter of principle. The debate over 
the tabled Labour amendment was, in other words, part 
of a much greater discussion over the "flux" of the 
role of ideas in the British political agenda. By
170 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 219, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 22 
February 1993, col. 725.
171 Ibid., col. 740.
172 Ibid.
173 Baker, Gamble, Ludlam, "The Parliamentary Siege 
of Maastricht," 49. See also Jill Sherman and Jonathan 
Prynn, "Major Faces Maastricht ’Constitutional 
Crisis’," The Times, 15 February 1993, 1.
174 Sherman and Prynn, "Major Faces Maastricht 
’Constitutional Crisis,'" 1. (Emphasis added.)
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ratifying the TEU, Cash argues, the United Kingdom is 
legally obliged to take on certain rights, duties,
obligations , and powers.175 Thes e responsibilities can
only have "an impact on the people by virtue of
enactment in the House of Commons,"176 As Cash
eloquently notes:
...[I]f we do not get exercised about the way in which
we are governed, about our Parliament, about whether we 
are to be to be taxed without consent, if we do not 
bother ourselves about whether the executive can 
railroad provisions irrespective, and possibly in 
defiance of Parliament, we shall deserve the fate which 
will befall us?77
For Lord Hailsham, the ministers’ treaty-making powers 
of prerogative must be "subject always to their total 
accountability to Parliament in its political or in its 
legislative capacity,”175 176 177 78 The basis for Rees-Mogg's 
legal challenge to the Government's Maastricht Bill, 
however, was that Major failed to seek parliamentary 
approval of the social protocol,179 180While the High Court 
ruled in July 1993 that the social protocol is 
"supplementary to the provisions of the treaty, "18° 
Rees-Mogg's legal challenge fuelled the anti-European 
Tories' determination "to defend the basic institutions
175 Parliamentary Debates, 22 February 1.993, col.
725.
176 Ibid« (Emphasis added,)
177 Ibid.
l7S Lord Hailsham, "Ratify the Rule of Parliament, " 
The Times. 21 July 1993, 14.
179 Philip Webster and Frances Gibb, "Rees-Mogg 
Wins Right to Fight Treaty," The Times, 20 July 1993,
1. ‘
180 Nicholas Watt, "Judges Thwart Rees-Mogg Assault 
on Maastricht," The Times, 31 July 1993, 6.
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of the British constitution and particularly Parliament 
and the courts d'lsl
The Euro-skeptic Tories have also attempted to 
offer various policy alternatives to the UK’s position 
on the EU. For example, a delegation of Euro-skeptics 
(led by Sir Richard Body) put together a manifesto 
articulating their disagreement with the Government's 
European policy.181 82 At a news conference, they insisted 
that their manifesto should not be construed as the 
launch of a new political party.183 Rather, they issued 
the manifesto as a warning to other Tories that they 
"would lose the next General Election unless they 
changed tack on Europe."184
John Wilkinson, one of the signers of the 
manifesto, believes that the Government needs "to 
recover powers and competences to the United Kingdom 
from the European Union."185 According to the manifesto, 
Body’s group would like to see Britain withdraw, for 
example, from the Common Fisheries Policy and the 
single currency. The "right of the European Court to 
intervene in national policies," the group insist,
181 Rees-Mogg, "Democracy at Stake," 16. See also 
"No Breach in Ratifying Treaty," The Times, 31 July 
1993, 6.
182 Jill Sherman, "Tory Rebels in Disarray After 
Manifesto Launch," The Times, 20 January 1995, 9. The 
Tory MPs who signed the manifesto were the following: 
Sir Richard Body, Mr. N. Budgen, Mr. C.J.F. Gill, Mrs. 
T.E. Gorman, Mr. A. Marlow, Mr. Richard Shepherd, Sir 
Teddy Taylor, and Mr. John Wilkinson.
183 Ibid.
184 Ibid.
185 John Wilkinson, in correspondence with the 
author, 16 May 1995.
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"should be revoked and in particular the right to make 
decisions with retrospective effect should be 
removed/''’186 The TEU should be subject of a referendum 
because its content (particularly the single currency) 
attempt to construct a new political organization.187 
Agreeing to the principles articulated in Body’s 
manifesto, John Redwood eloquently writes
This choice cannot be fudged, finessed, or brought down 
to issues of immediate political or economic advantage. 
It is not something to be decided later, on the spur of 
the moment, in response to the pressures of the day. It 
is not something that a handful of MPs on either side 
of the argument should be able to win by a timely shove 
during a moment of government weakness. It is a 
defining issue. What sort of people are we? Where do we 
belong? Do we value our independent institutions or 
don r t we ?188
Body’s manifesto states, thus, that in considering 
Britain’s membership to the European Union ”[c]onsent 
is fundamental to such a profound change and 
acquiescence is insufficient to sustain the progressive 
transfer of the right to make our own laws to 
undemocratic and unaccountable foreign institutions . ”189
Like Body’s group of Euro-skeptics, Margaret
Thatcher has called for the Tory government to
repatriate certain EU powers back to the member states.
Thatcher would like to see Britain reject the
Maastricht Treaty, declare independence of the pound,
186 Richard Body, et al., "Policy Paper," issued on 
19 January 1995.
187 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 204, Sixth Series, Session 1991-1992, 21 
February 1992, col. 581.
188 John Redwood, "One Vote is not Enough, " The 
Times, 3 April 1996, 16.
189 Body et. al., Policy Paper. (Emphasis added.)
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and break away from all moves towards the establishment 
of a political union/90 Thatcher would also like "to 
reverse" the growing protectionism of the Community by 
creating some form of an Atlantic Free Trade Area, 
incorporating North America and "the emerging market 
economies of central and eastern Europe as well as the 
EU itself/'190 91 "The real danger" Lamont writes, "is not 
that we sell too little to Europe, but that we will 
concentrate on Europe to the exclusion of the great 
opportunities for increased trade in markets such as 
Asia that are growing much faster/’192 193The more 
fundamental point for Thatcherr however, is this:
A point has been reached — indeed it was reached even 
before Maastricht — at which the objectives and 
perceived interests of the different members of the 
Community radically differ. A clear understanding that 
this is so and that our strategy for 1996 must be 
planned accordingly is the essential foundation for
inisuccess
THE PRINCIPLE OF DEVOLUTION AND THE TORY PARTY
As with the issue of the European Union, the 
Conservative Party's objection to the devolution 
process also falls into two general levels of argument. 
The first general level of argument is a practical one 
pertaining to the Conservative Party's 
economic/politica1 objections to devolution. These type 
of objections, as Fukuyama would assert, can be
190 Alice Thomson, "Thatcher Urges Britain to Veto 
Political Union," The Times, 22 May 1995, 8.
191 Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and 
Europe," Sec. 3, 3.
192 Lamont, "Europe and No Further," 19.
193 Thatcher, "Where I Stand on Britain and 
Europe," Sec. 3, 3.
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perceived to be merely "subsidiary" ones?94 From an 
economic point of view, the Tory leadership objects to 
the Labour Party’s understanding of the devolution194 95 
process because the Government claims that Scotland has 
done very well under the Union. Prime Minister John 
Major asserts that the United Kingdom has "enabled 
Scotland to develop an economy well-placed to meet the 
challenges of the next century."196 For example, the 
Scottish economy has entered into the area of the 
computer industry and the European Community "has given 
our companies the biggest home market in the world."197
In respect to the compute:r industry, Scotland is known
as the "Silicon Valley" of Europe,198 Scotland, for
example. produces 11 per cent of Europe’s
semiconductors and over 35 per cent of Europe’s
personal computers.199 200As well, Scotland has produced
over 50 per cent of Europe’s automated banking
machines ,200
194 Interview with Fukuyama. See also Chapter II of 
this dissertation.
195 For more on the Labour Party’s plans for a 
devolved Assembly in Edinburgh and its response from 
the Scottish National Party, see Chapter V of this 
dissertation.
196 "Scotland: Strength Through Diversity in the 
United Kingdom," Politics Today, No. 1 (31 Januarv 
1994): 7.
197 John Major, Speech to the Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow,
Scotland (UK), 12 May 1995, SCUA News Release.
198 "The United Kingdom: Maintaining the Union of 
its People," Politics Today, No. 4 (28 March 1995), 96.
199 Ibid,
200 Ibid,
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In being part of the United Kingdom, the former 
Scottish Secretary Ian Lang also argues that Scotland 
has benefited from European Union funds .201 The latest 
export figures show that more than 60 per cent (about 
£5.6 billion) of Scottish exports go to states within 
the European Union.202 More importantly Scotland will 
receive (over the next six years) from the European 
Union’s Structural Funds £240 million to improve its 
less developed areas such as the Highlands and the 
Islands. 203 The Tory leadership’s goal is to continue to 
develop Scotland’s business ties with Europe. Scotland 
Europa, for example, "provides a representative center 
for Scottish interests, giving them a direct voice in 
Brussels, and its opening marked a radical new 
departure for Scotland in Europe.”204 In order to 
facilitate Scotland's strength as a "great trading 
nation," the Scottish Secretary established the 
Scottish Trade international in 1991. Made up of a 
staff from the Scottish Office, "the central priority 
of this agency must be to help Scottish exporters 
capitalize on the challenges of the Single Market."205
The Tory Party claims that the Labour Party’s 
plans towards the establishment of a Scottish Assembly
201 Lang, The Fulfilled Society, 13.
202 Scotland: A Region of the European Union 
(London: Produced by the European Commission of the 
United Kingdom, 1994), 3.
203 Ibid.
201 Lang, The Fulfilled Society, 15. See also 
Parliamentary Debates, 7 February 1992, col. 612.
205 Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good 
(Edinburgh: HMSO, March 1993, Cm. 2225), 22.
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would, be to Scotland’s economic disadvantage- The 
establishment of a Scottish Assembly with tax-raising 
powers would be, Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth 
argues, dangerous to Scottish workers because such an 
Assembly could ’’produce a regressive taxation” in which 
Scottish workers would pay 15 per cent more tax ’’than 
their counterparts elsewhere in the United Kingdom- "20G 
An extra tax would also be "potentially lethal” to 
business confidence, inward investment, and 
employment,206 07 in which, economist David Bell argues, 
the Scottish Parliament could "add to business costs by 
adopting more stringent health and safety 
regulation-"208 As Lang practically summarizes, the 
Labour Party’s understanding of devolution would drive 
foreign investors out of Scotland and, as a result, 
Scotland would "lose jobs and businesses to [its] 
neighbors and competitors-"209
The Tories’ practical objections to the Labour 
Party’s advancement of a Scottish Assembly also falls 
into a political perspective, arguing that Shadow 
Scottish Secretary George Robertson’s plans would add 
another layer of administration that could eventually
206 Michael Forsyth, "Scotland’s Man in the 
Cabinet," Scottish Leader, Autumn 1995, 3. See also 
"Tartan Tax," The Scottish Leader, Autumn 1995, 1­
207 Michael Forsyth, "Now Can We See the Bill, 
Please?" Scotland on Sunday, 6 August 1995, 8.
208 David Bell, "Follow the Money, " Sunday Times- 
Scotland, 27 August 1995, 3. See also Major’s argument 
against the social chapter in Chapter VI of this 
dissertation.
209 "Lang Reveals 8 Billion Pounds Funding Gap in 
Separate Scotland," SCUA News Release, 3 May 1995-
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produce a "spillover" effect into other functional 
competencies,210 Another important concern for the Tory 
leadership is the effect that devolution would have on 
parliamentary sovereignty. The Labour Party’s proposal 
on devolution, for the Tory Party, does not effectively 
deal with the West Lothian Question.211 Under the terms 
set out in the Scottish Constitutional Convention,212 as 
Ian Stewart argues, Scotland would continue to send to 
Westminster 72 MPs to Scotland in which they would be 
able to vote on English domestic legislation, but their 
English counterparts would have no ability to legislate 
on Scottish affairs.213 ’’This creates,” Stewart writes, 
’’the bizarre situation that Gordon Brown will be able
to vote on education policy for Durham but not for his 
own home constituency of Dunfermline."214
The Scottish Constitutional Convention argues that 
the West Lothian Question can be solved by instituting 
Home Rule all round215 in which such a scheme would 
"recreate Britain or the United Kingdom as a federal 
state."216 Bill Walker finds a federal solution to the
210 lan Lang, "Labour Party’s Proposals on Scottish 
Devolution," The Times, 5 January 1995, 19..
211 Interview with Stewart.
212 For example, read Scotland’s Parliament.
Scotland's Right (Edinburgh: Scottish Constitutional 
Convention, 1995), 25 and "How it Will Work," Evening 
Times (Glasgow), 28 November 1995, 31. .
213 Stewart, Scotland's Future: The Scottish 
Constitutional Issue (1995).
214 Ibid.
215 Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right, 7.
216 Lynch, "Labour Answers to the West Lothian 
Question," 19.
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West Lothian Question to be a sound one217 because 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and the different 
regions of England would each have their own 
assemblies to "decide domestic policy, with a UK 
Parliament continuing to legislate on national 
matters.’’218 A federal style government would, thus, 
remove a source of "conflict" between the two houses
"as each would be wholly sovereign in its own area of 
jurisdiction.”219 220 221"However," Lynch writes, "while 
federalism contains all the answers to the West Lothian 
Question, it has very little party or public 
support.1,220
While the Conservative Party "stands unequivocally 
for the Union, 5,221 the Conservative Party after the 1992 
General Election promised, for reasons described below, 
that the Government would "look again at how the Union 
works."222 In "Taking Stock," the Conservatives made it 
its electoral priority to introduce "procedural and 
administrative improvements to the existing system of 
Government for Scotland, ”223 In maintaining the health 
of the Union, Lang writes, the Tory Party must
217 Interview with Walker.
218 Ian Stewart, Scotland's Future: The Scottish 
Constitutional Issue (Edinburgh: Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Central Office, 1996).
219 Ibid.
220 Lynch, "Labour Answers to the West Lothian 
Question," 19 and interview with Walker.
221 Stewart, Scotland's Future: The Scottish 
Constitutional Issue (1996).
222 Lang, The Fulfilled Society, 7.
223 Stewart, Scotland's Future: The Scottish 
Constitutional Issue (1996). (Emphasis added.)
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be pro-active in our search for new ways to build on 
the strengths of the Union and to make it relevant to a 
new generation of Scots. It is our task now to breathe 
new life into the Union.224
In attempting to be a ’’pro-active" Party, Lang’s 
Scottish Office issued its White Paper on Scottish 
government reform entitled Scotland In the Union: A 
Partnership for Good in March of 1993. The White Paper 
was the result of not only a 11 month examination of 
Scottish "constitutional issues" but "an attempt to
counter Labour and nationalist claims that the
Conservative Party had no mandate to govern north of 
the border, where it has only a quarter of the popular 
vote."225 In writing the White Paper, Ian Lang wished to 
assert Scotland’s full and active membership in the 
United Kingdom.226 In the Foreword to Scotland in the 
Union John Major writes that
too often in recent years there has seemed to be in 
Scotland a genuine, if sometimes unformed, anxiety that 
the Union is in some way less relevant to Scotland and 
her aspirations. It is the Government's duty to address 
that anxiety and that is what this White Paper does.227 
For the Major Government, the White Paper is an attempt 
to "encourage a distinctively Scottish approach to 
policy-making where that is in the interests of 
Scotland and renewed emphasis on identifying Scottish 
solutions for Scottish problems."228 The White Paper
224 Lang, The Fulfilled Society, 1.
225 Jonathan Prynn, "Lang Defends the Union in 
Reforms for Scotland," The Times, 10 March 1993, 10.
226 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard.) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 225, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 5 
May 1993, col. 170.
227 Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good,
999
6.
Ibid., 19.
216
asserts the need for change in policy-making at, for 
example, the European and Westminster levels.
At the Westminster level, the White Paper "aims at 
increasing the scrutiny powers of Scottish MPs and 
boosting the role and visibility of the Scottish 
Office...”229 For example, the Scottish Grand Committee 
would be allocated greater responsibilities and given 
more debating time at the Second Reading of Scottish 
bills. 230 231The type of Bills to go to the Scottish Grand 
Committee would gradually include Government Bills, Law
Reform Bills and a Private Members Bills. While a
formal vote on the Second Reading goes back to the 
House of Commons, this approach would enable the
Scottish Grand Committee to take "more account ... of
Scottish opinion during their consideration in
principle, thus allowing a fuller Scottish legislative 
program.1,231
At the European level, the UR government 
represents Scottish interests through the Office of the 
UK Permanent Representative (UKREP) in which the 
Scottish Office "contribute at relevant meetings of the 
Council of Ministers and of the Working Groups which 
prepare Council business across the policy spectrum."232 
While Lang recognizes the importance of Scottish 
representation in UKREP, however, he writes that "we
25.
229 Prynn, "Lang Defends the Union," 10.
230 Ibid.
231 Scotland in the Union: A Partnership for Good,
232 ibid., 21.
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cannot allow being part of Britain in Europe, with all 
the advantages it brings, to restrict at the same time 
the evolution of our own Scottish profile within the 
Community,"233 An important strength of the Union, 
writes Lang, is that "its diversity within unity allows 
there to take place a confident pursuit by each of its 
constituent parts of their own interests and 
identity,"234 For Lang, a "robust assertion" of Scottish 
interests in the EU "is not incompatible with Unionism, 
but the confident manifestation of it,"235 The Scottish
Office asserts that Scotland take a more direct role
in its own affairs through, for example, the 
Committee of the Regions,236 The Committee of Regions, 
which is made up of representatives from regional and 
local bodies,
shall be consulted by the Council or by the Commission 
where this Treaty so provides and in all other cases in 
which one of these two institutions consider 
app r op r i a t e,237
The purpose of the Committee of Regions, then President 
of the European Commission Jacques Delors observes, is 
to "communicate local concerns and grassroots 
reactions, giving real substance to the debates which 
can often be rather abstract,"238
233 Lang, The Fulfilled Society, 14.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
236 The Committee of Regions was set up as Chapter 
4 under Title II of the TEU.
237 Title II, Chapter 4, Article 198c of the TEU,
238 Jacques Delors, "The Committee of the Regions, 
European Access, No. 3 (June 1994): 7.
mThe Conservative Party’s argument against 
devolution, along an economio/poltical line of 
thinkingr does not bring into full question the End of 
History paradigm for, as mentioned already in this 
chapter,- Fukuyama could easily dismiss these issues as 
merely subsidiary. The next question/ then, is to 
determine whether or not if the Conservative Party’s 
allegiance to the Union is motivated by factors other 
than the mere pursuit of economic maximization and the 
institutional restructuring of Scottish affairs in 
Westminster politics.
In ascertaining why Conservatives are staunch 
Unionists/ one should note three important factors. 
First of all/ it is hard to understand why the 
Conservatives ’’stand unequivocally for the Union" at 
all when they enjoy minority political status in 
Scottish politics. The last time the Conservatives were 
able to win a majority of Scottish seats was in the 
General Election of 1955. The results of the General
Election of 1955 can be seen in Table 1 below.239
239 A variety of sources were used to compile Table 
1. They include: David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The 
British General Election of 1979 (London: MacMillan 
Press, 1980), 391 and 402; F.W.S. Craig/ ed., British 
Electoral Facts, 1885-1975 (London: The MacMillan 
Press, 1976), 20-31; F.W.S. Craig, ed., Britain Votes 
4: British Parliamentary Elections , 1983-1987 (Hants: 
Parliamentary Research Services, 1989), 184; "Two 
Nations — North and South," The Economist, 12 May 
1979, 22; and lan H. Wood and Roger Wood, eds.. The 
Times Guide to the House of Commons, April 1992, 
(London: Times Books, 1992), 251.
Table 1
Percentage of Votes and Number of Seats Won by the
Conservative Party in the General Election in Scotland
1945-1992
Year % of Votes No. of Seats'Total
Seats
1945 37.4 24 71
1950 44.8 31 71
1951 48.6 35 71
1955 50.1 36 71
1959 47.2 31 71
1964 40.6 24 71
1966 37.7 20 71
1970 38.0 23 71
1974 (Feb.) 32.9 21 71
1974 (Oct.) 24.7 16 71
1979 28.4 21 71
1983 31.4 22 71
1987 24.0 10 71
1992 25.7 11 72
According to Table 1, the Conservative Party (in
alliance with the National Liberal Party) won the 1955 
General Election by 50.1 per cent of the total votes. 
The Conservatives won more than 50 per cent of the 
seats (36 out of a total of 71 Scottish seats in that 
election year than in any other time since then. Since 
1955, as Table 1 demonstrates, the Conservatives have 
been unable to repeat the same performance in other 
general elections. In the October 1974 General 
Election, for example, the Conservative Party only won 
16 out of 71 Scottish seats. In the 1992 General 
Election, the Conservatives only won 11 out of 72 
Scottish seats.240 The Tory Party’s electoral 
difficulties in Scottish politics was further 
demonstrated in its poor showing in the April Scottish
240 Wood and wood, The Times Guide to the House ot 
Commons, April 1992. 251. For a commentary on this 
point, read Peter Riddell, "Minor Changes Mask Upheaval 
in Scotland," in Wood and Wood, The Times Guide to the 
House of Commons, April 1992, 291.
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Council elections of 1995.241 242In May 1995 the Tories 
lost the Perth and Kinross by-election. The 
significance of this by-election was that the Scottish 
Tories controlled this seat for the past fifty-three
242years,
It is also difficult to understand why
Conservatives are for the Union when there is the
constant claim among the Conservatives that the English 
taxpayers subsidize Scotland’s economy.243 According to 
the Scottish Office, for example, Scotland makes up
8.8 per cent of the UK population and contributes only
8.9 per cent of total UK revenue; yet, Scotland 
receives 10.3 per cent of UK public spending. 244 This 
means, the Scottish Office argues, that Scotland 
receives "some 17 per cent more public expenditure than 
the United Kingdom average and 21 per cent more per
245 David Scott and Gary Duncan, "Triumphant Labor 
Halts SNP Advance, The Scotsman, 7 April 1995, 1.
242 "Perth and Kinross: Historic Background," The 
Courier and Advertiser, 22 May 1995, 10. In that by­
election, the SNP candidate Roseanna Cunningham was 
able to take the Perth and Kinross seat by a 
comfortable margin of 7,311 votes (Peter MacMahon, "SNP 
Sweeps to Victory in Perth," The Scotsman, 26 May 1995, 
1) .
243 For the SNP’ response to this assertion, read 
Chapter V of this dissertation.
244 See Appendix B of this dissertation-. Scottish 
Office, Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland, 
1993-1994 (Edinburgh: Scottish Office, 1995), i, 8 and 
24 A similar report mentions this interesting point: 
"With only 5 per cent of the total UK population, Wales 
secured over 20 per cent of its inward investment in 
1991-1992 -- more than any other part of the country" 
("The United Kingdom: Maintaining the Union of its 
People," 102).
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head than in England."245 The identifiable general 
government expenditure — that is, those state 
functions which make up the Scottish Office’s budget — 
for Scotland in the area of health servicef for 
example, is 25 per cent higher and in education mere 
than 30 per cent than in England.246 Despite North Sea 
oil revenue, Lang argued before the Scottish Grand 
Committee in May 1995, there is a Scottish deficit of 
around £7 billion.247
A third reason pertains to the fact that the 
Labour Party is the dominant Party in Scotland and 
Wales. This is an interesting point because it was 
Labour wins in those parts of the United Kingdom which 
deprived the Tory Party the opportunity to form a 
Government in the General Elections of 1950, 1964, and 
1974. The results of the General Elections of 1950, 
1964, and 1974 can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 below.248
245 Scottish Grand Committee, "The Financial and 
Economic Implications of Independence for Scotland," 17 
May 1995, col. 4.
246 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
247 Ibid., col. 5.
218 Data was compiled from Craig, British Electoral 
Facts, 1885-1975, 20-31.
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Table 2
Number of Conservative Seats Won in the General 
Elections
of
England
1950,
N.Ire.
1964
Scot:
and
Land
1974
Wales UK Total
1950 253 10 31 4 298 625
1964 2 62 12 24 6 304 630
1974 268 - 21 8 297 635
1974 253 - 16 8 277 635
Table 3
Number of Labour Seats Won in the General Elections
of 1950, 1964, and 1974
England N.Ire. Scotland Wales UK Total
1950 251 - 37 27 315 630
1964 246 10 43 28 317 630
1974 237 - 40 24 301 635
1974 255 - 41 23 319 635
According to both tables,, the Conservative Party had a
narrow win of seats over Labour in English
constituencies of the general elections cited above;
however, Labor, as both tables demonstrate, was able 
to form a Government in these electoral years because 
of a win of seats over the Tory Party in both Scottish 
and Welsh constituencies. Without these seats, it seems 
then that the Labor Party would not have been able to
form a Government.
The evidence suggests, then, that Scotland is a 
financial and electoral liability for the Conservative 
Party.2"19 If Scotland is indeed a liability for the 249
249 For more of a historical analysis on the 
decline of the Conservatives in Scotland read David 
Seawright and John Curtice, "The Decline of the 
Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party 1950-92: 
Religion, Ideology or Economics," Contemporary Record; 
The Journal of Contemporary British History, Vol. 9,
No. 2 (Autumn 1995): 319-342. In this article, however,
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Tories, why not relinquish Scotland and deprive Labour 
the opportunity (as seen in 1950, 1964, and 1974) to 
form a Government in Westminster altogether?250 If 
Scotland is such an economic basket case, then why is 
former Scottish Secretary Ian Lang so adamantly opposed 
to Labour's plans for a devolved Assembly in 
Scotland?251 In examining the Tory Party’s support for 
the Union, what reasons can there be for the 
Conservative Government to "regard the constitution of 
the United Kingdom as something to be cherished and 
guarded, while [Labor] regard it as a political 
plaything to be used to their advantage [?] ”252
Seawright and Curtice places doubt on the beliefs that 
the Conservative Party is losing electoral approval 
because of "its opposition to devolution and [that the 
Party has] become too right wing for a normally 
progressive Scots electorate" (ibid., 319). Instead, 
the authors of this article that the Conservatives have 
failed to "appeal to certain symbols of Scots culture 
[like, for example, social democracy] and suffered from 
a leftward drift amongst the Scots electorate. But 
equally crucial has been the economic experience of 
Scots over the last forty years" (ibid.). It seems that 
the article refelects Fukuyama’s line of thought in 
which "specific forms [of] capitalism and democracy ... 
can be quite varied depending upon the residue of 
cultural and historical pre-modern residue that arise 
and I don’t think you will ever get rid of those 
entirely. ... There is certainly going to be many 
struggles over the economic and the share of the pie 
and that sort of thing. There will be fights between 
liberals and more social democratic types” (interview 
with Fukuyama).
250 "Time for a New Deal, " The Sunday Times -­
Scotland, 14 May 1995, 6.
251 Ian Lang, Speech to the Conservative and 
Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow, Scotland 
(UK), 11 May 1995, SCUA News Release.
252 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 210, Sixth Series, Session 1992-1993, 24 
June 1992, col. 250. (Emphasis added.)
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In ascertaining why the Conservatives are staunch 
Unionists,- one must take, instead, an historic 
perspective. Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm can be 
challenged along these lines because for the Tories the 
Union Is defended not for political gains, 253 but 
because they perceive themselves to be the protectors
of Great Britain’s historic traditions and 
institutions. 254 The Tories also fight for Scotland not 
because it is to their economic and electoral
advantage, but because, as Lang suggests, they ’’care 
about Scotland’s past, and its future that we stand 
steadfastly behind the Union."255 Major notes along the 
same historic lines that we
have deep instincts as Conservatives. We care 
passionately about the nations of the United Kingdom. 
Our feelings are emotional as well as intellectual.256 
As Philip Norton suggests, the Conservatives "stand 
unequivocally for the Union" because it "represent[s] 
continuity with the past and they embody the unity of 
society and the norms and conduct of that society."257 
Chris Patten argues that the unity of the Kingdom is 
"based on a common loyalty to the Crown, common 
citizenship and common representation in the
253 Interview with Walker.
254 David Clarke, The Conservative Faith in the 
Modern Age, Foreword by R.A. Butler (London: The 
Conservative Political Center, 1947), 10.
255 Lang, 1995 Speech to Scottish the Conservative 
and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow.
256 Major, 1995 Speech to Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist Association in Glasgow.
257 Philip Norton, "Conservatism, " in Foley, Ideas 
that Shape Politics, 41.
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Westminster Parliament,"258 In respect to the latter,
the Tory Party leadership perceives the relationship 
between England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales 
to be legally bound by the establishment of a single 
parliamentary framework»259
As a part of its legal tradition, Westminster 
Parliament is perceived to be the law making body of 
the UK,260 As A.V. Dicey wrote:
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means 
neither more nor less than this, namely, that 
Parliament thus defined has, under the English 
constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatever; and, further, that no person or body is 
recognized by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament,261 262 *
The Conservatives argue that the Scots work not in an 
English parliament but in a UK parliament in "which 
Scotsmen take their part. ,r262 In taking part in a
Westminster parliament, the Conservatives assert, the 
Scots can work along the lines of an unwritten 
constitution which has the ability to change. "The
ass Patten, The Tory Case (London: Longman
Group, Ltd., 1983), 46.
259 T.E. Utley, "Will Parliament Lose its 
Sovereignty?," in Charles Moore and Simon Heffer, eds., 
A Tory Seer: The Selected Journalism of T.E. Utley 
(London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1989), 98.
260 William B. Gwyn, "Political Culture and 
Constitutionalism in Britain," in Daniel P. Franklin 
and Michael J. Baun, eds., Political Culture and 
Constitutionalism (London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995),
20.
261 A, V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution, Ninth Edition, with an 
Introduction and Appendix by E.C.S. Wade (London: 
MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1939), 39-40.
262 The Answer to the Scottish Nationalists
(London: Scottish Unionist Whip Office, 1945), 17. 
(Emphasis added.)
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constitution,” Scottish Secretary Michael Forsyth 
writes, "is to a nation what the central nervous system, 
is to the body, ”2G3 in which its framework reflects
the accumulated practical wisdom of the community, ... 
the outcome of innumerable adjustments and 
modifications made by politically experienced 
individuals in circumstances of responsible political 
decision ,264 265
While the tradition of the unwritten constitution is a 
"dispersed" one "written down in hundreds of places, 1,265 
it is nevertheless a flexible one in which its 
uniqueness lies in its organic nature;266 267",,,its 
ability to change and move with the times, is often 
rightly proclaimed,1,267 The advantage of the unwritten 
constitution, in other words, is that it allows the 
Tories to practice "common sense politics,"268 A 
political framework of this type, Willetts argues, 
allows practical men to address "specific abuses rather 
than trying to implement overarching schemes for 
reforms,"269 In a lecture at the London School of 
Economics Lord Howe argues:
porSyth, "Now Can We See the Bill, Please," 8.
204 Anthony Quinton, The Politics of Imperfection 
(London; Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1978), 16.
265 David Willetts, Modern Conservatism (London: 
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1992), 155. Willetts is a 
Conservative MP for Havant.
266 Lang, The Fulfilled Society, 7.
267 Ian Lang, "Taking the Slow Road, " The Times, 10 
March 1993, 18. (Emphasis added.)
268 John Barnes, "Ideology and Factions, " in 
Anthony Seldon and Stuart Ball, eds., Conservative 
Century; The Conservative Party Since 1900 (Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 318.
269 Willetts, Modern Conservatism, 153. (Emphasis
added.)
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The whole British political tradition of constitutional 
development is, of course, a very pragmatic one. 
Problems have been solved on a relatively ad hoc basis. 
You do it, and then put a name to it subsequently, so 
to speak. Theory between the two — theory and fact— 
with most attempts to elevate any one theory into an 
eternal verity is likely to be disproved by events.270
Commenting upon Tory politics, David Millar of 
the Europa Institute in Edinburgh notes that the 
growing threat to sovereignty comes not only from the 
integration process, but by the "burgeoning realization 
by the ’submerged nations’ of Europe of their 
nationality, their individuality, and their place in 
the wider fin de si eel e Europe of the present 
decade.”271 For the Tory Party, however, the United 
Kingdom is a sacrosanct entity, 272 in which it is based 
upon an "unshakable belief that the people of these 
small islands share a common destiny and that both 
their shared and their distinctive social and economic 
interests require and justify a common Crown, 
Parliament and economic structure."273 While there have
270 Sir Geoffrey Howe, "Sovereignty and 
Interdependence in the World Today, ’’ The 1990 LSE 
Alumni Lecture Given on 8 June 1990 in London, England
(UK) ,^6.
271 David Millar, in correspondence with the 
author, 13 March 1995. Sir Teddy Taylor also writes: 
"... I think that you will know that I have personally 
taken the view for quite a while that our membership of 
the EC makes it more likely that Scotland will break 
away from the UK. This would be a means whereby they 
could have a role as a Member State sitting at the 
Council of Ministers" (Sir Teddy Taylor, in 
correspondence with the author, 22 November 1994).
272 Gallie, in correspondence with the author, 16 
November 1994. See also "Rifkind Spells Out His Views 
on Scotland and the Union," The Scotsmen, 16 April 
1988, 5.
273 Ibid.
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been difficulties between the nations of England and 
Scotland, 274 the Union is, as mentioned before, a 
marriage in which for better or for worse, the 
Conservatives perceive it as their Party’s duty to 
defend and safeguard the Union of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. "(S]o long as I have heart and 
voice," Major said to his fellow Tories in Glasgow 
1995, "I will defend against all those who would weaken 
it."275 In Glasgow three years earlier Major eloquently 
observed:
It is our Party that supports the Union, not because it 
has always been good for us, but because it has always 
seemed right to us. Not always in our political 
interest, but always in that of our Kingdom and the 
countries within it.276
For richer or for poorer, the Tories perceive the 
Union to be their historic duty to defend for it is
a union in which our nations work together but in which 
each sustains and develops its rich and varied 
traditions .277
As in any marriage, the purpose of the Union is not for 
one side to dominate (or to overshadow) the other. 
Rather, the purpose of the Act of Union (1707) was (and 
continues to be) not to destroy, but to celebrate 
Scotland’s "national identity."278 "Every people," Lord 
Howe notes, "has the right to preserve language,
274 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 624.
275 Major, 1995 Speech to the Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow.
276 John Major, Scotland in the United Kingdom 
(London: Conservative Political Center, 1992), 8.
277 Major, Scotland in the United Kingdom, 8 
(Emphasis in the original.)
278 Raymond Tong, "Scottish Nationalism: A View 
from England," Contemporary Review, Vol. 265, No. 1546 
(November 1994): 247.
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culture, communication, faith and traditions. "279 As 
Quinton Hogg notes, however, the aim of the Union is 
harmony
not struggle, is [the Union's] political objective. The 
health, security and prosperity of Britain and of all 
its people is its first guiding political principle.280 
Under a common parliamentary framework, Scotland is 
able to maintain its distinctiveness through the 
continuation of its legal system, its educational 
tradition, its "contribution of Scottish regiments to 
the British Army and [its] ceremonial heritage."281 "No 
better partnership," Lady Thatcher observed back in 
197 6, "has existed in the history of mankind, and we 
must do nothing to jeopardize its future, for it has 
much to contribute still,"282
Nevertheless, the aftermath of the 1995 April
Council elections demonstrated that there exists 
political discontent over Scottish Tory policy. 283 The 
Scottish Tories seem to be in a political dilemma where 
on the one hand the status quo is "impossible to 
sustain," yet on the other hand "independence would be
279 Howe, Nationalism and the Nation State, 13-14.
280 Quinton Hogg, The Case for Conservatism 
(London: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1947), 32.
281 "Rifkind Spells Outs His Views on Scotland and 
the Union," 5. See also A. H. Birch, Political 
Integration and Disintegration in the British Isles 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1977), 21.
282 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) , House of 
Commons, Vol. 903, Fifth Series, Session 1975-1976, 13 
January 1976, col. 233.
283 Arthur Bell, "MacKay is a Man to Solve UK's 
Constitutional Crisis," The Sunday Times, 28 May 1995,
2.
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a disaster J’284 Arthur Bell, who is Chairman of
Scotland's Tory Reform Group, notes that
[njobody in the Conservative Party wants to see the 
United Kingdom disintegrate. Nor should we rush to 
hasty ... compromises. The matter is far too serious 
for that. The danger is, that by ignoring the evidence, 
the Conservatives would achieve that which they wish 
least — destruction of the United Kingdom.285
In preserving the United Kingdom, however, the Tories 
have to bring about not only a "measure of social 
mobility, "286 but, moreover, a sense of political 
decentraliza.t±on.287 Through decentralization, the 
Conservatives can facilitate "assemblies with limited 
rights to legislate over particular geographical areas 
of a state which remains unitary elsewhere."288 Lord 
Hailsham is a proponent of devolution because the House 
of Commons is overworked and, more importantly, "is 
attempting tasks which it ought not to assume, and 
arrogating to itself rights which it ought not to 
possess."289 Lord Hailsham eloquently notes:
A nation whose parts and classes are constantly at odds 
with one another can never be independent or truly 
sovereign. It is our job to find new arrangements 
within a wider whole which will reconcile the demands 
of diversity within the limits of unity. We must 
recognize that we are living in an age of change, and
284 "The 39 Steps to Home Rule," The Economist, 1 
February 1992, 36.
285 Bell, "MacKay is a Man to Solve UK’s 
Constitutional Crisis," 3.
286 Sir Teddy Taylor, "Scotland: Where Did the 
Tories Go Wrong?" The Daily Telegraph, 10 May 1979, 18.
287 Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of Democracy: 
Diagnosis and Prescription (London: Williams Collins 
and Sons, Ltd., 1978), 138.
288 Ibid.
289 Lord Hailsham, "The Nation and the 
Constitution," in Colin MacLean, ed., The Crown and the 
Thistle (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1979), 75.
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in such an age it is our business to fit our age-long 
institutions into our present requirements and 
aspirations ,290
Unlike Labour, however, the Conservative political 
tradition does not perceive devolution as adding 
another layer of government; rather, it sees devolution 
bringing power to the people,291 Forsyth argues that the 
bringing of power to the people can be brought forth by 
establishing new political links between citizens and 
local authorities, community councils, school boards, 
and other groups?92 "As I have said before," Forsyth 
notes, "the ultimate unit of devolution is the
individual. ”293
At the time of the Perth and Kinross by-election 
John Young and four other former chairmen of the 
Cathcart Conservative Constituency Association drafted 
the "Declaration of Cathcart,"294 The Declaration was 
not only a demand for a referendum on devolution, but
moreover, a call on the Government to listen to 
Scotland’s grassroots,295 In a press conference, Mr, 
Addison said that the Conservative Party should "not 
close the door on devolution as a Government. We should
290 Ibid., 80.
291 Elgar Jenkins, "Reform of Local Government, " in 
Andrew Duff, ed., Subsidiarity within the European 
Community {London: Federal Trust for Education and 
Research, 1993), 111.
292 Forsyth, "Scotland’s Man in the Cabinet," 3.
293 Ibid,
294 Gillian Bowditch, "Tories in Uproar as Rebels 
Demand Scottish Manifesto," The Times, 12 May 1995, 11. 
The other four signers of the declaration were the 
following: George Dallas, Jack Addison, Kenneth Ross, 
and Alistar MacKenzie (ibid).
295 John Young, et. al,, "Declaration of Cathcart," 
issued in May of 1995.
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be prepared to examine the whole issue of the 
government of Scotland. We should have confidence in 
the people of Scotland."396 In this sense,- it seems 
doubtful that one can characterize those who signed the 
Declaration as just "one of many other fringe groups"397 
that have emerged in the annals of the Tory Party.
At the 1995 Scottish Tory Conference in Glasgow, 
however, Major made the point that he wants to 
reestablish Tory links to Scotland’s grassroots in an 
attempt to understand what its electorate is 
thinking.39S As Major said in Glasgow three years 
earlier
I can tell you what I believe. But it is not for me, as 
an Englishman, to tell the people of Scotland what they 
should feel. I come here to listen to them. That is my 
way. To listen: that I will always do.* 297 * 299
As a successor to Ian Lang, Scottish Secretary Michael 
Forsyth wishes to explore innovative alternatives in 
improving the government of Scotland by "devolving 
power downwards, [by] giving Scottish people more power 
and more control over their own lives and more of a say 
in their own affairs."300 In looking at ways to transfer- 
powers from the Scottish Office to local councils, 
Forsyth notes that the Tory Party must find ways of
ass As reported in Bowditch, "Tories in Uproar as 
Rebels Demand Scottish Manifesto," 11.
297 Telephone conversation with Gillian Bowditch on 
the 15 May 1995.
398 Nicholas Wood, "Major sets Out on a Quest for a 
People’s Policy," The Times, 13 May 1995, 1.
399 Major, Scotland in the United Kingdom, 9.
300 Ewen MacAskill and Peter MacMahon, "Forsyth’s 
New Deal: Power to the People," The Scotsman, 27 July 
1995, 8.
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convincing Scotland is not "losing out" in being part 
of the United Kingdom,301 As Lang said in Glasgow in
1995:
But we don’t need to abandon our policies. We need to 
have faith in our policies. Let’s present them better, 
explain them better. For it’s no good having policies 
that are right, that are working and succeeding unless 
we can get that message across.. .Because if we do, 
those policies and those beliefs can also win for the 
us the next general election.302
Like Lord Hailsham, Rifkind issued his wholehearted 
support for the preservation of the United Kingdom; 
however, he also notes that "the constitutional status 
of the England and Scotland must be compatible and 
comparable if the Union is to be strengthened and not 
overturned. 303 The Union, after all, is a political and 
social entity that must evolve if it is to survive. "A 
state without some means of change, ” as Edmund Burke 
wrote back in 1790, "is without the means of its 
conservation. Without such means it might even risk the 
ioss of that part of the constitution which it wished 
most religiously to preserve. "3(M
CONCLUSION
This chapter looked at various strands of thought 
in the Tory Party regarding its understanding of
301 Ibid.
302 Lang, 1995 Speech to the Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow.
303 Malcolm Rifkind, Speech to the Conservative 
Women’s Council of the Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist Association Conference in Glasgow, Scotland
(UK), 12 May 1995, SCUA News Release.
301 Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, Edited with an Introduction by Conor Cruise 
O’Brien (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1984), 106 
(emphasis added).
294
Britain’s role in the European Union. What emerged from 
the analysis is this. The Tory leadership (under John 
Major) demonstrated a practical economic assessment of 
the UK’s relationship to the European Union, and it
concluded that it was not in Britain’s national
interest to isolate itself from the EU framework
because of the economic benefits that Britain would
enjoy under its domain. In relation to Francis 
Fukuyama’s End of History paradigm, Major's vision of 
Europe is about the widening of consumer markets and 
the ultimate success in spreading growth and prosperity 
the former communist states of Eastern Europe. Major’s 
understanding of Europe, therefore, flows from economic 
charts, rather than from a romantic vision of what 
Europe can or should be.
The Euro-skeptics’ fundamental complaint is about 
the TEU which they believe would be detrimental to 
parliamentary sovereignty. For them, this is epitomized 
by the proposed introduction of a single currency which 
Spicer and Lamont adamantly oppose. Moreover, they 
both perceive the UK’s agenda for Europe as contrary to 
that the continent’s vision of the EU. For Lamont, the 
UK should consider seceding from the EU and only 
participate in the European Economic Area. 305 In this 
respect, argues Lamont, the UK would still enjoy access 
to European markets.306 Body’s group of Euro-skeptics 
called on the Government to seek repatriation of state
305 Lamont, "Europe and No Further," 19.
306 Ibid.
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functions from the EU and for a referendum on the
single currency. While Spicer does not like the idea of 
referendums in of itself, he believes that in this case 
it is a necessary one because of the TEU’s political 
ramifications. 307 In respect to the End of History 
paradigm, the debate within the Tory Party marked how 
significant ideas like self-determination state 
sovereignty are at the end of the twentieth century. 
The ultimate outcome over these issues remain to be 
seen. What has been demonstrated in this chapter is 
that the Conservatives’ division over these important 
issues seem to signify that ideas remain an important 
theme in British politics and that the Euro-sceptics 
will do what is necessary to preserve what they feel is 
part of Britain’s historic foundations.
In respect to devolution, the above analysis 
examined the question as to why the Tories are such 
staunch Unionists from an economic, electoral and 
historic perspective. Considering they were unable to 
win a majority of Scottish seats since the 1955 
General Election and, moreover, considering they lost 
by narrow margins to form a Government (all because of 
Labour wins in Scotland) in the 1950, 1964, and 1974 
General Elections, the Tories, nevertheless, adamantly 
believe in the Union. From an historic point of view, 
the Party perceives for itself an historic role in 
maintaining the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty
307 Parliamentary Debates, 13 January 1993, cols. 
981-982.
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and the unwritten constitution. While the "nations” of 
England, Scotland, and Wales each possess distinctive 
characteristics, they, for Conservatives, benefit and 
contribute to the common aspirations and interests of 
the United Kingdom. Even though the Tory Party has 
consistently, over the years, been a minority party in 
Scottish politics, the Tories perceive themselves as 
the guardian of Britain’s historic institutions and
traditions.
In 1995, the Tories suffered electoral defeats in
Scotland’s Local Council elections and in the Perth and 
Kinross by-election. For Scottish Tories, these 
electoral defeats were seen as a signal that perhaps 
they should not dismiss the concept of devolution 
altogether. Unlike the Labour Party, the Conservatives 
would like to see a form of devolution power closer to 
the people. Major is attempting to modernize the Union 
by reestablishing the Tory Party’s links with the 
Scottish grassroots in an attempt to understand what 
the electorate is thinking.308 It remains to be seen as 
to whether or not they will be successful.
308 Nicholas Wood, "Major Sets Out on a Quest for a 
People’s Policy," The Times, 13 May 1995, 1.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
This dissertation posed a fundamental and 
important question: Is there more to politics than the 
mere pursuit of economic maximization? In analyzing 
the political scene of the post-Cold War world,- Francis 
Fukuyama has asserted that there is emerging a trend 
in the international community in which a growing 
number of states are no longer struggling over 
whether to be democratic,-1 2but are more concerned with 
economic activity in a global consumer market 
environment? For example,- Fukuyama refers in to the 
European Community as an example of his End of History 
paradigm3 because its member states of the European 
Community made a commitment in the Single European Act 
of 1986 not only to the creation of a single market, 
but to the development of a single currency and Central
Bank»
In placing Fukuyama's paradigm within the context 
of international relations theory, this study revealed 
certain similarities between his paradigm and that of 
the writings of David Mitrany. For example, Mitrany 
believed that the practitioners of international
1 Interview with Francis Fukuyama, at the RAND 
Corporation, in Washington, DC (USA), 16 December 1993. 
For a complete transcript of this interview, see 
Appendix A of this dissertation.
2 Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and. 
the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 
Ltd., 1995), xiii.
3 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the 
Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, Ltd., 1992), 67.
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relations could concentrate upon the practical politics 
of alleviating social and economic problems J For 
Mitrany, what was important in the practice of 
international relations was no longer the battle over 
the role of political ideas, but the practical ability 
to make lives better for the citizens of the body 
politic through the development of an international 
system of functional agencies? Like Mitrany, Fukuyama, 
as was seen in Chapter II of this study, believed as 
well that the pursuit of international politics would 
no longer be driven by imagination or idealism, but "by 
economic calculation, the endless solving of technical 
problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction 
of sophisticated consumer demands.”4 5 6 7
This study then compared Fukuyama’s and Mitrany’s 
writings to that of the integration theory of Ernst B. 
Haas. He believed that the creation of functional 
agencies would be implemented at the regional, rather 
than the global, level. An example of a regional 
functional agency was the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) in which its member states would 
cooperate in the production of coal and steel/ Haas 
also asserted in his writings that the functional
4 David Mitrany, The Progress of international 
Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933}.
5 Ibid.
6 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," The 
National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 18. (Emphasis 
added.}
7 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe; Political? 
Social, and Economic Forces. 1950-1957 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1968).
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attributes of the ECSC would "spillover" into other 
functional competencies such as the development of a 
common market and in the research and development of 
atomic energy,- thus leading to the creation of a 
supranational entity.
Unlike Mitrany, however, Haas also observed that 
the creation of a functional agency at the regional — 
let alone the international — level requires the 
shifting of allegiances and loyalties of interest 
groups and political parties away from the state to 
that of the new economic and political institutions in 
question.8 What makes this point relevant to the End of 
History paradigm is that because the states of Western 
Europe were no longer in need to search for 
alternatives to the principles of liberal democracy,9 
Haas believed that interest groups and political 
parties could therefore concentrate their efforts in 
looking for new institutional structures in solving 
economic and social problems. In his writings, Haas
observed that institutions like the ECSC would be the
best practical step forward for the states of Western 
Europe to begin developing a supranational structure.
Haas in his later work, however, observed that the 
issues of national identity and state sovereignty 
continued to be vibrant in West European political 
thinking. This form of political thinking created a
backlash in which certain states involved in the
8 Ibid.
9 Interview with Fukuyama. (Emphasis added.)
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development of a European framework would assert their 
quest to preserve their historic institutions and
traditions.
In analyzing the practitioners of European 
integration, Spinelli observed that the problem created 
by "federal functionalists"10 like Jean Monnet is that 
they failed to move beyond the mere technical and 
institutional problems of governance in Western Europe. 
For Spinelli, it is not enough simply to create 
institutions to deal with coal and steel and in
bringing about a common price for agricultural 
products. What was also needed for the development of 
European unity, for Spinelli, was the creation of a new 
"political society."11 As was demonstrated over the 
debate in attempting to ratify the European Defence 
Community,12 certain practitioners of European politics 
at the end of the Second World War continued to think 
within the political mindset of national identity and 
state sovereignty.13
Another example of this political phenomenon was 
the advent of Charles de Gaulle in France. De Gaulle 
asserted his belief in the sanctity of national
10 David Mitrany, The Functional Theory of Politics 
(London: Martin Robertson and Company, Ltd., 1975), 76.
11 Altiero Spinelli, The Eurocrats: Conflict and 
Crisis in the European Community, translated by C.
Grove Haines (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
1966), 12.
12 See Chapter IV of this dissertation.
13 For an examination of these issues in the early 
post-1945 period read, Alan S. Milward, The European 
Rescue of the Nation State, with the assistance of G. 
Brennan and F. Romero (London: Routledge, 1992).
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identity and state sovereignty by challenging the 
merits for a supranational Europe through, for example, 
the Fouchet reports and the 1965-1966 ’’Empty Chair" 
crisis. In those reports, outlined a confederal 
structure in which the states would work together over 
certain problems of common interest but remain distinct 
in others fields of competence. Moreover, de Gaulle 
fought with the proponents of a supranational Europe 
not because they disagreed over ’’subsidiary”14 issues 
like agriculture, but because the supranationalists 
like Walter Hallstein were pushing for more federal 
responsibilities. For de Gaulle, the expansion of 
central powers would deny France its historic role as a 
leading player in European affairs. While a compromise 
between de Gaulle and his European counterparts over 
the future of Europe was found in Luxembourg, the 
debate between federalists and intergovernmentalists
would continue.
The 1970s marked another period of tension between 
supranationalists and intergovernmentalists over the 
issue of European unity. In respect to the issue of 
state sovereignty, the oil crisis of the 1970s made it 
difficult for EC member states like Britain and France
to draft a foreign policy or external economic 
relations agreement with its EC counterparts (let 
alone with the United States) over the issues of energy
14 Interview with Fukuyama.
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and the Middle East?5 In retrospect,, the former British 
Prime Minister Edward Heath asserted the practical 
purpose of European unity was to acknowledge that
we all have common problems, together we can solve 
them. What the leaders of forgot in the second half of 
the 70s, and so far during the 80s, is that the 
problems were common. They [simply] turned in on 
themselves . . ?6
In looking at the practical problems of European 
unity, however, Fukuyama could very well dismiss these 
issues as subsidiary because they can be categorized as 
the "practical” concerns that states fight over in the 
realm of international politics?7 While this might be 
the case, the crux of the supranationalists’ agenda was 
not simply about the establishment of a free trade 
zone; rather, the European unity movement marked a 
fundamental turning point as to how Europeans were to 
govern themselves. This fundamental reevaluation of 
European statecraft manifested
supranationalists like Roy Jenkins
development of a single currency and a central bank.
The supranationalists' agenda also manifested 
itself iii the Single European Act of 1986 and the 
Treaty on European Union of 1992. In the SEA, the 
supranationalists not only called for the establishment 
of a single currency, but it also called for the wider * * *
itself when
pushed for the
/
15 For an examination of the oil crisis in Western 
Europe, read William C. Cromwell, The United States and 
the European Pillar: The Strained Alliance (London: 
MacMillan Press, 1992).
16 Hugo Young, "No, Prime Minister, " Marxism Today, 
November 1988, 16.
17 Interview with Fukuyama.
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use of majority voting in bringing about the creation 
of single market. The Treaty on European Union’s 
federal agenda not only included the Social Chapter and 
the establishment of European citizenship, but, 
moreover, the resolve "to continue the process of 
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe » . . "1S
In the 1990s, however, the supranationalists’ 
agenda of an ever closer union was challenged by the 
Danes in their referendum on the TEU in 1992 and by the 
Norwegians in their referendum on EU membership in 
1994. Victor Smart of The European comments on the 
growing uneasiness within Europe over European unity as 
simply
a vicious clash between two forces with opposing 
interests. On the one hand there are the politicians 
and their technocrat advisers with a vision of a single 
currency, likely to prove a stepping stone towards 
wider political integration. On the other are ordinary 
people who grow impatient of the entire monetary union 
discussion once it threatens their economic self­
interest .18 9
However, can Europe’s uneasiness over the future of 
European unity simply be about "the economic share of 
the pie”?20 Is there something more to this crucial 
debate than the mere political squabble "between 
liberals and social democrats’’?21 For the Danes, the 
fundamental debate was not about economics or how to
18 Preamble of the TEU. (Emphasis added.)
19 Victor Smart, "Will Maastricht Stir a Revolt of 
the Masses?," The European, 14-20 December 1995, 11. 
(Emphasis added.) See also "Politics v. Economics," The 
European, 8-14 February 1996, 12.
20 Interview with Fukuyama,
21 Ibid,
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best proceed with making a single market work. Rather, 
it was based on the belief that European Union would 
"destroy national r2idepende;icez even national 
character, While a part of the Norwegian debate 
revolved around fishing rights, there also existed an 
historic element in the Norwegian mindset which is 
skeptical of relinquishing sovereignty to a 
supranational entity.* 23 While the role of economic 
maximization certainly is evident in the realm of 
international politics, the concept of national 
identity retains its validity for the nation "is a 
place where people feel a natural connection with each 
other because they share a common language, a religion, 
or something else strong enough to hind them together 
and make them feel different from others: 'we, ' not 
' they, ’ ”24 * *
The crucial clash of ideas was also analyzed 
within the British case study of this dissertation. The 
economic/practical side of political activity was 
highlighted both within the Scottish National Party 
(SNP) and British Conservative Party camps. Politicians 
like Jim Sillars and John Major, for example, assert an 
economic rationale for being within the European Union 
because both have advocated the economic and material
- "Why the Danes Wouldn’t," The Economist, 6 June 
1992, 42. (Emphasis added.)
23 Norway Not Hooked, " The Economist, 22 May 1993,
41.
24 "The Nation State is Dead. Long Live the Nation
State," The Economist, 5 January 1996, 17. (Emphasis
added.)
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benefits of being part of a single market. While the 
SNP would agree with the basic tenets of the European 
Union’s social chapter. Major objects to the chapter; 
however, these objections are more for practical 
reasons. Major is an opponent of the social chapter 
because it would make Britain’s industries
uncompetitive in the world market. In relation to 
Scotland, Major asserts that the Westminster Parliament 
protected Scotland’s economic base by opting out of the 
social chapter because it would, as Major noted in his 
1992 Glasgow speech, have destroyed Scotland's 
competitive edge in attracting foreign investment.25
Sillars’ and Major's economic rationale for 
European unity is also highlighted in the necessity of 
not isolating Britain (or, in case of the SNP, 
Scotland) in an interdependent environment. Both 
Sillars and Major are pro-Europeans not because they 
are ardent federalists, but because they perceive the 
European Union as a means in achieving for Britain (or, 
for the SNP, Scotland) economic and social prosperity. 
Arguing from their own point of view, Major and Sillars 
believe in the importance of constructive participation 
in the shaping of the European Union.
Nevertheless, the economic/practical reasoning of 
Sillars and Major generated an argument among those 
within the SNP and the Tory Party who assert that the 
political controversy over European unity is much more 35
35 John Major, Scotland in the United Kingdom 
(London: Conservative Political Center, 1992), 7.
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than about ’’subsidiary” issues. Politicians like Jim 
Fairlie and Margaret Thatcher are opposed to the 
European Union because of the detrimental effect issues 
like the single currency and the establishment of a 
central bank would have on the sovereignty of the
state. While both Fairlie and Thatcher admit to the
importance of cooperation in an interdependent world, 
this does not require the creation of a supranational 
organization.
Beyond the economic arguments, for supporters 
sympathetic to their viewpoint there is something of 
profound significance in which the process of 
Europeanization ’’has undermined the vitality and 
integrity of British politics.’’20 For both Fairlie and 
for Thatcher, the Treaty on European Union is the 
antithesis to their particular perception of national 
identity and state sovereignty. Beyond the mere 
squabbles of economic maximization, Fairlie and 
Thatcher believe that there are certain principles 
(like national identity and state sovereignty) worth 
striving and fighting for. They both share a common 
belief in the need to protect "political
accountability and self-government.”* * 27 28"No Government," 
Cash writes, "has the right to give this inheritance
20 Bill Cash, "A Party of the Nation?," The Times,
21 March 1996, 20.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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The last two chapters also discussed the future of 
Scotland’s continuing relationship to the United 
Kingdom. The Conservative Party hold several objections 
to the Labour/Liberal Democratic proposals for 
establishing a devolved parliament in Edinburgh.29 A few 
of the Conservative Party’s objections to an Assembly 
can be construed as to what Fukuyama would categorize 
as "subsidiary” issues. For example, the Conservatives 
object to the introduction of a devolved assembly 
because it would add another layer of administration 
and would add an extra tax on the Scottish population. 
An extra tax could, as Chapter VI demonstrated, cost
business confidence and could threaten an economic 
exodus of Scottish jobs.
While the Tory Party argue, for example, that the 
Constitutional Convention does not answer detailed 
issues like the West Lothian Question,30 they also 
concentrate their energies in asserting principles 
which transcend economic maximization and "short term 
political gain.’’31 The British Conservative Party’s 
objections to devolution (along Labour/Liberal 
Democratic lines) can challenge Fukuyama’s paradigm 
when it is analyzed from an historic perspective. For
29 Scotland's Parliament. Scotland's Right, 
(Edinburgh, Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995). 
See Chapter V of this dissertation.
30 For more on this point, read Peter Lynch, "Labor 
Answers the West Lothian Question," Glasgow Herald, 20 
January 1996, 19 and Calum MacDonald, "A Great Chance 
for Lib-Labbery,” New Statesmen and Society, 8 March 
1996, 20.
31 Interview with Bill Walker at Constituency 
Office in Blairgowrie, Scotland (UK), 18 August 1995.
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the Tories, the United Kingdom is perceived to be a 
marriage32 in which, for better or for worse, it has 
evolved for the past three hundred years.33 In that 
time, the Union has adopted to changing circumstances 
to strengthen and encourage the Kingdom’s organic 
growth.34 "For me," Lord Mackay writes, "the value of 
the Union is beyond price," for it is a Union which 
consists of nations with a rich source of diversity.35 
While the Scottish Enlightenment inspired Margaret 
Thatcher’s political thinking,36 the Conservatives have 
maintained their faith in the Kingdom despite poor 
economic and electoral performance. In sickness and in 
health, the Conservative Party upholds the sanctity of 
the Union even when Scotland runs an 8 billion deficit
and, moreover, even when in the past the Scots have 
proven (as they did in the General Elections of 1950, 
1964 and 1974) to be less than reliable Tory voters.
While the Conservative Party maintains a uniform 
belief over the sanctity of the United Kingdom,37 there 
are factions within the SNP who are divided over the 
merits (or lack thereof) of a Scottish Assembly. While
32 Interview with Ian Stewart at Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Association Headquarter, in 
Edinburgh, Scotland (UK), 29 August 1995.
33 Interview with Walker.
34 Ian Lang, The Fulfilled. Society (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Conservative Unionist Central Office, 1993),
7.
35 Lord Mackay, "A House Divided Against Itself, " 
The Times, 7 February 1996, 18.
36 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years 
(London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 618.
37 Robbie Dinwoodie, "Devolution? It’s a Trap," The 
Glasgow Herald, 14 January 1995, 10-11.
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the SNP leadership and the rank and file are firm in 
their belief of an independent Scotland, there are 
divisions over whether a devolved Assembly is an 
appropriate " springboard”38 for independence or an 
impediment to the SNP’s political destination.
As pointed out in Chapter V, Alex Salmond and 
other SNP colleagues like Allan Macartney and Roseanna 
Cunningham are proponents of a devolved Assembly not 
because they perceive it to be the best offer for 
Scotland, but that they can "use it" to slowly but 
surely reach an independent Scotland.39 In asserting an 
economic rationale, the SNP believes a devolved 
Assembly can be used as a platform to (at least) start 
addressing Scotland’s economic and social problems and. 
start the process of building for Scotland a better 
future. Nevertheless, the SNP maintains an 
"Independence" platform for the Party remains very much 
devoted as to how it can "speed up the process so that 
in the new millennium Scotland will once again play her 
part as an independent nation."40
SNP opponents of a Scottish Assembly like 
Christine Creech and Jim Fairlie assert, however, a 
belief that the guest for independence cannot be based 
upon an economic rationale. While a devolved assembly
38 Allan Macartney, "A Springboard for 
Independence," The New Politics for Independencef 1995 
SNP Conference Issue, 6-7 and Alex Salmond, "Truth and 
Devolution," Scotland on Sunday, 5 February 1995, 6-7.
39 Roseanna Cunningham, "Use it, Use it. Use it*," 
The New Politics for Independencet 1995 SNP Conference 
Issue, 4.
40 Macartney, "A Springboard for Independence, " 5.
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might be able to alleviate economic and social problems 
in the short run, a subordinate Assembly to that of 
Westminster does not help bring about a new political 
society in the long run?1 Fairlie and Thatcher may 
share a common dislike for the European Union; 
nevertheless, their understanding of state sovereignty 
and of the historic traditions they wish to uphold are 
very much very different from one another. Fairlie and 
others who share his sentiments shout for independence 
not so that Westminster might then restructure its
government so that Scottish needs are better met or, 
for that matter, so that Scotland attains a greater 
"share of the pie," but for the simple fact that 
Scotland is a distinct nation in its own right and is 
therefore worthy of statehood.
The purpose of writing this dissertation, then, 
was to ascertain whether or not in the post-Cold War 
world there was more to the pursuit of politics than 
the mere creation of a consumer culture. While the 
pursuit of political activity is driven (but not 
exclusively) by economics and by the realities of 
"practical politics," this study has attempted to 
demonstrate that politics is not simply about 
maintaining a "culture of contentment."41 2 There are
41 Christine Creech, "Devolution — A Unionist 
Parliament," The New Politics for Independence, 1995 
SNP Conference Issue, 6-8 and Jim Fairlie, "I Am Not a 
Nationalist, But...," in David Rollo, ed., The Scotland 
We Seek (Oban: Scots Independent (Newspapers) Limited, 
1987), 8-9.
42 John K. Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment 
(London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1992).
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those, for example, in the British political arena who, 
as this dissertation highlighted, believe in historic 
principles and traditions which cannot be sacrificed 
for the mere attainment of economic and political gain.
In examining the western political world, one can 
also cite that other examples where political activity 
is not merely driven by economic calculation. In 
November 1995, for example, the Canadian province of 
Quebec voted 50.6% to 49.4% "to remain part of 
Canada.’’43 Despite the narrowness of the vote, the 
separatists' defeat has "given new energy to this long 
quarrel"44 calling for a new referendum on independence. 
While there are hopes that the narrow federal victory 
will encourage the Canadian government to enter into a 
new dialogue with Quebec over Constitutional reform,45 
what are the prospects of Quebec attaining a "distinct 
society" clause as "protection against efforts by 
English-speaking Canada to undermine its language, 
culture or civil code of justice based on the French 
system"?46 Is constitutional reform in itself enough to 
appease Quebec’s separatist movement?47 Moreover, if 
Quebec were to be worse off after independence, would
43 Robbie Dinwoodie, "Quebec Divides Scots,"
Glasgow Herald, 1 November 1995, 1.
44 "Another Referendum?," International Herald 
Tribune, 2 November 1995, 8.
45 Clyde H. Farnsworth, "What Next for Quebec 
Separatist Movement?," International Herald Tribune, 2 
November 1995, 3 and "The Way Ahead," International 
Herald Tribune, 2 November 1995, 8.
46 Farnsworth, "What Next for Quebec Separatist 
Movement?," 3.
47 Dinwoodie, "Quebec Divides Scots," 1.
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those in the nationalist movement still favor a
constitutional divorce from Canada?48
Another interesting case study would be to examine
the Republic of Ireland's changing relationship to the 
European Union and the Catholic Church. As a member of 
the European Union,- Ireland is attempting to secularize 
its institutional and political practices as it enters 
into the next century?9 For example, the people of 
Republic of Ireland has made it easier now for couples 
to obtain a divorce.50 The secularization process of 
Ireland has opened up a debate between the Catholic 
Church and more progressive Irish over issues like 
abortion.51 To what extent is there a possibility of a 
clash between the "pre-West" (for example, the Catholic 
Church) and the "post-West” (for example, feminism) 
over western principles of individualism and liberalism 
as Ireland enters the twentieth century?52
In conclusion, what this dissertation has 
attempted to demonstrate is that political ideas and
48 For more on the issue of Quebec nationalism and 
and its relation to Canada, read Tim A. Mau, "'Le 
Quebec Libre’: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?," Woodstock 
Road Editorial: An Oxford Magazine of Politics and 
currnet Affairs, Michealmas 1993, 43-44; Jacques 
Parizeau, "The Case for a Sovereign Quebec," Foreign 
Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995): 69-77; and Daniel 
Johnson, "The Case for a United Canada," Foreign 
Policy, no. 99 (Summer 1995): 78-87.
49 John F. Stacks, "Irish Renaissance," Time, 11 
December 1995, 30-33.
50 "A, Different Ireland, " International Herald 
Tribune, 29 November 1995, 10.
51 Stacks, "Irish Renaissance, " 33.
52 For more of a discussion on the terms "pre-West" 
and post-West," read James Kurth, "The Real Clash," The 
National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 1994): 3-15.
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beliefs are now in a state of "flux.”53 In analyzing the 
End of History paradigm, this dissertation has asserted 
that Fukuyama's work was (or continues to be) too 
narrow in scope; that is, Fukuyama only discusses his 
paradigm within the parameters of there no longer be 
any clear alternatives to the principles of liberal 
democracy. While this might be the case, this study has
illustrated that ware a plethora of other ideas that
occupy Western political thought which can be construed 
as a challenge to the political principles of, for 
example, national identity and state sovereignty which 
can trace their historic roots back to the days of the 
French Revolution in 1789. If one can broaden the scope 
of Fukuyama's paradigm then the "Age of Discussion", as 
the late Russell Kirk had once observed,54 does not 
appear to be ephemeral.
53 Michael Foley, "Introduction," in Michael Foley, 
ed., Ideas that Shape Politics (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1994), 2.
54 Russell Kirk, Beyond the Dreams of Avarice: 
Essays of a Social Critic (Peru, Illinois: Sherwood 
Sugden and Company, Publishers, 1991), 50.
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APPENDIX A
TRANSCRIPT
INTERVIEW WITH FRANCIS FUKUYAMA 
AT THE RAND CORPORATION 
IN WASHINGTON, DC (USA)
16 DECEMBER 1993
Gabriel Kikas: GK. 
Francis Fukuyama: FF.
GK: How would you respond to the criticism that 
the very idea of the Last Man is somehow a 
contradiction of the idea of the End of History? Are 
you convinced that there is in politics an inexorable, 
almost determinist force which leads to the end of the 
development of ideas?
FF: Well, I don’t think it is a determinist force 
by any means. It depends on what you mean by 
determinist. The nature of science and the way we 
understand the world leads to a coherent unfolding of 
the historical process because the mastery of science 
is not a random process. It takes place in concrete 
stages, which then determines a number of things, like 
the kinds of economic production possibilities which 
are available to us and therefore the nature of 
economic probes and the nature of warfare and that 
dictates also all kinds of social and political 
structures like the nation state, for example, after 
the Peace of Westphalia which was driven in large 
measure by the needs for warfare which in turn was 
driven by higher technological developments and that 
required the ending of little sovereignties and the 
creation of larger centralized bureaucracies and tax 
systems.
And in that sense, if you want to call that 
determinist you can. But there are many degrees of 
freedom in that broad framework for alternative lines 
of development and certainly the development of self is 
very discontinuous so it is never linear moving ahead, 
but it is still motion in a random direction and it is 
not cyclical. It is moving in a certain way. And I 
think there is a limit to the overall... [Does not 
complete the sentence.]
Overall, I think the economic process leads to 
homogenization of certain structures in human 
societies, but there is a limit to how homogenous they 
become and broadly speaking there is no alternative to 
markets in the general sense, and to determine prices 
and economic structures, and not a lot of alternatives 
to some forms of democracy for advanced societies. But 
there are specific forms like capitalism and democracy
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that can be quite varied depending upon the residue of 
cultural and historical pre-modern residue that arise 
and I don’t think you will ever get rid of those 
entirely. And this, I think, is what you are dealing 
with now. You have a broad framework of a house 
established and how they decorate each room is very 
hard to determine.
GK: Yes, I can see that. The End of History 
paradigm suggests that the End of History does not 
necessarily mean the end of politics? You mention that 
political events would still occur. In your judgment, 
what is the primary purpose of politics? Dose not 
democracy and the very nature of politics presuppose 
disagreement? Isn’t politics about the struggle of 
ideas?
FF: Well, yes, it is. It depends, to some extent, 
on the level of the struggle. That, in that sense, 
Europe is no longer struggling over whether or not it 
should be democratic, like if they should be ruled by 
the throne or through popular election. There is 
certainly going to be many struggles over the economic 
and the share of the pie and that sort of thing. There 
will be fights between liberals and more social 
democratic types. And then there will be fights over 
quality of recognition. You can see this in the United 
States. Fights over feminism, race relations and, this 
year, Gay rights and this sort of thing. Essentially, 
over specific rights of recognition. And within that 
democratic framework, I think politics, in that sense, 
is never going to disappear.
GK: The one thing that I find interesting is that 
you seem to define communism v. liberal democracy as 
the great ideological confrontation of the twentieth 
century. Can ideological confrontation go beyond East- 
West competition? You describe the driving forces of 
history (that is, technological expansion and the 
struggle for recognition). [However], you do not seem 
to define ideology per se. Liberal democracy might seem 
to be the dominant ideology, but, as Samuel P. 
Huntington explains, one cannot exclude the possibility 
of the emergence of new ideologies? Cannot 
confrontation within liberal democracy bring about the 
need for a new synthesis in contemporary political 
culture? Ideology being a much a broader term about 
ideas.
FF: Well, yes. Obviously, there will be alot ideas 
in conflict. But the question is are there are going to 
be new foundational ideas. That has to do with the
1 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," The 
National Interest, no. 16 (Summer 1989): 4.
2 Samuel P = Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of 
Endism, ’’ The National Interest, no. 17 (Fall 1989): 9.
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basic political structure of a society and the 
principles of equality and liberty, for example, or if 
you can up with alternative principles. You know, I am 
not a prophet. I cannot say that there will not be new 
ideas. But it is remarkable among the vanguard of world 
development that how today that are no major 
alternatives in terms of political principles, but that 
there are plenty of fights on subsidiary issues. But 
the basic ones are there. (Emphasis added.)
GK: Well what about Conservatism v. Liberalism 
within the United States? Both come from the same 
source (that is, social contract theory). Conservatism 
[is] about duties and obligations [whereas] liberalism 
more about rights. Now, that seems to be a clash of 
ideas. And they agree on the same things, like free 
elections and so forth. How do you see that?
FF: There are a variety ways of explaining. One is 
liberal democracy is founded on the twin principles of 
liberty and equality and both of those principles must 
be honored. [T]he struggle between Conservatives and 
Liberals over how you can't maximize those at the same 
time. [Alex] de Tocqueville said that there is a 
tradeoff generally speaking where more equality means 
less liberty and vice versa. And it seems to me that in 
the US most fights between Liberals and Conservatives 
could be reduced as to where one draws the line between 
liberty and equality on urban programs for poor blacks, 
they can cost alot of money. Affirmative Action, you 
may be discriminating against a qualified white person, 
limit of higher taxes and this and that. So, that is 
going to be an illustration of that struggle. Liberal 
wants social programs, and the conservative does not 
want it because it diminishes freedom. But both agree 
that some degree of equality and some degree of freedom 
are worthwhile. Now, that is different from alot of 
European conservatives, who, for example, have 
different attitude to freedoms. Alot of British Tories, 
for example, who do not accept an egalitarian premise. 
[Emphasis added.] They are not happy with democracy in 
certain ways.
GK: The Scots [for example] are not happy with 
Tories at all. I have lived but in Scotland close to 
three years and the word Tory [for many Scots] is a 
very ugly word. Let us go on to some other questions 
regarding international relations. You mention in your 
book that the predominate trend in international 
politics is the liberal democratization of the state. 
This trend signifies a possible End of History. In a 
New Republic article (17 August 1992), however, you 
write, "The truth is that not all countries are equally 
capable of sustaining stable democracies... Indeed, the 
current 'third wave', as Huntington notes, has 
probably exhausted itself and may well retreat in the
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next few years."3 Has this pragmatism come from 
changing from a political philosopher back to policy 
maker?
FF: It is all in the book. Look, my argument in 
the book, among other things, is that democracy is 
related or follows economic development.[Emphasis 
added.] The whole of Part II is dedicated to 
demonstrating that there is a relationship between 
economic development and the possibility of stable 
democracy. And, just in the beginning, there is 
obviously a vast difference in the ability of a 
country, like Hatti, to support a working democracy 
with that of a country like Poland. And, in fact, I 
think that this is the big mistake that the Clinton 
Administration has made in that everyone is equally 
capable of building a democracy and I think that’s just 
not an absolute rule. You have to be conscious of your 
expectations. I think you have to be cautious in your 
expectations for very poor Third World countries to be 
able to be able to create a workable democratic system. 
And I also admit to there be many cultural factors that 
presuppose[?] certain societies to democratize. There 
is a great correlation between Christianity and 
democracy, which explains why a vast majority of the 
world’s democracies are culturally Christian countries.
GK: You mention nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism as being major impediments to the end of 
history. How important is state sovereignty at the end 
of the twentieth century? Do you think, for example, 
Samuel P. Huntington’s thesis of the "Clash of 
Civilizations"4 challenges the End of History 
[paradigm] ? And how would you respond to this 
challenge?
FF: I think there are several problems. First of 
all, [Dr. Huntington] does not take into account the 
homogenizing consequences of the development of 
culture. Japanese and Chinese culture (what he calls 
Confucian culture) is not what it was a hundred years 
ago. It has evolved considerably as a result of 
economic modernization. And I don’t think that there is 
anything in that culture that is so strong that a 
Confucian society from not becoming a democratic 
society. And once it becomes a democracy, the degree of 
potential conflict between those societies as a whole 
and the West as a whole (or Christendom if you like) 
becomes much less. And, furthermore, I guess my main 
problem with the thesis is that the boundaries of these 
cultures of civilizations are not at all clear. It is 
variable [that is] subject to change. And I think that
3 Francis Fukuyama, "The Beginning of Foreign 
Policy," The New Republic, 17 August 1992, 30.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, "Clash of Civilizations," 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.
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this is the major defect. You know people do not think 
of themselves in living within a homogeneous,- cultural, 
entity. I do not think of myself as a member of 
Christendom. They might have done that in the 
fourteenth century. You think of yourself as an 
American, German, or Japanese. That would not be a part 
of Christendom, but that is not a meaningful... 
[Fukuyama does not complete his sentence.]
I think [the ’’Clash of Civilizations] thesis works 
best in the Middle East where there is, particularly 
among the fundamentalists, a concept of a Muslim [?] 
which transcend ... particular national identities; it 
is higher than those identities and people in that 
region do [not] think of the fight between Libya and 
the United States as a fight between two nation states, 
but as a fight between Christians and Muslims. So there 
is validity to [Dr. Huntington's] model, but it does 
not make any sense in the Far East, in Latin America, 
in Europe, for the most part. (Emphasis added.)
GK: In Bosnia, the one thing that seems to be 
clear is that both Greeks and Serbs are worried about 
the rise of an Islamic state in Europe. [Can that be 
classified] as a ’’Clash of Civilizations’’?
FF: I don't think that this is the issue.
GK: You don't think that this is the issue?
FF: First of all, in Bosnia the Muslim identity 
was never really that important. And Huntington uses 
that as an example of the ’’clash" of two civilizations. 
But, on the one hand, the US-Soviet fight in the Cold 
War was an intra-civilizational fight, where all the 
fighting took place within Western civilization,5 
whereas the Bosnian-Serb fight or the Serb-Croat fight 
is a ’’Clash of Civilizations.’’ And I think that's 
ridiculous. The Bosnians and the Serbs and the Croats 
share much more in common with each other than the 
Russians and Americans ever did. They differ in 
religion, but they speak the same language, have the 
same history, they know each other well and they eat 
the same food, and so many of their cultural practices 
are identical in ways that was never true for Russians 
and Americans. Aid to call one intra-civilzational and 
the other a fight between civilizations is very hard to 
do. (Emphasis added.)
GK: One of the political theorist that I am 
dealing with is David Mitrany. He perceives politics to 
be the problem in international relations. Like 
yourself, Mitrany concluded that the history of
5 James Kurth discusses this interesting point in 
’’The Real Clash,” The National Interest, no. 37 (Fall 
1994): 3-15.
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political philosophy can no longer move forward because 
all the great questions of political philosophy have 
been answered? The major challenge for Mitrany is 
this: "We have reached a stage where the state is in 
danger of breaking down under the strain of the 
functions and in consequence of the powers imposed upon 
it by the community which it serves a1,7 You still think 
within a system of states. And from what I understand 
from other theorists (like Marx) is that the state 
would wither away but in your [paradigm, the state] 
does not wither away.
FF: Actually, Ko j eve was a great believer in the 
withering away of the state.
GK: Is the system of states a suitable actor in 
fulfilling the ends of liberal democracy?
FF: Yes, I think it will be. Not for theoretical 
reasons. You know if you are a true Universalist 
liberal you probably will look forward to the eventual 
creation of a world federation, the withering away of 
all these national identities. I just think that 
realistically that is not likely to happen because 
peoples identity are still formed within national 
communities. The possibility of common action is 
limited to the, I mean, largest, you know, scale that 
you will accomplish is the nation state. The reasons 
for that, I think, are kind of complicated. Peoples’ 
social identity is stronger the smaller the group is. 
They operate within, the more they have in common, the 
greater the moral authority that will exist. And I 
think that sense of community is important to people. 
It can be eroded to some extent but it will never 
disappear. So I think for that reason a German will 
think of himself as a German to a large extent and not 
simply as a European. And least of all as a citizen of 
the world.
GK: There is only so much strain a state can take. 
As Kolakawsky seems to assert that we seem to have 
’’endless expectations”s and that somehow given the 
erosion to our economic resources become critical, how 
does that affect the overall...
FF: No, no, look. The state is obviously ' losing 
its sovereignty both to supranational organizations and 
to sub-national organizations. But, I thought the 
question was.more.will there be an end to that process * * *
6 David Mitrany, The Progress ot International 
Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), 
16-18.
7 Ibid., 19.
s Leszek Kolakowsky, ’’Uncertainties in a 
Democratic Age,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 
(1990): 47-50.
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will the state disappear and my answer to that is no. 
But I think clearly it is losing its sovereignty. We 
are returning to a sort of medieval world where we have 
a hierarchy of different organizations which some are 
international and some subnational. The makers of all 
that were from the post-war period all the national 
economic institutions. (Emphasis added.)
GK: The World Order Models Project (WOMP)9 
conceives of a world political system beyond the realm 
of the state. This is because the state is unable to 
cope with current political problems (for example, the 
security of the environment, human rights, nuclear 
proliferation) [which are considered] to be 
transnational. How would you respond to people like, 
for example, Richard A. Falk? Is WOMP an unrealistic 
endeavor?
FF: Well, certainly in the terms he lays out, yes. 
Look I think you can only have order among entities 
that have basic agreement and values. People like 
Professor Falk think we can cooperate with the Libyans 
or we could have cooperated with the Soviets during the 
Cold War and I think essentially that’s nonsensical. 
The things that divide these entities are much 
stronger than that which unites them. As I said in the 
book I think you can have, in terms of regional 
organizations, are things like NATO or the CSCE (and 
even that is too large), but at least a regional 
organization where every body has the same political 
structure, the same ideology and that sort of thing. 
But if you attempt to extend that I think that it is 
kind of hopeless.
GK:Do you see the revitalization of religion at 
the end of history? Richard A. Falk, in Explorations at 
the Edge of Time, writes:
"Politics is being reinfused with religious symbols and 
claims; religion is being summoned to the trenches of 
popular struggle, even lending support in some 
circumstances to violent tactics. This breakdown of the 
separation and antagonism between politics and religion 
represents an effort by modernists to handle a new 
agenda of societal demands. What is most revealing is 
the reconciliation of Marxism and Christianity in a 
series of Third World settings, a process that is one 
of mutual enrichment without any necessary effort to 
subordinate one to the other."10
9 For example, read Saul Mendlovitz, ed., On the 
Creation of a Just World Order (New York: The Free 
Press, 1975) and Richard A. Falk, A Study of Future 
Worlds (New York: The Free Press, 1975).
10 Richard A. Falk, Explorations at the Edge of 
Time (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 35.
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Is religious fundamentalism the new Hegelian antithesis 
to liberal democracy? What impact, for example, will 
the Religious Right in the United States have on the 
End of History!
FF: Well, first of all, religious fundamentalism 
is not a homogenous phenomenon. It is very 
heterogeneous. In the Islamic world, it is antithetical 
to liberal democracy. But this form of religion is not 
tolerant.
GR: But what the Religious Right in the United 
States for example. They have some very interesting 
ideas of what one type of books should be read and 
what should be taught in schools. They seem to be 
limiting liberty of the freedoms one could be exposed 
to. How do you respond to that?
FF: Well, that is a matter of degree. No liberal 
society has been perfectly liberal. There has always 
been some constraint. You cannot show hard core 
pornography on prime time TV; so the question is where 
you draw the line. The [line] [over the constraints of 
liberalism] was at the time of the [Founding Fathers?] 
was drawn here, then it was shifted over here, and now 
the religious fundamentalists want to move it back a 
little like this. Now that is not a fundamental assault 
on liberalism it seems to me. That is just an 
adjustment, a bit of fine tuning.
In general, I think that the problem with this 
sort of analysis is that [Professor Falk only 
discusses] liberation theology and the conversion of 
Marxism and Christianity. I think the more important 
religious phenomenon in Latin America is Conservative 
Protestantism, which is a very big phenomenon. A third 
of Chile’s population is now Pentecostal; [this is] 20% 
of Brazil’s population, very large protestant 
communities in Central America. And then there is alot 
of sociological literature on these people now. And 
almost all of it now confirms Max Weber’s observations 
of the effect of Protestantism in Europe. Because 
basically what they are {we call them fundamentalists 
today) are like the Puritans of the sixteenth century 
in England. They have the same sort of relationship to 
Capitalism and democracy that Puritanism historically 
in Western Europe did. That is to say, especially in 
the first generation, where one tends to be very strict 
and rigorous and not liberal in the sense we interpret 
it. They create a kind of private space in the ability 
to work together. They are sectarian; that is, the 
foundation (especially in a Catholic country) of a sort 
of social organization that one would need as part of a 
healthy civil society. They promote these puritan 
virtues of thrift and hard work and this and that. 
Level of education and hygiene go up.
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And this is why religious fundamentalism is just 
not a homogenous phenomenon. Conservative Christianity 
in the West (generally speaking) has been (not directly 
supportive) of modern democracy, but created a social 
environment in which both capitalism and democracy 
became much more possible. It is the basis of modern 
individualism, and it provides the support of the 
individual conscious against the state, and all of 
these liberal concepts. Fundamental Islam does not do 
that.
GK: Please elaborate as to what you see as the 
fundamental impediment to West European integration 
today? And how does that affect the End of Historyl
FF: There is a couple of things. One thing, the 
concept of the EC itself. I think the concept has been 
driven by the European Commission and has been heavily 
influenced by the French and, particularly, by the 
French socialists. And they have a concept of 
ultimately of a Europe that looks like France, in which 
the French bureaucracy has a role in regulation and the 
setting of standards and getting into certain social 
issues (like workers’ rights) and this sort of thing. 
And, it seems to me, that the more ambitious your 
goals, the less chance of your realizing it. Because 
the consensus for that type of thing does not exist. 
And I think that was the basis for Margaret Thatcher’s 
unhappiness with it.
And, I think, until you arrive to a greater degree 
of (and I think alot of the anti-Maastricht votes were 
not the result of some Neanderthal nationalism, but 
alot of, when it came right down to voting for 
Maastricht, alot of the European public supported the 
general concept of Europe. But alot of it means the way 
we are going to label our local wines is going to 
change, and some bureaucrat in Brussels is going to 
tell us how long of a sausage we can create, and do we 
really want this. And, I think, that is going to be a 
major stumbling block. And in the abstract, every 
national identity will want; [does not complete the 
sentence] every nation has a characteristic fiscal 
policy. That what really caused the currency crisis 
from last year. The Germans are incredibly tight fisted 
and they don’t like inflation and they have the 
internal and social discipline to run a very tough 
anti-inflationary policy. Whereas the Italians were 
never able to balance a budget in their national 
existence. [There is] something not very Italian about 
it.
And I think until you overcome this sort of thing; 
and they are not the most important differences in the 
world, in way you can see the same differences with the 
States in the United States. Obviously, out of those 
differences, some sort of federalism is possible. But
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whether it is the tight degree envisioned in 
Maastricht, or something is looser, it is going to be 
harder to do it.
GK: What is also required for a wider political 
Europe is for some foreign policy consensus. And the 
Europeans have never been able to pull that off.
FF: That’s for sure.
GK: Now this revolves around a clash of ideas as 
to how the world should look. It is the same case in 
the United States. You have what we might define as 
democrats and then , on the other hand, what we might 
be called Realists. And some of those ideas ...
FF: Yes, but some of that has to do with the 
constitutional structure. The Europe that is envisioned 
does not have a strong executive. And foreign policy 
has always had the problem of the executive v. the 
legislative branch. If, American foreign policy was 
made by Congress and there was no president our foreign 
policy would look like the EC. We would never get into 
war, we never do anything risky. . . and invest into the 
future. And I think that [there is a strong] case where 
you need a strong executive agent. For other reasons, 
Europe is not going to build that strong executive 
agent. Right now they have this unit veto system where 
any member can jinx any initiative that they got. If 
any one of the American states could veto any foreign 
policy cooked up by Washington, we would not have much 
of a foreign policy.
GK: I understand the foreign policy process. But 
in the West we have come to the crossroads as to where 
international relations should go, what type of world 
structure we want to create. And I think that I see a 
clash of ideas. Thatcher’s whole disagreement with 
Europe is the lack of common principles. And so long as 
you have state interests, it will be difficult to do 
anything.
FF: Well, maybe it is a bit harder to do that now 
because the whole world is in a broad transitional 
phase and it is very hard to understand what is going 
on. I am not sure that within the terms of the 
principles of foreign policy that there is a greater 
degree of disagreement than in the earlier times. There 
has always been this tension between realpolitik and a 
more idealistic one. It went all the way back to 
Colonial times. I think that it is permanent tension in 
foreign policy that won’t go away. Aid in that respect 
I do not think that is more confusing than it was 
during the Cold War. The world is certainly more 
confusing and you are right. It just now finding what 
organizations are appropriate to deal with it.
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GK: Given the critiques, given current events, are 
there any themes or points in The End of History and 
the Last Man you would write differently?
FF: Well, I think nationalism has gotten worse. 
There is still a transitional phase. These nationalisms 
have been suppressed and are coming out. But the model 
of the future will not be Serbia. Once these passions 
have been played out, the model will be like the EC and 
it may take a long time to happen. Eastern Europe will 
move towards Western Europe and not the reverse. The 
length of time that will take will be quite a long one.
GK: Essentially, in international relations there 
are no guarantees to anything. You are right in the 
sense that at the present moment there does not seem to 
be an alternative that can confront liberal democracy. 
But there has always been confrontations with liberal 
democracy since the beginning. The rise of Marxism was 
the result of a disagreement with liberal democracy. 
And there is no reason to believe that there could 
emerge a new disagreement. It seems as though nature 
has a way of perhaps starting history. There is 
uncertainty.
FF: Well, 1 accept that. That seems to be the 
message of the latter half of my book. We have not 
stopped at a random point. There are good reasons why 
large parts of the world are democratic; but whether if 
you could prove it was the End of History in the 
theoretical sense you have to show that there are no 
remaining contradictions that democracy cannot deal 
with. And that I think you cannot show frankly. There 
are parts of the human personality that are not going 
to be satisfied in a democratic society. Therefore will 
seek some form of expression that could be very 
dangerous to democracy.
GK: As you said in the book, there are forces 
within liberal democracy that could undermine the very 
principles we wish to uphold. Huntington wrote that 
there is nothing worse than the heretic.11 In a book 
review by R.E. Jones he notes that you seem to side 
with Leo Strauss rather than with Alexandre Kojeve 
regarding the problems of liberal democracy.12 Is the 
real hero of your book Strauss, not Kojeve?
FF: To a certain way, that is right. What Strauss 
said the defect of Kojeve’s argument is the Last Man. 
The creature that is produced in the historical process 
that is something less than human. And I think that 
ultimately Kojeve does not have a good answer to that.
11 Huntington, "No Exit: The Errors of Endism, 9.
12 R. E. Jones, "Thinking Big," Review of 
International Studies (1993),: 202.
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GK: What I find interesting is that you mention 
about pessimism in the first half of the book. You 
mention people like Jeane Kirkpatrick and Jean-Francois 
Revel. And then you go into the Last Man and all the 
problems that come with it you seem to come full 
circle. This pessimism makes the End of History a 
dubious enterprise. You would say that the question 
mark is very much there.
FF: That is a good way of putting it.
GK: I guess what I am asking is about the 
intention of writing the book. You certainly provide 
alot of empirical evidence for your argument. However, 
like the philosopher, you do not come to a final 
answer.
FF: Yes, I think that is right. The more important 
part of the book is not the empirical part, but the 
philosophical and normative. However, it is 
informative, in the sense of Hegel, that the issue is 
not for a group of graduate students to sit around in 
their dorm rooms to discuss what is the best regime in 
the world that they can imagine. The real question is 
the best regime has to answer in historical terms. That 
it is not the figment of someone’s imagination; you 
have to look at what ideas have been thought and tried. 
And then given the test of historical reality. And 
given that sort of test, liberal democracy seems to 
have a privileged position; but, ultimately I do not 
think you can answer that question simply empirically. 
You have to return to the normative. At that point, we 
would have to say that in the end you cannot tidy up 
all the loose ends. You can say why liberal democracy 
has been broadly appealing to many people; but it is 
not going to be appealing to all people at all times. 
Therefore, one cannot constitute a true end.
GK: If you read the End of History as a reader,
whati/ypur reaction be?
FF: I say it is a very good question.
326
APPENDIX B
IDENTIFIABLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE BY COUNTRY
£m 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
England 112,795 124,569 143,030 157,865 167,848
Wales 7,671 8,537 9, 553 10,944 11,372
N.Ireland. 5,930 6,121 6,704 7,295 7,802
Scotland 14,973 16,300 17,881 20,323 21,426
UK 141,368 155,527 177,169 196,427 208,448
IDENTIFIABLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE AS PERCENTAGE 
OF UNITED KINGDOM TOTAL
% 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
England 79.8 80.1 80.7 80.4 80.5
Wales 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.6 5.5
N.Ireland 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7
Scotland. 10.6 10.5 10.1 10.3 10.3
UK 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
IDENTIFIABLE GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PER HEAD BY
COUNTRY
£ per headl989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
England 2,373 2,612 2,990 3,263 3,458
Wales 2, 685 2, 971 3,315 3,376 3,913
N.Ireland 3,757 3,867 4,218 4,508 4,781
Scotland 2,939 3,202 3,505 3,976 4,185
UK 2,477 2,717 3, 086 3,386 3,582
(Source: The Scottish Office, Government Expenditure and 
Revenue in Scotland, 1993-94.)
327
NORTH OIL REVENUES
Year £billion Year
ofbillion
1979-80 2.3 1988-89 3.2
1980-9 3.7 1989-90 2.4
1981-82 6.5 1990-91 2.3
1982-83 7.8 1991-92 1.0
1983-84 8.8 1992-93 1.3
1984-85 12.0 1993-94 1.2
1985-86 11.3 1994-95 1.6
1986-87 4.8 1995-96 2.4
1987-88 4.6
GENERAL GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS IN SCOTLAND, 1993-94
United KingdomScottish Estimates Scotland as a 
percentage of UKatmillion million
Income Tax 58,400 4,600 7.9
Social Sec. 39,500 3,500 8.7
Contributions
Value Added 
Tax
38,900 3,300 8.6
Local
Authority
Revenue
21,200 2,000 9.3
All Other 
Revenue
72,000 7,000 9.7
Total 230,000 20,400 8.9
Revenue
(Source: Scottish Office, Government Expenditure and 
Revenue in Scotland, 1993-94.)
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THE ’’FISCAL DEFICIT” IN SCOTLAND AND 
IN 1993-1994
THE UNITED KINGDOM
Scotland United KingdomScotland as a
% of UK
Genera.! 28.4 283.5 10.0(5)
Government 
Expenditure 
(£ bn)
General 
Government 
Revenues 
(£ bn)
20.4 230.0 8.9
General 
Government 
Borrowing 
Requirements 
( £ bn)
8.1 53.5 15.1
GGBR as % 15
of GDP
(Source: The Scottish 
Revenue in Scotland,
8.5 -
Office, Government Expenditure and 
1993-1994.)
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